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ABSTRACT
SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND FAIR WEATHER FRIENDS:
LUSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1941-1951
by
Paula Celeste Gomes Noversa Rioux
University of New Hampshire, September, 2012
This dissertation analyzes the diplomatic relations between Portugal and
the United States from 1941 to 1951, a decade that resulted in a tremendous and
permanent shift in Luso-American relations. It examines the wartime and
postwar goals of both Portugal and the United States. It reveals how these two
nations overcame their differences during the war and worked towards mutually
beneficial ends after the war. Moreover this dissertation asserts that Antonio
Salazar, Portugal's Prime Minister, permanently altered Portuguese-American
relations and managed to supplant the assurances found in the flagging AngloPortuguese alliance with a series of American initiatives-the European Recovery
Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program.
Up until WW II, Portugal's oldest ally had been Great Britain. Beginning in
1373, their alliance brought them commercial, political, and military benefits.
Though never abandoning her commitments to Great Britain during WWII, the

xii

reality of Portugal's security needs—the fourth largest colonial empire of the
time-demanded the protection of a great naval power. Prior to World War II,
Luso-American relations were based on long, but tenuous, commercial ties and a
small steady Portuguese immigration stream to the United States. Portugal's
importance during WWII lay in her geographical position, particularly the Azores
archipelago. It soon became clear to the United States that the geopolitical
significance of Portugal, her Atlantic Islands, and her colonies would be felt for
decades to come.
This study is driven by an analysis of the national interests of Portugal and
the United States both during and after WWII. This thesis enhances the field of
Portuguese diplomatic historiography by examining this crucial decade in the
area of Luso-American relations, 1941-1951. Studying this diplomatically dense
period in Luso-American relations as a whole is fundamental to understanding
the Portuguese shift away from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance towards stronger
Luso-American relations. This study's significance also lies in the fact that, as a
post Cold War study of the period, it is not encumbered by superpower
analogies.

xiii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The year 1943 witnessed the first of a series of diplomatic actions
between the United States and Portugal which, within one decade, would
permanently alter the relationship between the two. At the start of 1943, the tide
had not yet turned in favor of the Allies in the Battle for the Atlantic. Their losses
were high. They needed the use of Portugal's Atlantic Islands for an airbase to
protect shipping lines from predatory German submarines. Yet, Portugal
understood that the Allies could offer no assurances. One misstep could spell
disaster for the Portuguese. They were vulnerable to the Germans, particularly
by air. Throughout the course of the war, several factors combined to preserve
Portuguese sovereignty: Portuguese neutrality, though conditional; Portuguese
geography and its importance to the Allies; Portugal's ability to draw Spain into a
neutral block; and, finally, Germany's decision not to invade Iberia. By
December of 1943, the Americans were granted the use of the Lagens airbase
on the island of Terceira, Azores—albeit under British command. Thus began
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the remarkable shift in relations between these two countries from one of
indifference and sometimes suspicion, to that of forbearance and even a sense
of necessity.
By 1952 Lisbon, at the request of the United States, was playing hostess
to a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) meeting. Dean Acheson,
U.S. Secretary of State, described the importance of this meeting in his work
Present at the Creation where he stated, "Lisbon was to be the supreme gamble
upon which we would stake our whole prestige, skill, and power."1 For Acheson,
the significance of the Lisbon meeting lay in the success of its American-driven
agenda. Key to that agenda was a discussion of the future role of Germany in
N.A.T.O. and German rearmament, which the United States thought essential for
the future defense of Europe but France was resisting. For Portugal, the
significance of the Lisbon meeting lay in the location of the meeting. Portugal
was a founding member of N.A.T.O. Hosting a N.A.T.O. meeting reaffirmed her
sense of prominence in the world, while membership in N.A.T.O. gave her
government political legitimacy, and favorable international status. After nearly
two centuries of periphery, Portugal was once again center stage.
To fully comprehend the changes that occurred in the relationship
between Portugal and the United States from 1941 to 1951, it is critical to
understand the rise and decline of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Six hundred
years in the making, this alliance was a quintessential part of Portugal's foreign
policy.

The alliance itself grew out of a common Atlantic perspective, was

1Dean

Achesori, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department (New York:
WW. Norton & Company Inc., 1969), 609.
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reinforced by a series of treaties and marriages, and was put to the test time and
again. Yet, in all that time, Portugal and Great Britain remained allies. It is not
until the advent of the Second World War that this unique relationship was
permanently altered. The circumstance that hastened this transformation was
the decline of British world influence—economic, political, and military—in the
face of ever-increasing American preeminence and the costs of two world wars.
Without a strong Atlantic partner, Portugal could not protect her empire. Thus, it
was only natural that when faced with an ally who could no longer protect her
interests, Portugal cautiously sought out another who was both willing and able.
Prior to World War II, Luso-American relations were based on long,
though tenuous commercial ties, as well as steady, though relatively small
Portuguese immigration streams to the United States.2 For the United States,
Portugal's importance during the Second World War lay in her geographical
position, particularly that of the Azores archipelago. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was made painfully aware of this during the first few years of the Battle
for the Atlantic where Allied losses at the hands of German submarines were
difficult to counter.
It soon became clear that the geopolitical significance of Portugal, her
Atlantic Islands, and her colonies would be felt for decades to come. Though
never abandoning her commitments to Great Britain, the reality of Portugal's
security needs demanded the protection of a great naval power. After all,

2The

prefix Luso means Portuguese. It is derived from the ancient Roman name for the
province of Lusitania. Its people were known as Lusitanians. For the purposes of this thesis the
terms Luso-American and Portuguese-American will be used interchangeably.
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Portugal had the fourth largest colonial empire of the time but did not have
sufficient resources to protect it. Thus, even after World War II, the global
repercussions of this new relationship would be keenly felt. The resultant
economic, political and military ties between Portugal and the United States were
remarkable.
In February of 1943, George Kennan wrote the following analysis for the
U.S. State Department:
Every great conflict between a major continental power and a major
extra-continental maritime power has found Portugal a bone of
contention between the two, if not a battle ground...Its security, in
consequence, has always depended on its ability to maneuver, to play
one force off against the other, to 'sell' itself to both belligerents in the
capacity of a neutral. But the success of this policy has depended in
turn on the firmness and astuteness of the regime in power in Lisbon.
And this—in view of the lack of a dependable and permanent ruling
class---has depended for the most part on chance."5

Assigned to the American Embassy in Lisbon, he was writing to explain
Portugal's position of neutrality in the face of ever increasing pressure by the
Allies for her cooperation. Although this assessment reflected an understanding
of Portugal's geopolitical situation, it did not reflect an understanding of the
broader historical context of those events. At best Kennan's evaluation portrays
Portugal as a weak power sacrificing her own interests to the interests of bigger
powers; at worst, it strips Portugal of her political will

3National

Archives, Record Group 59,Records of the Department of State, Letter, George
F. Kennan to Department of State, 4 February 1943; quoted in Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Price of
Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question and World War II [Part One]," Luso-Braziiian Review
23, n.s. 1 (Summer 1986): 110.
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This dissertation analyzes the diplomatic relations between Portugal and
the United States from 1941 to 1951. It demonstrates how the Portuguese play a
role in foreign affairs greater that their population or economy might suggest. It
examines the wartime and postwar goals of both Portugal and the United States,
and shows how these two nations overcame their differences during the war and
worked towards mutually beneficial ends after the war. This study reveals the
building blocks of Luso-American relations in the second half of the Twentieth
Century to be the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
Finally, this dissertation argues that policy makers in Portugal had a
coherent foreign policy plan. The Portugal's Estado Novo government was not
simply reacting to international events. They held fast to their wartime goals and,
after the war followed a policy meant to supplant the commercial, political, and
military assurances found in the centuries old Anglo Portuguese alliance with
those found in the E.R.P , N.A.T.O., and the M.D.A.P, Thus, primary to
understanding the Estado Novo's foreign policy is an understanding of the
elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, particularly those found in the treaties
of 1373, 1386, 1661, and 1703.

Methodology
This thesis will enhance the field of Portuguese diplomatic historiography
by examining a crucial decade in the area of Luso-American relations, 1941-

5

1951. Studying this diplomatically dense period in Luso-American relations as a
whole is fundamental to understanding the Portuguese shift away from the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance towards stronger Luso-American relations. This
study's significance also lies in the fact that, as a post Cold War study of the
period, it is not encumbered by superpower analogies, i.e. superpower vs. small
power.
At the start of the Second World War the United States was a capitalist
powerhouse, but its political and military influence was in large part limited to the
Western Hemisphere. It had great potential, but that potential was restricted by
the habit of clinging to certain Early Republic virtues such as the maintenance of
a small peacetime army and no "entangling alliances." Concurrently, Portugal
was a small continental power but a large colonial power with interests in both
Africa and Asia. Ironically, prior to the Second World War, the United States tried
its best to stay out of European political interests—and intrigues-worldwide,
whereas Portugal struggled to maintain some prominence in the same.
This study will be driven by an analysis of the national interests of Portugal
and the United States both during and after the Second World War. Portugal's
foreign policy decisions during World War II were meant to achieve her three key
wartime foreign policy goals. First and foremost, the Portuguese sought to
maintain Portuguese continental sovereignty. Second, Portugal acted to
preserve Iberian neutrality throughout the war. Finally, Portugal insisted on the
defense of her colonial empire. Meanwhile, as a belligerent, the United States
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had winning the war at the lowest cost in American casualties as her primary
goal.
After the Second World War, Portugal sought to fulfill of her postwar
foreign policy goals. The Portuguese government wanted to secure a place in
the postwar European economy. She needed to not only maintain her
continental sovereignty, but also preserve her empire. Lastly, she wanted to
modernize her armed forces—i.e. better weapons, and better training. This
dissertation will contend that these goals were unattainable via Portugal's waning
Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The political and military guarantees of the AngloPortuguese treaties of 1373, 1386, and 1661 and the commercial guarantees
inherent to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1703 could no longer be met by the
British. Instead, Portugal met these goals by participating in a series of American
initiatives-the European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
For the United States, postwar goals were evolving throughout the war.
Many of the ideals inherent in the Atlantic Charter were lost to the realities of the
Cold War. In the end, the United States had two Key postwar goals. First, she
desired an economically strong capitalist Western Europe to thwart the possibility
of communist subversion in the region. America also wanted to contain the
expansion of the Soviet Union. In order to achieve these goals, the United
States entered into a new dynamic diplomatic era in which she assumed a
leadership role. For the first time in her history, America linked the long-term
economic, political and military stability of Western Europe with her own future.

7

As a result of this new vision she initiated several multinational programs meant
to secure the stability of Western Europe—the European Recovery Program, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
The archival sources which drive this dissertation were found in Portugal
and in the United States. The Torre do Tombo in Lisbon, Portugal is the main
national archive of Portugal. Located in Lisbon as well, the Arquivo do Ministerio
de Negocios Estrangeiros (AMNE) is separate from the national archive, and is
home to the records of Portugal's Foreign Ministry Nearly all of the Portuguese
archival documents in this dissertation were found at the A.M.N.E. Most of these
documents are part of the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, D.C. Collection.
The vast majority of the American archival documents came from the National
Archives at College Park, Maryland. These documents included the Records of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Records of the Department of State, the Records of
the Office of Strategic Services as well as a few documents from the Records of
the Treasury. Other sources, such as Records of the Central Intelligence
Agency, were found at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. Beside
the archival sources there were many collections of public documents used. For
the war years (1939-1945), Foreign Relations of the United States was essential
to this study as was Dez Anos de Politica Externa.

Historiography

8

Until recently, Portuguese historians have shown little interest in their
nation's diplomatic relations. Probably the best-known Portuguese diplomatturned-scholar is Franco Nogueira. He published a number of books on
twentieth century foreign relations topics such as Portugal and the United
Nations, and the Portuguese-African colonial wars. Interestingly, Nogueira's
study of the Portuguese African colonies, The Third World (London: Johnson,
1967) included a "Foreword" by Dean Acheson. His most recent scholarship, a
multivolume biography of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (Portuguese Prime
Minister/Dictator, 1933-1968), quickly became the definitive Portugueselanguage biography of Salazar.4
In terms of an English-language biography of Salazar, Filipe Ribeiro de
Meneses' recent work, Salazar, a Political Biography, stands alone. His
outstanding use of the Salazar Archive at the Torre do Tombo combined with an
easy writing style have resulted in a what is sure to become the classic study in
the life of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Meneses' focus on domestic pressures
and how those issues come to bear on the foreign policy decisions of Salazar,
even at the height of World War II, offer an interesting perspective on both the
man and his policies

5

The state of diplomatic history in Portugal began to change in the mid
1980s. In his work, Portugal e as Regencias de Argel, Tunes e Tripoli, Fernando

"The original titles by Franco Nogueira cited above are: As Nagoes Unidas e Portugal:
Estudo (Lisbon: Atica, 1962); Dialogos Iriterditos (Lisbon: Intervengao, 1979) and Salazar:
Estudo Biografico 6 vols. (Coimbra: Atlantida Editora, 1977 -1985). Although a biography, this
work devotes quite a bit of time to foreign policy analysis, particularly from 1936-1944 when
Salazar intermittently took over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War.
5Filipe

Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar, A Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books, 2009.
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de Castro Brandao stated that as early as the 1970s he had argued before the
faculty of the History Department at the University of Lisbon for the promotion of
monographs dealing with Portuguese diplomatic history.6 In the next decade,
both descriptive and analytical signed articles or chapters began appearing in
major Portuguese reference works, e.g. Franco Nogueira," A Politica Externa," a
chapter in Historia de Portugal, II Supplemento (Porto: Livraria Civilizapao,
1981). These early works really set the stage for what was to come.
No discussion of Portuguese diplomatic historiography would be complete
without a succinct examination of Nuno Severiano Teixeira's work. He has
published extensively in the field of Portuguese foreign affairs and has
contributed greatly to the study of nineteenth and twentieth century Portuguese
history. His chapter in Antonio Costa Pinto's work, Modem Portugal is of
historiographical significance because Teixeira is clearly attempting to go beyond
the narrative when he argues:
Portugal is both a European and an Atlantic country. As a small,
semi-peripheral power with only one land border, it has always
experienced an unstable geopolitical balance, caught between the
devil of continental pressure and—literally—the deep blue sea.
Geopolitical conditions, as well as the constant search for balance,
have informed the strategic options and historical characteristics of
Portuguese foreign policy.7

6

Fernando de Castro Brandao, Portugal e as Regencias de Argel, Tunes e Tripoli:
Subsidios para a Historia Diplomatics Portuguesa (Porto: Secretaria de Estado da Emigragao,
1985), 9
7Nuno

Severiano Texeira," Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese Foreign Policy,
1890-1986," in Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture, ed. Antonio Costa Pinto,
2nd edition, (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, 2011), 95.
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Teixeira interprets the historically difficult geopolitical position that Portugal is in
vis-a-vis her location along the Atlantic and her shared border with Spain. He
then applies that struggle within Portugal's national conscious to be either
European or Atlantic to Portugal's long-term foreign policy decisions.8
Another diplomat turned scholar is Jose Calvet de Magalhaes. Beginning
his diplomatic career just after World War II as Portuguese Consul in New York
City, he experienced a stellar career in the Portuguese diplomatic corps and is
currently Visiting Lecturer at the Universidade Nova in Lisbon. He has published
too many books and articles to list here. Of most interest to this dissertation was
his work, Portugal: an Atlantic Paradox. This succinct but intriguing co-authored
work was meant to spur interests in the study of Luso-American relations on both
sides of the Atlantic. The authors argue that one of the key historiographical
problems in the field of Luso-American relations in that they tend to be limited to
geopolitical studies, which they contend has resulted in a general lack of
understanding between the people of both nations.9

"Teixeira's titles include: 0 Poder e a Guerra, 1914-1918: Objectivos Nacionais e
Estrategias Politicas na Entrada de Portugal na Grande Guerra (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa,
1996); Portugal e a Guerra: Historia das Intervengdes Militares Portuguesas nos Grandes
Conflitos Mundias, seculos XIX-XX (Lisbon: Edigoes Colibri, 1998); A Primeira Republica
Portuguesa: entre o Liberalismo e o Autoritarlsmo, in coordination with Antonio Costa Pinto
(Lisbon: Edigoes Colibri, 2002); and A. Barreto and M. F. Monica, Dicionario de Histdria de
Portugal, vol. IX, Suplemento P/Z (Porto: Figueirinhas, 2000), s.v. "Politica Externa," by Nuno
Severiano Teixeira.
"Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva. Portugal: An
Atlantic Paradox, Portuguese/US Relations after the EC Enlargement. Lisbon: IEEl, 1990. Avery
interesting, though brief, work that seeks to combine and reveal both Magalhaes diplomatic experience
with his academic insights is Conversas com Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Europeistas e I solacionistas na
Politica Externa Portuguesa (Lisbon: Editorial Bizancio, 2005) by Alvaro de Vasconcelos. Through a
series of interviews Vasconcelos questions Magalhaes regarding these two elements in post-WWII
Portuguese foreign relations — Europeanists v. Isolationists

11

Portuguese diplomatic studies of Luso-American World War II era
diplomacy have focused on the negotiations over the development and use of the
Lagens and Santa Maria bases in the Azores Jose Freire Antunes distinguished
himself by being the first to attempt a broader series focusing on Luso-American
relations. Os Americanos e Portugal, was initially intended to analyze the course
of Portuguese-American foreign relations from 1941 to 1976. Presently, he has
published three volumes in that series, Os Anos de Richard Nixon, 1969-1974
(Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1986), Kennedy e Salazar: o Leao e a Raposa (Lisbon:
Difusao Cultural, 1991), and Nixon e Caetano, Promessas e Abandono (Lisbon:
Difusao Cultural, 1992). These volumes detail the diplomatic relations between
the United States and Portugal from 1961 to 1976.
Antunes also published Roosevelt Churchill e Salazar a Luta pelos
Agores (Lisbon: Ediclube, 1995) which should have been a part of the Os
Americanos e Portugal series but was instead published as a separate
monograph. This series garnered Antunes a great deal of publicity in Portugal
when it was first published because of its polemic analysis of contemporary
political figures such as Mario Soares—then President of Portugal. Here in the
United States, Antunes was praised because of his extensive use of American
classified documents, and his grasp of the workings of the United States
diplomatic corps.10 This monograph argues that, although Great Britain did
everything possible to convince the United States to enter the Second World
War, once the United States had entered the war Britain realized she had

10Howard

J. Wiarda, review of Os Anos de Richard Nixon, 1969-1974, by Jose Freire
Antunes, in Luso-Brazilian Review 25, n.s. 2 (Winter 1988), 117-119.
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awakened a sleeping giant and would pay for the consequences of that act with
an ever-diminishing role in world affairs. Antunes uses the negotiations over the
Lagens base in the Azores as a case study of that developing rivalry between the
United States and Great Britain.
Luis Nuno Rodrigues has also written a focused study on the negotiations
between the United States and Portugal for the establishment of a base in the
Azores, No Coragao do Atlantico,11 In this work he argues that the signing of the
1944 Accord between the United States arid Portugal constituted both a point of
arrival and a point of departure for the two nations. This was a point of arrival
because it marked the conclusion of a long series of negotiations. It was also
point of departure because this Accord allowed American Armed Forces direct
access to the Azores, a situation which has continued uninterrupted to this day.
This dissertation differs from both Antunes' and Rodrigues' works on
several levels. First, this work does not use the Azores base negotiations as a
case study for understanding the relationship between two other powers—i.e the
United States and Great Britain—as does Antunes. Second, unlike Rodrigues'
study, this work does not limit itself to one event in Luso-American relations.
This dissertation contends that to understand the development of Luso-American
relations during World War Two it is not enough to simply study the bilateral (or
trilateral) events of the time in isolation. The declaration of neutrality by Portugal,
the strategic importance of the Azores, and the rise of American naval

11Luis Nuno Rodrigues, No Coragao do Atlantico: Os Estados Unidos e os Agores
(1939-1948) Defesa e Relagoes Internacionais (Lisbon: Prefacio-Edigao de Livros e Revistas,
Lda., 2005).
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dominance are all simply the elements of this complicated story. In and of
themselves, they do not make up the history of Portuguese-American relations
during WWII. There is more at play here because during the war every
government involved was thinking of and planning for their postwar roles. Thus,
although these studies offer a good analysis of the events that they narrate, by
the very nature of their focus they cannot see the broader diplomatic picture. In
contrast, this thesis argues that the only way to fully understand Luso-American
relations in the mid-twentieth century is to analyze a broader length of time taking
into account both the wartime and postwar interests of both Portugal and the
United States.
In terms of American historiography, Luso-American relations is usually
relegated to a footnote, a few paragraphs of a chapter in a work dealing with the
history of World War II, or a brief journal article. American historians tend to
focus on the Big Four, and the subsequent Cold War. Even the recent interest in
the wartime neutrals has been limited to Switzerland and its banking scandal.12
Most recently, David Reynolds has emerged as one of the leading
scholars in World War Two diplomacy. His study, From Munich to Pearl Harbor,
offers a keen analysis on the formation of President Roosevelt's foreign policy
and his abilities to shape Allied policy. Reynolds argues that Roosevelt's foreign

12There

are only three exceptions to this rule. The first is the dissertation by Jerry K.
Sweeney, "United States' Policy toward Portugal during the Second World War" (Ph.D. diss.,
Kent State University, 1970). The second is "American Foreign Policy and the Portuguese
Territories" (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, 1975) by Andrew R. Raposa. The third,
twenty-five years later, is the dissertation by Luis Nuno Rodrigues, "To the 'Top of the Mountain'
and 'Down to the Valley': The United States and Portugal during the Kennedy Presidency" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2000).
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policy reflected a combination of both geopolitics and ideology. Geopolitics is
described as "an expanded geography of U.S. security." Reynolds identifies
American ideology as "the assertion of U.S. principles of liberal, capitalist
democracy." Furthermore, Reynolds argued "FDR insisted with growing fervor
that, in the age of airborne warfare, the world could and did threaten America,"13
This dissertation builds upon this perspective noting that the very reason for
America's continued interest in Portugal after the war was precisely because of
her Atlantic islands and the strategic value that they added to N.A.T.O. as a
whole and to America's new airborne vulnerability.
Without question, the leading American Cold War historian is John Lewis
Gaddis. His most recent monograph on the subject is The Cold War: A New
History. In this work Gaddis looks at the Cold War as a whole. He admits that
there is nothing new in terms of interpretation when he argues that conflicting
ideologies were the basis for and the constant within the Cold War. He argues
that this assessment, however, comes from looking at the Cold War from start to
finish, something he was not able to do when he first began writing about the
Cold War. Looking at this historical event from this perspective, he said,
"produced new ways of looking at its parts."14 This dissertation follows that line
of logic when it agues that only by examining Luso-American relations from
1941-1951 can the interconnectedness of the events fully understood.

IJ David

Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the
Second World War, The American ways Series (Chicago: Ivan R Dee. 2001), 4.
'"John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), xi.

15

In the United States, the most common venue for an historical discussion
of Portuguese-American relations is a journal article. Here two American
historians stand out, Douglas L. Wheeler of the University of New Hampshire and
Jerry K. Sweeney of South Dakota State University. Both scholars have
published articles on the subject of Portuguese-American relations since the
1970s. Wheeler's focus has been the political aspects of Luso-American
diplomacy. Meanwhile, Sweeney has concentrated on the strategic aspects of
the relationship.15
Otherwise, it is the social scientists—political scientists and economists—
on both sides of the Atlantic who have found this topic worthy of lengthy study.
Beginning in the 1970s, a series of books and articles was published by authors
such as Howard Wiarda in the United States, Luc Crollen in Brussels, and, more
recently, Fernanda Rollo in Portugal. In each case the author used Portugal as a
case study in small power geopolitical strategy, i.e. how does a small power
maintain itself as a sovereign nation in a world community which is divided by
two superpowers?
Although the works listed above were significant to this study in terms of
the narrative and as sources for further study, none of the monographs served as

15For

the purposes of this study, several articles by Douglas L. Wheeler stand out: "The
Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II [Part One]," Luso-Brazilian
Review XXIII, n.s 1 (1986): 107-127; "The Price of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question,
and World War II [Part Two]," Luso-Brazilian Review XXIII, n.s. 2 (1986): 97-111; and "The
Azores and the United States (1787-1987): Two Hundred Years of Shared History," Boletim do
Instituto Histdrico da llha Terceira 45, n.s. 1 (1987): 55-71. Jerry Sweeney has also written
several key articles: "Portugal, the USA and Aviation," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 9
(1972): 77-84; "The Framework of Luso-American Diplomatic Relations during the Second World
War," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 10 (1973): 93-100; and, most recently, "A Matter
of Small Consequence: U S Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor," Independent
Review 7.1 (Summer 2002): 91-102.
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a historiographical model for this study. As a work of historical inquiry, as
opposed to one of political science or economics, the approach to this topic
differs dramatically from that of the social scientists listed above. In this study,
Portugal is not viewed as a case study, a paradigm for understanding the
behavior of other small powers, nor is the United States viewed as motivated
exclusively by issues of power and dominance.
It also differs from the works of historical inquiry heretofore mentioned for
a variety of reasons. First, this study probes the historical elements that
comprised the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance because they are essential to
understanding traditional Portuguese national interests and the formation of her
foreign policy. Ultimately, those elements will serve as a standard by which
Luso-American postwar relations can be judged.

Second, this thesis examines

this period as a whoie, not as a series of significant, yet segmented, independent
events. World War II, the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program are all significant events of the twentieth century, worthy of
individual study. Yet, studied separately, they cannot show the dynamic shift that
was taking place in Luso-American relations Finally, Portuguese-American
relations from 1941 to 1951 are examined within the context of their respective
national interests. By 1951, the United States had in place several key
multinational organizations which they hoped would ensure the development of
an economically stable and peaceful Western Europe. Concurrently, Portugal
had supplanted the then flagging Anglo-Portuguese alliance with a series of
multilateral agreements that served the same economic, political, and military
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purpose. These agreements laid the foundation for stronger Luso-American
relations in the second half of the Twentieth Century.

Outline
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter defines the
thesis. It presents the methodology used. It speaks to the historiography of the
period, and serves as a chapter outline of this study.
Chapter two offers a succinct analysis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance
from the fourteenth century up to the creation of Portugal's New State regime in
the 1930s. During this six hundred year period numerous treaties were signed,
marriages were made, and economic ties were formed between Great Britain
and Portugal. This chapter focuses on four essential Anglo-Portuguese treaties1373, 1386, 1661, and 1703. Established in 1373, the political and military
elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance are renewed and strengthened with
the signing of the 1386 treaty and the consequent marriage between the two
royal houses. The Treaty of 1661 expands the both the political and military
obligations of both parties to include their colonial empire. Finally, the Treaty of
1703 sets the commercial standard for both parties for nearly a century after.
Consequently, an analysis of these four treaties reveals the political, military and
commercial elements of this alliance.
In the mid nineteenth century, the African colonial issue began to put a
strain on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The second half of Chapter two studies
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the growing distance between the two peoples. In 1890, the British Ultimatum
challenged the alliance bringing the two nations to the brink of war. By the early
twentieth century, it became clear to the Portuguese that the Anglo-Portuguese
alliance was deeply flawed. Accordingly, Portugal began to reassess this
alliance and weigh her options. It is only at the end of World War II that a
possible substitute for Great Britain emerged. By chapter's end the reader will
fuliy understand both the essential components of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance
and its significance in terms of meeting Portugal's foreign policy goals. This is
vital in order to comprehend the postwar shift that occurs in Luso-American
relations.
Chapter three considers the relative lack of formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and Portugal prior to the nineteenth century. In place
of formal diplomatic relations, traditional commercial interests and migratory
streams linked these two nations. These economic and social ties date back to
the 1700s and form the basis of early Portuguese-American relations. This study
clearly reveals how a promising start in Luso-American relations turned sour
when American diplomats failed to follow international protocol during early treaty
negotiations. This led to a period of scant diplomatic relations, as both parties
realized that neither served their foreign policy goals. For the Americans,
Portugal was an imperial power who could not see beyond her need to protect
her colonial interests. For the Portuguese, the American example of successful
colonial revolt was a real threat to her control over her South American colony,
Brazil. This chapter then turns its attention to Portuguese-American relations

19

from the nineteenth century to the 1930s. During this contentious period in
Portuguese history, diplomatic relations between the two countries was still
weak.

Although Portugal was a republic by 1910, this political change had

come at a radical cost. There was a dramatic rise in political and social violence
within Portugal prior tc the establishment of the republic, the most notable being
the assassination of Portugal's king and his heir in 1S08. Although the United
States recognized the new government, she certainly was not enthusiastic in her
support for what was the third European republic—France and Switzerland being
the other two. Even co-belligerency during the First World War failed to bring
these Atlantic powers any closer together.
Chapter four sets the stage for the shift in Portuguese-American relations
by surveying Portuguese diplomatic affairs during the early years of World War II.
Portugal declared her neutrality at the request of Great Britain, a neutrality to be
understood within the constraints of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Thus, she
was publicly neutral while, privately, she acted as an Allied collaborator. Walking
a fine line between the interests of the belligerents was not a new strategy for
Portugal. Her ability to maintain her position of neutrality while negotiating the
sale of wolfram to all parties while concurrently directing the protracted secret
negotiations for the development of a military airbase in the Azores for the Allies
speaks volumes to the deft skill of her diplomats.
Meanwhile, the United States was granted access to the Lagens airbase
in the Azores although it would remain under the control of the British for the
duration of the war. This period was remarkably frustrating for American
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negotiators because they chose to pursue diplomacy with Portugal through the
prism of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, i.e. they allowed the British to take the
lead on all negotiations with Portugal. This method resulted in dissatisfaction for
the Americans. It also left the Portuguese suspicious of American wartime
intentions, since they were never privy to them.
Chapter five offers an analysis the key events in Luso-American relations
during the latter half of the war. America's early frustration with the negotiations
for the use of the Lagens base in the Azores led to direct talks between the
Americans and the Portuguese. From the American perspective, the purpose of
the talks was to secure the right to construct and use another airbase in the
Azores-this time in Santa Maria—which would come under the direct command
of American forces. For the Portuguese, the negotiations for the base revolved
around the issue of the liberation of Portuguese Timor. The Japanese had
occupied Portuguese Timor. The Portuguese desire to participate in this Allied
action became one of her key wartime goals, and the cornerstone of the Santa
Maria negotiations. The completion of this treaty was the first step towards a
permanent alteration in Portuguese-American relations.
Chapter six explores post World War II Luso-American relations by
examining three major events. These events were: first, the offer of Marshall
Plan funds to Portugal; second, the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; and third, the establishment of a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact
between Portugal and the United States. This chapter examines the rationale in
Portugal that led her to participate in the Marshall Plan, but opt out of receiving
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funding during its first year. The Portuguese chose to do so in order to allow
other nations who were in more dire financial straights than they to gain
immediate access to Marshall Plan funds. The decisions made by the
Portuguese government clearly reflect that something other than economic
determinants were at play. Instead, the Portuguese were trying to place
themselves in a stronger political position in relation to the United States.
Chapter six then probes one of the pivotal moments of the twentieth
century, the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United
States led the fight for Portugal's admittance to N.A.T.O. as a founding member.
Portugal's status was based on strategic necessity Her Atlantic Islands were
seen as vital to both American air and naval interests. Her vast colonial
possessions were an added bonus. On the other hand, in terms of international
standing, Portugal had everything to gain and nothing to lose by her involvement
in N.A.T.O. Becoming a founding member of N.A.T.O. satisfied each of
Portugal's postwar goals.
Finally, chapter six also considers the impact of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Pact between the United States and Portugal. At face value, this
treaty satisfied Portugal's colonial security needs. What had once been
safeguarded by the British Royal Navy would now be protected by the United
States Armed Forces. Concurrently, this satisfied America's strategic needs in
her new role as protector of the free world. Moreover, this military component
completes the shift from the British-centered alliance to a new Americancentered alliance which would furnish Portugal with the military equipment and
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military expertise that she needed—something that for centuries had been the
role of the British.
The final chapter assesses the shift in Portuguese-American relations in a
post World War II world. For the United States the events of World War II
resulted in a tremendous change in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in terms of
American military involvement on a global scale. Indeed, this change was
indicative of the post war shift in the balance of power worldwide. For Portugal,
however, World War II was not nearly the watershed event that it was for the
United States. After World War II, Portugal found a willing substitute for her old
ally in the United States. Portugal may have changed partners, but she was still
dancing to the same tune, i.e. she had found a means by which to meet her
economic, political and military needs. This dissertation will then conclude with a
concise examination of Luso-American relations since 1951.
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CHAPTER I!

OLDEST ALLIES

"I have an announcement to make to the House arising out of the treaty
signed between this country and Portugal in the year 1373..."1 So began Prime
Minister Winston Churchill's statement to Parliament on 12 October 1943
regarding the recently finalized secret negotiations between Great Britain and
Portugal for the use of certain military facilities in the Azores. In his work, The
Second World War, Churchill reflected,
I spoke in a level voice, and made a pause to allow the House to take
in the date, 1373. As this soaked in, there was something like a gasp.
I do not suppose any such continuity of relations between two Powers
has ever been, or will ever be, set forth in the ordinary day-to-day
work of British diplomacy.2
Indeed, Portugal and England have enjoyed the longest alliance between two
nation states in the world. The expansion of this relationship was vital to the
development of Portugal's foreign policy over the centuries. They first gained

1Winston

S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 5, Closing the Ring (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 165.
2lbid.

24

each other's respect as brothers-in-arms during the Crusades. Then, beginning
with the treaty of 1373, these two nations chose to bind their country's futures
time and again by periodically renewing their ties of fr iendship and perpetual
alliance. These bonds were deepened by frequent marriages among the
aristocracy of both realms. They also shared a common Atlantic experience,
including a rather stellar maritime history. Finally, they often shared common
continental enemies—Spain and, sometimes, France. Throughout the centuries,
Portugal and England have experienced substantia! political, commercial and
strategic advantages because of this partnership. Nevertheless, at times, they
have also had to pay a great price for the distinctive moniker—oldest allies.3

Strange Bedfeiiows
At first glance, no two European nations could seem more dissimilar in
both tradition and history than Portugal and Great Britain. Beside the obvious
linguistic differences, Portugal and Great Britain have dissimilar religious,
political, social and economic histories. Portugal was a distinctly Roman Catholic
nation born of the Reconquista and the Crusades and, later, home to the
Inquisition.4 Although England began as a Roman Catholic nation and sacrificed

3Douglas

L. Wheeler, Historical Dictionary of Portugal (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press,

1993), 37.
4The Reconquista, or Reconquest, refers to that part of the Crusades in which Christian
knights fought against the armies of Islam in an effort to retake iberia. Initiated in 711 A.D. by the
assault on Iberia by the Moors, this period of Reconquest ends in 1492 when the Isiamic
Kingdom of Granada falls to King Ferdinand.
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many soldiers to the Crusades, by the sixteenth century she was a decidedly
Protestant nation. After the Catholic Reformation, these religious differences
became the root of some friction, not between the two governments per se, but
between their peoples. This uneasy state of affairs was most keenly felt by the
merchant families of both realms who, for commercial purposes, sometimes had
to take up residence in the other kingdom.5
Another distinction between the two powers was their respective political
developments. Portuguese law was founded upon Reman Law, which helped
shape her political tradition. The father ruled the family with absolute authority.
Likewise/the Portuguese king ruled as an absolute monarch. Only in the midnineteenth century, after the Peninsular War and nearly a decade of fratricidal
civil war, did Portugal become a constitutional monarchy. On the other hand,
England spearheaded the Liberal movement. From the recognition of the Magna
Carta in 1215 by the English monarchy to the publication of John Locke's
"Second Treatise on Civil Government" (1690), no other western nation so clearly
expressed and executed the concept of a constitutional monarchy heid in check
by the-rule of law. This dissimilarity in political development became yet another
barrier to understanding or sympathy between these two peoples.6
In terms of social and economic development, again there is a clear
difference between the two nations that can be traced back to Portugal's

5L.
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Germanic heritage.7 In Portuguese families, when the father died, property was
divided equally amongst his male heirs, which is a Germanic tradition. This
tradition led to the splintering of both wealth and political power. Traditionally,
the aristocracy did not pay taxes on their lands, instead, taxes were paid by the
lower classes. This tax system reinforced the traditional medieval distinctions
between the upper and lower classes, or the nobles and the peasants. It also
discouraged members of the nobility from engaging in commerce because that
would then require them to pay taxes. In great contrast, since the twelfth
century, British Common Law enforced the system of primogeniture which gave
the first-born son the right to all titles and properties held by the father. Younger
sons were then compelled tc find other occupations—service to the crown or
commerce. Regardless of station or occupation, everyone paid taxes. There
also was no social stigma attached to participating in trade. Thus, in Great
Britain, members of the aristocracy often directed the interests of their younger
sons to the business world.8
One nation developed into a Roman Catholic, absolutist kingdom whose
aristocracy held fast to the medieval concept of a rigidly stratified society and, as
a result, developed a great disdain for engaging in commercial activities.
Meanwhile, the other became a Protestant, Liberal constitutional monarchy
whose aristocracy played an active, though not exclusive, role in its nation's
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commercial development. Yet, throughout these disparate developments the two
governments remained true to the spirit, if not always the letter, of their alliance.
The Anglo-Portuguese alliance can be divided into four distinct phases. At
the beginning of the relationship, these aliies were equals in terms of political
standing and overall military strength. For most of the 16th century, Portugal held
the upper hand because her navy's strength far surpassed that of England. That
all changed rather abruptly in 1580 when King Philip II of Spain gained the
Portuguese crown and secured it for his heirs until 1640. After 1640, Portugal
emerged independent but greatly weakened, it is during this second phase that
the formal relationship between the two kingdoms deepened with not only
renewed defensive treaties, but also several commercial treaties. The third
phase begins and ends in the nineteenth century, a century in which Portugal
was at its political nadir, while Britannia ruled the seas. True to her word, Great
Britain came to Portugal's aid and defended her shores many times. Ironically,
the price of this defense was that for the rest of the century Portugal was a virtual
dependent of Great Britain. Finally, the last phase of the Anglo-Portuguese
alliance began in 1890 and continues until today. This was a period of initial
disillusionment between the two allies rooted in conflicting African interests. Had
it not been for the challenges of World War I and World War II the alliance might
have ended then and there. Instead, it has mellowed like a good, tawny port into
a comfortable undemanding friendship.
This chapter examines the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance from the fourteenth
through the early twentieth centuries. For the purposes of this dissertation it is
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not necessary to study in detail the long and complex diplomatic history that
shaped this alliance. Instead this chapter offers an analysis of four treaties1373, 1386, 1661 and 1703-which formally bound the two nations together. The
first three treaties reveal the political and military elements that are fundamental
to this alliance. The latter was a commercial treaty that laid the foundation for
Anglo-Portuguese trade in the eighteenth century. These treaties are examined
within their historical context—i.e. the overall European political setting, the
societal connections, and even the familial bonds. The focus of the chapter then
shifts to a study of the crisis of 1890, the British Ultimatum. This event
challenged the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and nearly brought these two realms
to the brink of war. Although the Alliance survived it was greatly weakened. The
challenges of World War I and continued rivalry iri the African continent only
served to remind Portugal that her oldest ally could no longer meet her security
interests—i.e. the preservation of both continental sovereignty and empire.

The Ties that Bind
With the Cross of Saint George Inscribed on Their Hearts.
From the Crusades to the Hundred Years War
Although it was the Treaty of 1373 which initiated the formal diplomatic
ties between England and Portugal, the main historic event that began the socialmilitary connection between these two realms was the Crusades. It was not
uncommon for crusaders en route to the Holy Land to put into port at the mouth
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of the Douro River before continuing on their way to Palestine. In his part of the
Reconquest efforts in Iberia, King Afonso Henriques often requested the aid of
these same crusaders. In his first strike at Lisbon (1140), he received the aid of
a fleet of seventy ships. Originally bound for Palestine, these English and
Norman crusaders agreed to help the new King. The combined attack resulted in
the sacking of Lisbon's surrounding areas and the payment of tribute to the
Portuguese King, but no decisive victory.9
Seven years and many successful campaigns later, Afonso Henriques
was in a better position to take the city of Lisbon from the Moors. As good
fortune would have it just before the start of this new expedition, a fleet of 164
vessels arrived in the Douro carrying three groups of crusaders: English;
Germans; and Flemish and Boulogners. King Afonso Henriques appealed to
these crusaders to join him in the fight. In recompense, he offered them all the
spoils of the city and land to any crusader who wished to stay in Portugal. The
siege of Lisbon resulted in a great victory for the Portuguese. As for the
crusaders, more than a few took the King up on his promise and settled near
Lisbon. After the siege of Lisbon, it was also not uncommon for Gilbert, Bishop
of Lisbon, to travel to England to preach the Crusade in Iberia. Consequently, by
the time Faro was taken in 1249 and the Kingdom of Portugal had reached her
modern boundaries, Portuguese and English knights had formed strong bonds in
Iberia based on blood and sacrifice in the name of the Christian God.10

9Livermore,
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The formal beginning of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance is set against the
drama of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). A series of dynastic marriages
between the royal houses of England and France set the stage for this
complicated and protracted series of hostilities. Thus, when the male line of the
French Capetian dynasty ended with the death of Charles IV in 1328, King
Edward III of England laid claim to the throne. As the nephew of Charles IV and
the grandson of Philip IV (the Fair), Edward III was a legitimate pretender to the
French throne. Nevertheless, the French nobility preferred Philip of Valois as
their next monarch.
As both claimants searched for allies throughout the continent to
strengthen both their political and their military positions, the kingdom of Castile
and Leon became increasingly significant. What attracted these adversaries to
Castile was her naval fleet. Designed by Genoese experts, Castilian galleys
were fast and maneuverabie. Unlike their French and English counterparts, the
Castilian fleet was commanded by experienced and professional captains and
admirals. Thus, a treaty with Pedro I, King of Castile, would bring with it an
immediate military advantage.11 Pedro, however, had his own domestic troubles
which resulted in his death in 1369 by his brother's own hand. Enrique of
Trastamara was now King Enrique II of Castile.12
King Enrique II thus set about the task of meeting his obligations to France
while also securing the legitimist towns—i.e. those towns who still showed

"Russell, 5.
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support for other legitimate pretenders to the crown-within his reign. The latter
was no easy task for there were others who claimed the legitimate right to the
title, King of Castile. These pretenders openly courted the loyalties of these
towns. Amongst them were John, Duke of Lancaster, and Fernando, King of
Portugal.
Pedro died with no surviving sons. However, he left two daughters,
Constanza and Isabella. Constanza was the eldest of the two and, therefore,
next in line for the throne. A widower, John of Lancaster wasted no time in
arranging a marriage between himself and the Infanta, Dona Constanza. They
were married in Roquefort in September of 1371. By early December, the Duke
and new Duchess of Lancaster, along with Dona Isabella, were off the continent
and safely back on English soil. Once there, John immediately added King of
Castile and Leon to his titles.

13

Meanwhile, as the nephew of King Pedro of Castile, King Fernando of
Portugal (1367-1383) was yet another legitimate pretender to the throne of
Castile and Leon. Unfortunately, he was also young, impetuous, and easily
manipulated. In his sixteen-year reign, he managed to squander much of the
royal coffers and earn the ire of the people of Lisbon. During his brief reign,

13John's brother, the Earl of Cambridge would later marry Isabella. See C.H. Williams,
"The Expedition of John of Gaunt to the Peninsula," in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations,
ed. Edgar Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1935; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1971), 32.

32

Fernando made and then broke a series of treaties, including the first political
treaty between Portugal and England.14
The treaty of peace, friendship and alliance was initiated by King
Fernando and Queen Leonor of Portugal to King Edward III of England, and
signed in London by their respective representatives on 16 June 1373. Each
party was clearly named and their respective titles reveal much about the
ongoing regional conflicts. King Fernando was rightly referred to as the King of
Portugal and Algarve. King Edward III was named King of England and France.
Finally, there was a reference made to the affection between the Portuguese
monarchs and the King's son, John, King of Castile and Leon and Duke of
Lancaster. Clearly, at the signing of the treaty, Fernando had renounced his
claim to Castile in favor of John of Lancaster. Edward III still claimed France for
himself, and John still asserted his right to Castile and Leon.15
This treaty was primarily a treaty of friendship and alliance. In Article I, the
monarchs of both realms asserted that they and their successors would
...henceforth reciprocally be Friends to Friends and Enemies to
Enemies, and shall assist, maintain, and uphold each other mutually
by sea and by land against all Men that may live or die of whatever
dignity, station, rank, or condition they may be, and against their
Lands, Realms, and Dominions.16

14Fernao
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It follows then that in Article II both parties agreed that they would not "form
Friendships with the Enemies, Rivals or Persecutors of the other Party; or
knowingly himself or through others advise, aid or favor the Enemies, Rivals or
Persecutors of the other Party..." Moreover, each of the signatories agreed to
keep the other informed of and forewarned against any possible plots and
schemes.17
Additionally, this was a defensive treaty. Article III called for each party to
send "...armed Troops, Archers, Slingers, Ships and Galleys sufficiently supplied
with all requisites and other kinds of defence...."18 Military aid was to be
rendered in support of the other in the case of invasion or proposed invasion by
their enemies. However, this support should be offered "...without great injury to
his Country...."19 Thus, neither party was expected to weaken its own defenses
in the aid of the other. Yet, both were left confident that they could rely on the
other in time of war. For the English, Portugal's naval defenses were paramount
not only because of the French threat to their own coastline but also because
England's plans to invade France required the assistance of a greater naval
power. On the other hand, Portugal alone could not repel a Castilian invasion.
Thus, they could only hope to fend off the Castilians until an English army was
brought ashore to provide assistance.

17lbid.

18lbid.,

19lbid.

466.

By necessity then, the Treaty of 1373 was negotiated and signed under a
veil of secrecy. The English wanted the advantage of surprise when they
invaded the continent—be it Iberia or France. Portugal wanted this pact kept
secret because she knew the consequence of its revelation would be an invasion
by Enrique II before English aid could arrive. At this point, the Portuguese were
risking far more than they were gaining. Nevertheless, Portugal needed an ally
as a countermeasure not only to Castile itself, but also to the threat posed by the
Franco-Castilian alliance. England was the logical choice
Enrique ll's reaction was both swift and harsh. In that same year, he
ordered the blockade of the port of Lisbon with a Castiiian fleet, and then
personally led an invasion ot Portugal. Needless to say, both Fernando and
Edward III were ill prepared to handle such quick action. The result was that
Fernando was forced to sign a degrading peace treaty at Santarem in 1374. In it
he renounced his alliance with England and pledged instead to support Castile
and France. This came at the worst possible time for England because fighting
had just again begun in earnest between herself and France. England could
have benefited from Portugal's fleet. Instead, Portugal sent no less than five
galleys to serve in a Luso-Castilian fleet under the command of the Castiiian
Fernan Sanchez de Tovar. Its task was to harass the English coastline.
Portugal also sent other galleys to sail directly with the French fleet.20
Fernando's commitment to the French cause diminished greatly once
Enrique withdrew his forces from Portuguese soil. When Enrique II died in 1379,
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the Portuguese monarch saw an opportunity for renewed negotiations with the
English. After Fernando fell ill, however, control of the Portuguese government
shifted from Fernando's hands to that of his wife Leonor and her closest advisor,
Juan Fernandez de Andeiro, the Count of Ourem. They negotiated the marriage
of Beatriz, Fernando's only heir, to the newly widowed King Juan I of Castile.21
The nuptial mass was celebrated on Sunday 17 May 1383. The father of
the bride refused to attend, nor did he allow his chanceller mor, Lourengo Anes
Fogaga, to attend in his stead

According to Fernao Lopes, the king's chronicler,

the king stated that both he and Fogaga had "the cross of Saint George inscribed
on their hearts" and so it was fitting that Foga?a should remain with the king.22
This, of course, was a reference to their amity to the English crown and their
disapproval of the marriage. Fernando sent word to Richard II that this marriage
was not of his doing and that he continued to regard the Treaty of 1373 as valid.
In England only the Duke of Lancaster remained convinced.23
Less than a month after her marriage, Fernando died at the age of 38 from
tuberculosis.24 According to the nuptial agreement, Beatriz would succeed to the
throne and her consort, Juan I, would bear the title of King of Portugal. If they

21Originally, Beatriz was to marry King Juan's son. However, the King's consort died in
the midst of the negotiations. This created an extraordinary opportunity for the Castilians. The
marriage of the Castilian King to the Portuguese Infanta meant the possibility of a union of the
two realms in the near future. It is hard to imagine that Fernando aid not foresee the inevitable
consequence of such a union, and its detrimental effects upon Portuguese independence. Yet,
he could do little once the negotiations were finalized. See Russell, 352.

220riginally,

"que tijnha a cruz de Sam Jorge scripta no coragom como elle..."
Translation mine. See Lopes, 447.
23Russell,
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had a son or daughter, he or she would rule Portugal as a separate kingdom; if
not, the Castilian heir would rule the two kingdoms as one realm with two
separate Cortes.25
Upon Fernando's death, Leonor ruied in F^ortugai as regent for her
daughter, Beatriz, and her son-in-law, Juan. Much to the annoyance of the
people of Lisbon, she filled her court with Castilians and Galicians. Almost
immediately the King of Castile added the royal symbols of Portugal to his own
standard. Then, in December, he led an army to secure personally the
Portuguese city of Guarda along the border. These events proved more than the
lower nobility could stand. With the overwhelming support of the Olisipianos,
they devised a plan.26 They proposed that Joao, the Master of the Military Order
of Avis, and illegitimate son of Pedro I, taKe control of the palace in Lisbon. On 6
December of the same year, Joao entered the palace and murdered the Count of
Ourem. Leonor tied. When she finally met up with Juan and his forces in
Santarem, she formally handed over the reins of the Portuguese government to
him.27
The people of Lisbon urged Joao to accept the title "defender of the
realm." He hesitantly accepted this title, and then began making plans for what

25Russell,

353.

26The

term Olisipiano refers to the people of Lisbon also known as Lisboetas. It harkens
back to the Roman period of Portuguese history when the city of Lisbon went by its Roman name
Olisipo. It is not uncommon for the Portuguese, like so many other people, to identify themselves
by their city of residence. However, in the case of the Portuguese, often the reference is to the
Roman name rather than its modern Portuguese name. This dissertation will use both the
Roman and the contemporary reference.
27Livermore,

100.
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he knew would be a difficult campaign. Although the revolution had spread to
Porto and then to other cities and towns throughout the kingdom, Juan made
ready for a siege of Lisbon which he thought was key to breaking the rebellion.
He had the support of nearly fifty-four castles and other small areas, which were
controlled by the Portuguese landed nobility. They stood by their word in support
of Queen Beatriz and her consort.28
Unfortunately for the Castilians, Juan's siege of Lisbon in the fall of 1384
was doomed from the start. What had begun as brief outbreaks of disease within
the Castilian ranks soon turned into an epidemic. Juan's advisor begged him to
retreat. He stubbornly refused. Not until he began to lose an estimated two
hundred men a day, was Juan was finally convinced to abandon the siege. The
Lisboetas rejoiced at the obvious hand of God in their salvation for they had
nearly run out of food and could not have held out much longer.29
Meanwhile, Joao sent Fogaga, now his chanceller mor, to England to seek
assistance from the English crown. The results of this diplomatic mission were
two-fold. First, they were allowed to recruit anywhere from 400 to 700 English
and Gascon mercenaries—at least one hundred of whom were English archers.
Second, Fogaga's diplomatic mission sparked a renewed interest in the Kingdom
of Castile and Leon by John of Gaunt.30

28Russell,

29lbid.,
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30The exact figures of English and Gascon mercenaries varies depending on the source
from two hundred to eight hundred. For a lengthy discussion of the historiography surrounding
this issue see both the text and footnotes of Russell, 383-386.
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The mercenaries left Plymouth to Portugai sometime in March of 1385,
and they arrived one month later in Portugal as the Portuguese Cortes concluded
that Joao was Portugal's legitimate heir to the throne. They came to assist the
King with his up-coming campaigns to secure the loyalties of certain cities and
prominent castles in northern Portugal. This he did with great aplomb. By the
time Juan entered Portugal with his Castilian armies-again bent on taking
Lisbon-Joao was well prepared for the defense of his crown. The pivotal
moment came on the 14 August 1385 at Aljubarrota when a force of 35,000
Castilians led by Juan himself met with a crushing defeat at the hands of Joao's
army of only 6,400 men. The English archers proved essential to this victory.
Juan quickly withdrew his remaining forces traveled down the Tejo River and
then embarked with the entire Castilian fleet to Seville.31
Joao's victory at Aljubarrota secured Portugal's independence for the next
two hundred years. It confirmed his position as King of Portugal, lent authority to
a new diplomatic mission from Portugal to England meant to secure a stronger
alliance between the two crowns, and furthered John of Gaunt's interests in the
Kingdom of Castile and Leon. After Aljubarrota, Juan's hold on power seemed
much more vulnerable and his kingdom all the more attractive to John of Gaunt
who now saw in Joao a worthy ally who had proven himself in battle against the
common enemy, the King of Castile.
Negotiations between Portugal and England progressed at a rapid pace
and resulted in the signing on 9 May 1386 of the Windsor Treaty between King
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Joao of Portugal and King Richard II of England. Like the Treaty of 1373, Article
I of this treaty ensured a perpetual state of amity between the two parties:
...between the above Kings [Joao and Richard] now reigning, and
their Heirs and Successors, and between the Subjects of both
Kingdoms, a solid, perpetual, and real League, Amity, Confederacy,
and Union, not only in behalf of themselves, and their Heirs and
Successors, but also in favour of the Kingdoms, Lands, Dominions,
and Countries, and their Subjects, Vassals, Allies, and Friends
whatsoever, so that either of them shall be bound to succour and
afford aid to the other, against all Men that may live and die who shall
attempt to violate the Peace of the other, or injure his State in any
way.... 32
The only exceptions to this rule were Pope Urban and his canonically elected
successors, the Lords Wenzeslas, and John of Gaunt.3j
The next six articles of the treaty specified the extents and limits of this
league for both signatories. It gave complete freedom of, movement for the
representatives of the king within each other's realm. As in the Treaty of 1373, it
stipulated that upon request either side should provide both military and naval
assistance to the other. This assistance would be provided within six months of
the request.34 Furthermore, the discovery of any plots or schemes against the
other should be treated as though it were an injury to himself and dealt with
immediately. In this case it was not enough to merely inform your ally of the
planned deception. Instead, Article VII stipulated that, "he shall prevent it as

32Foreign

Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Alliance between England and Portugal,-Signed at
Windsor, 9th May, 1386," British and Foreign Stale Papers, 1812-1814, 1-Part 1 469.
33lbid.,

470. Ironically, it is John's son, Henry of Bolingbrokes, Earl of Derby, who will
later usurp Richard II making himself King of England in 1399 and reigning as Henry IV. This
stipulation allowed for the simple reaffirmation of the treaty by the House of Lancaster. See
Anthony Goodman, "John of Gaunt, Portugal's Kingmaker," History Today 36 (June 1986): 16.
34Windsor,

9th May, 1386, 470-472.
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much as in him lies, as though he were desirous of preventing the injury and
contumely intended to his own interest..

^

One of the unique elements of the Windsor Treaty of 1386 was the
inclusion of merchant interests in what should have been a strictly politicalmilitary alliance, including complete freedom of movement to "Merchants or
others, of whatever rank, dignity, or condition soever..

Whether Portuguese or

English, Article II also guaranteed "either Party safely and fearlessly to enter the
Kingdom, Lands, Dominions of the other, and mutually to have intercourse and
trade with his Subjects, ... [and go] as freely and as peacefully as they would be
allowed to do in their own Country..06
This latitude of freedom granted to the merchant class reflected the strong
commercial ties which already existed between the two realms. Trade between
Portugal and England dates back to the early thirteenth century. Early
Portuguese merchants sold national products such as wine, cork, salt, olive oil,
and wax.37 Early imports from England included wheat and woolens. By the mid
sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants offered a dizzying array of exotic goods
from eastern markets such as the Persian Gulf, India, Indonesia, China and
Japan. These goods were often immediately re-exported to points north from
London to Danzig. Portugal, however, also became an integral part of an

35lbid.,

472.

36Wiridsor,

9th May, 1386, 470. It is interesting to note that prior to the Treaty of Windsor,
Portuguese merchants in Lisbon and Porto had negotiated a separate treaty with Edward III to
these same ends. This treaty, signed in 1353, called for the protection of Portuguese merchant
interests in England. This was quite common for the time. Goodman, 17.
37Williams,
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extensive network connecting Italian merchants—primarily Genoese and
Venetian-with northwest Europe. English merchants made regular stops in
Lisbon. Their Portuguese counterparts frequented not only London, but also
Southampton and Bristol.38
Finally, it is the Windsor Treaty of 1386, not the Treaty of 1373, which has
been reaffirmed countless times. The treaty itself required such action. Article
XII specified "that all Heirs and Successors of... [Joao and Richard II], each in
their time, shall, within a year, to calculate always from the day of his Coronation,
be obliged, ...to swear to. renew, ratify, and confirm by a Public Attestation, as
well as by their Great Seal, the present Alliance... ,"39 Thus, King Joao and King
Richard II chose to bind their kingdoms, their heirs, and their subjects to the other
in perpetuity.
At this time, each had a good deal to gain from this pact. For Joao the
aliiance brought with it legitimacy. Aljubarrota and the Portuguese Cortes
notwithstanding, the new King of Portugal understood that he needed
international recognition to further secure his position among the other European
monarchs. The Treaty of Windsor brought that and more. It brought a sense of
continuity to the realm by ensuring that, although a new dynasty had been
established, the House of Avis would continue to support long established
political and commercial ties with England. Last, but certainly not least in the

38Goodman,

17. For further analysis, including a map detailing the extent of the
Portuguese trade network see, A. J. R Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415 - 1808: A
World on the Move (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univei sity Press, 1998), 124-130.
39Windsor,

9th May, 1386, 473.
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mind of the King, it guaranteed military aid shouid Juan, or his successors, turn
their attentions once again towards Portugal
This alliance was just as important to England The Franco-Castilian fleet
had been wreaking havoc on English galleys. In this same year, the English
feared rumors of a concentrated French attack upon her coast. The FrancoCastilian naval alliance was at the core of their fears. A naval alliance with
Portugal would offset this imbalance. No sooner had the Windsor Treaty been
signed by the kings' representatives, than Richard II invoked it to request the use
of Portuguese galleys. The Portuguese complied by sending ten large galleys to
serve with Richard's fleet for six months at the expense of the Portuguese crown.
After this period, expenses were to be born by the English crown. The squadron
remained in the service of England for the next four years/0
Beside this squadron, another Portuguese fleet made up of transport ships
and galleys was making its way to Plymouth, England. Their orders were to
transport John of Gaunt, Pretender to the Castilian crown, his family, and his
army to the Portuguese coast. Upon their arrival, these forces would be joined
by Joao's army in an attempt to once and for all secure the Kingdom of Castile
and Leon for the Duke of Lancaster and his wife Dona Constanza.41
While these plans ultimately failed, the mission itself had a tremendous
impact on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance because it resulted in the marriage of

40Russell,
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King Joao of Portugal to Philippa, the eldest daughter of John of Gaunt

42

This

union resulted in the creation of the most dynamic royal family in the annals of
Portuguese history. Queen Philippa had a great influence on the moral
standards of the Portuguese royal court. She also instilled in her children a great
sense of intellectual curiosity which had been markedly absent among the
Portuguese nobility prior to her arrival.
Joao and Philippa's childreri-Duarte, Pedro, Henry, John, Fernando, and
Isabel-distinguished themselves in both letters and the arts. The most famous,
of course, was Henry "the Navigator." He was Master of the Order of Christ and
thus possessed both the intellectual desire and the wherewithal to initiate the era
of the discoveries.
This marriage also had political ramifications in England. It was Queen
Philippa's brother, Henry, who would eventually usurp the crown of England. He
then sought out international recognition of this new title. His brother-in-law Joao
was more than happy to oblige. Throughout Henry's reign, he maintained a
warm correspondence with Philippa, and encouraged many marriages between
the noble houses of Portugal and England. These good relations continued
between the Houses of Avis and Lancaster well into the fifteenth century.43

42Although

John of Gaunt failed in his attempt to secure the Castilian crown for himself,
his Iberian campaign cannot be viewed as a failure. While in Iberia, he managed to marry his
eldest daughter Philippa to Joao of Portugal. When the military campaign went badly, he secured
a separate peace with Juan. Although John had to relinquish all future claims to the Castilian
crown, for this he received from Juan a sizable indemnity. He also negotiated the marriage of his
second daughter, Catherine, to Juan's son, Enrique. Thus, although he did not secure the crown,
he left Iberia no worse for the wear. See Goodman, 19.
43A

good measure of this amity is the number of Portuguese kings and princes who were
thereafter inducted into the famed Order of the Royal Garter, beginning with Pedro, Duke of
Coimbra in 1427. Ibid., 20.
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At this point, England and Portugal were allies in every sense of the term.
Earlier military ties forged at the expense of Moorish blood, were formally
recognized in two succeeding treaties, 1373 and 1386. At the signing of the
Windsor Treaty, they had two common continental foes, France and Castile.
They came to each other's defense on both land and sea against those same
enemies. Politically, they recognized each other's dynastic claims at critical
moments, thereby, facilitating international recognition of those claims. They
strengthened these political ties with a variety of aristocratic marriages, the most
significant being that of Joao of Avis to Philippa of Lancaster.
Commercially, they guaranteed not only the safe conduct, but also the
interests of each other's merchants within the other's realm. This was essential
to the economic development of both kingdoms. By the fifteenth century,
Portugal and England had developed a kind of symbiotic relationship. Portugal
imported English woolens and wheat. Meanwhile, the English elites desired
exotic goods from the Mediterranean which Portuguese merchants adeptly
provided. English manufacturers also needed a dyestuff known as grain which
they purchased directly from Portugal. This is what gave English woolens their
famed brilliant red coloring. Thus, both Portugal and England reaped the
economic benefits of this league in terms of both imports and exports.44
Over the next century, the Portuguese realm expanded exponentially.
Under the direction of the House of Avis, Portugal spearheaded the European

44lbid.

The Portuguese also provided wine, which-because of French and Castilian
interference coupled with the English loss of Gascony -was otherwise difficult for the English to
obtain. For further discussion of Anglo-Portuguese trade in the fourteenth see also Williams, 4042.
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discoveries. Her ships were the first to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, the
first to secure an overseas route to the Spice Islands, and the first to sail into
Asia. Not only was she the first to sail into blue waters, her sons were also the
first to discover and chart the winds and currents of the Atlantic, Indian, and
Pacific Oceans. Consequently, she was also the first European power to
establish a worldwide trading-post empire.
The next two hundred years of leadership in European expansion seemed
to fulfill Portugal's destiny. They brought to Portugal extraordinary wealth and
fame. Continental Portugal was small and constantly threatened by her larger
neighbor, Castile. On the open ocean, however, Portugal was dominant—at
least for a few centuries. After having wrenched herself from Castile, she
continued the fight to distance herself from Castile. Her experiences as a
nation—the Battle of Ourique, the siege of Lisbon, the Battle of Aljubarrota, and
her accomplishments at sea—imbued her with a sense that Portugal was a great
power. Given this context, her alliance with England makes all the more sense.
They were both on the periphery of Europe. They were Atlantic powers who
allied with each other against a common continental enemy—Spain and France.

In the Shadow of Mine Enemy: Spanish Iberian Hegemony and the Fight
for Portuguese Independence
In 1557, Joao III of Avis died, leaving his three-year-old son Sebastiao as
heir to the Portuguese throne. Raised on the glorious tales of crusading knights,
Sebastiao was determined to add his name to the ranks of his forefathers. When
he reached the age of maturity and assumed the crown, he began planning a
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Moroccan campaign. In 1578, at the age of twenty-four and childless, Sebastiao
led his army into Morocco. Sebastiao's lack of experience and inadequate
military intelligence led to an overwhelming defeat at Alcacer-Quivir. Portugal's
next generation of leaders was either lost or held for ransom. King Sebastiao
himself was never found and, thus, presumed dead.45
What began as a horrible military defeat ultimately resulted in a loss of
sovereignty for Portugal. When the dust settled, it was King Philip II of Spain
who secured the legitimate claim to the Portuguese crown. From 1580 to 1640
the Philips of Spain ruled Portugal and her empire. Initially Portuguese
autonomy was guaranteed. Each succeeding Philip became less interested in
(Jovferning Portugal and all the more disinterested in upholding the original terms
of the agreement. The final blow to Portuguese prestige came from Philip IV and
the appointment of the widowed Duchess of Mantua as governor of Portugal.
One of her first acts was to arbitrarily increase both taxes and troop requisitions
in Portugal. Portuguese anger and resentment over these actions was on the
rise. They needed only the right opportunity.46
Opportunity for a Portuguese revolt came in the form of a Catalonian
uprising. Philip IV's forces were thus occupied on the other side of the peninsula.
On 1 December 1640, the Portuguese conspirators mounted the palace steps,

45Walter C. Opello, Jr. Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy, Westview
Profiles. Nations of Contemporary Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 44.
46Livermore,

171. Philip II never won the hearts of the urban Portuguese, the lower
nobility, or the lower clergy. It was these sectors of Portuguese society that would later foment
revolution. See also Fernand Braudei, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the
Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, vol. II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949; reprint, New
York: Harper& Row Publishers, Inc., 1973), 1176-1185

47

shot and defenestrated the Aide to the Duchess, Vasconcelos. They then
arrested the Duchess and awaited their King. Their choice was D. Joao, the
Duke of Bragan?a-the wealthiest and most powerful aristocrat in Portugal. Five
days later Joao arrived. Ten days after, he was crowned Joao IV, King of
Portugal.
What of the Spanish? There were only three small Spanish garrisons in
Portugal. Each had almost immediately quit the country. The revolt in Catalonia
was going splendidly for the Catalonians, poorly for the Spanish Hapsburgs.
Thus, the "restoration'' was complete. While intermittent attempts by Spain to
reincorporate Portugal into the realm failed, formal Spanish recognition of
Portuguese independence would not be realized until a treaty was signed in
1668.47
While gaining the title of King may have come easily, securing the
Kingdom would prove much more difficult. The real crisis faced by Joao was not
domestic, but diplomatic. Portugal needed to reassert herself internationally.
Yet, she had an empty treasury, no army, no navy to speak of, no allies and one
relentless enemy-Spain. The military, problems were quickly resolved. A new
tax was levied whose funds were tasked for the refitting of arms and ships. The
diplomatic situation, however, took much more time and effort than had been
expected.

47Livermore,

172 When finally signed on 13 February 1668, the treaty of peace between
Spain and Portugal called for the mutual restitution of all conquered territories—with the
exception Ceuta which chose to remain loyal to Spain. See Calvet de Magalhaes, 90.
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Meanwhile, in England, the Stuarts had succeeded the Tudors. Domestic
unrest consumed the Stuarts from 1642 to 1660. For Portugal, The Treaty of
Peace, Commerce and Alliance, between Great Britain and Portugal (1642) was
significant in that it recognized Joao IV as King of Portugal and offered
assurances of British neutrality in the current state of hostilities between Portugal
and Spain. On the other hand, the English sought and gained commercial
concessions in the Portuguese colonies similar to those granted the Dutch, as
well as liberty of conscience and worship to English merchants trading in both
Portugal and her colonies

48

Twenty years would pass before full diplomatic ties were reestablished
between Portugal and Great Britain. The treaty signed on 28 April 1660 went
straight to the heart of the matter. Portugal was still at war with Spain. Article II
stated explicitly that. "His Majesty of Portugal, or anyone whom he may depute,
shall be permitted to raise and procure, in this Commonwealth, Soldiers and
horses, to defend and secure himself against the King of Castile."49

48Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance between Great
Britain and Portugal,-Signed at London, 29th January, 1642," British and Foreign State Papers,
1812-1814, 1-Part1: 473-480. For an insightful analysis of the three treaties of the seventeenth
centuries see, Edgar Prestage, "The Treaties of 1642, 1654 and 1661," in Chapters in AngloPortuguese Relations, ed. Edgar Prestage (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1935; reprint,
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 140.
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Office, "Portugal: Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Portugal,Signed at Whitehall, 28th April, 1660," British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814, 1-Part 1:
492-494. It should be noted that before this treaty could be ratified in Portugal the Stuarts
regained the throne in England. Representatives of the Portuguese crown remained in London
and immediately initiated negotiations for a treaty of marriage between the two kingdoms The
Treaty of 1661, the treaty of marriage, ratified and confirmed all treaties signed between the two
realms from 1641 to that date. See. Foreign Office, "Portugal: Treaty between Great Britain and
Portugal, of Marriage between His Majesty Charles the Second and the Princess Catherine,
Infanta-Signed at Whitehall, 23rd June, 1661," British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-1814, 1Part 1: 495.
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The following year, 1661, the alliance was confirmed and strengthened by
a treaty of marriage between Charles II and the Portuguese Infanta, Catherine of
Braganga. If the treaty of 1660 fulfilled Portugal's current military needs, the
treaty of 1661 went far in satisfying Portugal's diplomatic concerns. Not since the
Windsor Treaty of 1386 did the language used in a treaty between Portugal and
Great Britain specifically bind the two Kingdoms' interests and futures. This
treaty signed 23 June 1661 contained nineteen published articles and one secret
article. Of the nineteen articles, only five deal directly with the Infanta and her
needs. The rest spoke to the distribution and reorganization of Catherine's
extraordinary dowry, and to the commercial, military and diplomatic interests of
both realms. Plainly stated, it made clear the expectations of England regarding
trade within the Portuguese colonies, while concurrently guaranteeing Portugal
much needed military and diplomatic assistance in regards to both the Dutch and
the Spanish.
The treaty begins, as expected, by specifying the details of the marriage
itself—i.e. who gets what, when, and where.50 This was, however, no simple
treaty of marriage. British merchants were granted wide commercial rights in
Portuguese India and Brazil, as well as extensive personal liberties. Indeed, it
specified that British subjects engaged in commerce in these locations would

50The King of England received Tangier, Bombay and two million crowns Portuguese.
For her part, the Infanta was assured "free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion..." and to this
end her own chapel. She would also receive "a jointure of £30,000 of English money by the year,
together with at least one such Palace or House as Her Majesty may make her ordinary
residence in...all which Her Majesty shall enjoy during her life, if she survive His Majesty." Keep
in mind that the Queen Mother had been a French Roman Catholic. Consequently, these
assurances of religious freedom and independent income were each repeatedly framed within the
following phrase "in the same manner as the Queen Mother enjoyed." This served as a gentie
reminder to an Anglican parliament that this union posed no new threat. Ibid., 497.

50

"enjoy all privileges and immunities...which the Portuguese themselves
enjoy...."51 Meanwhile, the Portuguese Crown received clearly detailed military
commitments from the British crown concerning the defense of Portugal from
invasion. Furthermore, in the published articles of this treaty, the King of Great
Britain promised to "take the interest of Portugal and all its Dominions to heart,
defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land, even as England
itself...."52
Yet, it was in the Secret Article of the treaty of 1661 that the true nature
and extent of this union was revealed:
...His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of the great advantages and
increase of Dominion he hath purchased by the above-mentioned
Treaty of Marriage, shall promise and oblige himself...to defend and
protect all Conquests or Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal,
against all his Enemies, as well future as present: moreover, His
Majesty of Great Britain doth oblige himself to mediate a good Peace
between the King of Portugal and the States of the United Provinces,
and all Companies or Societies of Merchants subject under them,
upon conditions convenient and becoming the mutual interest of
England and Portugal; and in case such a Peace ensue not, then His
Majesty of Great Britain shall be obliged to defend, with Men and
Ships, the Dominions and Conquests of the King of Portugal.53
The interests of Great Britain and Portugal were now mutual; the preservation of
empire, both British and Portuguese. Since British merchants enjoyed the same
immunities as the Portuguese within the Portuguese Empire, Portuguese colonial
interests were de facto British colonial interests.
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Thus, after twenty-one years, Portugal was once again not only a
recognized independent European sovereignty, but aiso an international
commercial and political power. Prior to 1580, that status was based on her
ability to project power across every navigable ocean. After 1661, the
Portuguese monarchy recognized her limitations vis-a-vis the ever-increasing
reach of the French, the Dutch and the British. In terms of empire, Portugal gave
up hope of regaining her position in the Far East and instead began to focus her
attention on Brazil.
The Portuguese understood that their international status was largely tied
to their colonial holdings. Again, continental Portugal was small, but her
empire—the losses in Asia notwithstanding—was vast. Portuguese development
of Brazil brought direct wealth to the Portuguese crown in the form of precious
metals, It also brought tremendous wealth to the realm in terms of goods for re
export via the metropoie.
This period of Spanish domination reaffirmed the clear and present danger
that Spain posed for Portugal. Accordingly, after 1640, the Portuguese found
themselves reasserting their Atlantic identity, fighting to preserve their colonies,
and standing shoulder to shoulder with the other great European colonial powers
in their development of the New World. Portugal was not simply a European
power. She was a colonial power. Beside continental sovereignty, Portugal also
had as a key national interest the preservation of her empire. The AngloPortuguese alliance would prove essential to defending the political and military
interests of Portugal.
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Woolens for Wine: The Methuen Treaties
The defensive treaties notwithstanding, it was the commercial treaty of 27
December 1703 that had a long-lasting impact on Anglo-Portuguese relations.
Indeed, it remained in effect for over one hundred years. Initiated by the
Portuguese, the treaty was negotiated and signed by John Methuen, a British
minister to Portugal, and dealt primarily with commercial exchanges between the
two countries.
Historians point to the Methuen treaties of 1703 as evidence that Portugal
was already a quasi-dependent of Great Britain. Careful reading of the treaties
and an understanding of the continental circumstances under which they were
negotiated and signed, however, allows for a different interpretation. Contrary to
common interpretation, during the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713),
Portugal was not in a weak political position. Indeed, Portugal was in a position
of power as evidenced by the language of the treaties signed. They offer no sign
of dependency on the part of Portugal, but instead offered Portugal some distinct
advantages.
Paul Methuen was appointed British minister to Portugal in 1697. He
replaced his father, John Methuen, who had served in the same capacity from
1691 to 1696. Soon after Paul Methuen's appointment, Europe was on the brink
of yet another dynastic conflict known as the War of Spanish Succession. Once
again, Portugal found herself unwillingly involved in a continental conflict yet in a
position of power due to her unique geographic location. Both father and son
worked tirelessly in 1703 to negotiate no less than three treaties with Portugal
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within that year. The first two brought Portugal into the Grand Alliance. The last
was a commercial treaty between Portugal and Great Britain.54
Negotiated and signed by John Methuen, the treaty of 1703 was
comprised of only three articles. The first article of the treaty stated that Portugal,
from that moment forward, would admit "the woollen [sic] cloths and the rest of
the woollen [sic] manufactures of the Britons...'55 This was important to the
British because for nearly eighteen years there had been a variety of restrictions
placed on the importation of British woolens into Portugal. As stated earlier, the
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import of British woolens to Portugal went back centuries and was an important
staple of the English economy.56
The treaty, however, also dealt with another item of common interest to
England and Portugal-wine. The second article placed a condition upon the
importation of these British goods into Portugal. It stated that Britain would "be
obliged for ever hereafter to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into
Britain....deducting or abating a third part of the Custom or Duty [placed on
French wines]." Consequently, the duty imposed on Portuguese wines was twothirds that of French wines. While this offered the British an alternative to French
wines, now costly and difficult to come by because of the war with France, it also
gave Portuguese wines a tremendous market advantage in Great Britain. From
this point forward, Portuguese Port and Madeira wines—both fortified winesbecame the wines of choice in Great Britain and her colonies.57
Article two also stipulated that should the British government ever attempt
to alter this "abatement of Customs., it shall be just and lawful for His Sacred
Royal Majesty of Portugal again to prohibit the woollen [sic] cloths, and the rest
of the British woollen manufactures." This stipulation gave Portugal not only a
substantial guarantee of continued preferential treatment, but also a clear form of
redress of grievances should the British Crown, for whatever reason, ever decide
to reverse that standing.58
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Finally, the last article of the Methuen treaty required ratification of the
treaty by both parties within two months time.59 This they both did without
reservation. For the British, regaining the Portuguese woolens market was
critical to the continued expansion of their manufacturing sector. Lisbon was,
after all, an entrepot for Mediterranean trade. For the Portuguese, this treaty
went a long way in helping Portugal correct the balance of trade between herself
and Great Britain. In fact, the long term effect of this treaty was that Portugal
could now pay for British imports in goods rather than gold. The increased
demand for Portuguese wines also helped develop and expand that industry in
northern Portugal.60

The English Century
The Third Empire: Africa and the "Rose Colored Map"
On 11 January 1890, Her Majesty, Queen Victoria sent a brief but
compelling note to the Portuguese government in regard to a recent skirmish
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between Portuguese troops and African natives. The fighting took place in a part
of central Africa in which Portuguese interests and British interests collided, the
Valley of Shire in Nyasaland. The note insisted that the Portuguese withdraw
their troops from the area immediately and also withdraw all claims to this area.
It began,
What Her Majesty's Government require and insist upon is the
following: [Send instructions to the Governor of Mozambique to
withdraw all troops from the specified areas]...Mr. Petre [British
Ambassador to Lisbon] is compelled by his instruction to leave Lisbon
at once with all the members of his legation unless a satisfactory
answer to the foregoing intimation is received by him in the course of
this evening, and Her Majesty's Ship Enchantress is now at Vigo
waiting for his orders.61

This became known as the British Ultimatum. The tone and language used in
this memorandum made clear to Portugal—and, later, the world-that the
relationship between these two allies had shifted dramatically over the course of
the nineteenth century.
At the root of this change in the alliance was the growing disparity in
power—both economic and military—between the two realms. In the 19th
century, Great Britain reached her acme as a world power. By the end of the
century Britain dominated one-quarter of the world's land and one-fifth of the
world's population. She was a commercial powerhouse, with vast global
interests. Her Majesty's Royal Navy adroitly protected both her landed empire
and her commercial empire. Britannia did indeed rule the sea.

61The memorandum is quoted in its original English as found in Basiiio Teles, Do
Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro, Esbogo de Historia Poliica, Obras de Basiiio Teles (Porto: Lello &
Irmao, 1905; reprint, Lisbon: Portugalia Editora, 1968), 83
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Concurrently, Portugal was at hei political and commercial nadir By the
19th century, Portugal had already lost most of her holdings in Asia, and would
soon lose Brazil as well. During the Peninsular Wars, Napoleon's armies laid
waste to Portugal until finally being expulsed by an Anglo-Portuguese army in
1813. This turbulent period was followed by a long civil war between rival
Portuguese princes for the Portuguese crown and, shortly thereafter, a popular
uprising. All of this turmoil had a detrimental effect on Portugal. Commercially
she was devastated. Politically she was fragile. Relations between Great Britain
and Portugal began to sour with Britain seeming more the bully and less the ally.
From 1850 to 1870, the period known as the "Regeneration," Portugal was
politically more stable. Her economy had begun to turn around. She looked to
her African colonies as both an assertion of her continued prominence in the
world and as a region not yet fully exploited for its commercial value. Even
before the traditional timeframe for the Scramble for Africa (1879-1895),
Portuguese and British interests clashed because both had a plan to develop
central sub-Saharan Africa.
In 1851, the Conselho Ultramarino was created within the Portuguese
government. It had two primary tasks. First, it was to promote and reinforce the
ties between the metropole and the colonies through both commercial expansion
and capital investment. Second, it was to stop or at least diminish the intrusion of
other European powers into Portuguese territories, particularly that of Great
Britain in the lands between Angola and Mozambique.62 Between 1785 and
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1877, Portugal had made no fewer than twelve expeditions into the hinterland
between Angola and Mozambique. She therefore claimed these territories by
right of "prior discovery." Prior discovery was the accepted method for claiming
new territories in international law until 1375
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The following year, an international conference was held in Brussels.
Attendees were very critical of historical claims to the interior of Africa. Instead,
they propose the view that "effective occupation" should be the standard for
recognition. This, of course, was problematic for Portugal. That same year
Luciano Cordeiro founded the Geographic Society of Lisbon. Its mission was
twofold: to invigorate Portuguese public opinion regarding the issue of
colonialism, and to fund large expeditions into central Africa.64
On 26 February 1884, the Treaty of Zaire was signed in London between
Portugal and Great Britain. In it the British recognized Portuguese claims to
territories along the Zaire River. They based their decision on the fact that
Portugal had more established trading posts than the Belgians who had their own
claims to the Congo Basin. When details of the treaty were released in the
press, tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the British government to
abandon their position. They did. The Portuguese were stunned at this reversal
and called for an international conference to resolve the question once and for
all.65 This led to the Berlin Conference in November 1884. The conference
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found against Portugal and, instead, recognized the sovereign territory of the
international Association of the Congo. One week later, 23 February 1885, the
independent state of the Congo was founded, as a Belgian colony. Worse yet,
the Berlin Conference resolved that "effective occupation," not prior discovery,
would be the standard for international recognition of sovereignty within the
interior of Africa.66
This was particularly discouraging for Portugal because it placed her at a
distinct disadvantage. Up until the Berlin Conference, what had been her
advantage in Africa was time. Simply stated, she had been the first to create a
trading-post empire and earlier commerce had not necessitated the development
of the interior. Portuguese expansion into the African hinterland would require a
large investment of capital, and the introduction of new technology, e.g. the
extension of a well-planned railroad system from the port cities to the interior.
She would also need enough men to both secure these vast areas and then to fill
the bureaucratic ranks necessary to maintain control over these same territories.
In comparison to her European rivals, Portugal was easily outmanned and
outgunned. Much to her dismay, Portugal's greatest rival in Africa was her oldest
ally, Great Britain.
Portugal had a definite vision of her place in Africa. She called it Africa
Meridional Portuguesa. In 1886, Portugal met with representatives from both
France and Germany to discuss her plans for sub-Saharan Africa. In two
separate treaties the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Henrique Barros Gomes, had
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fixed the frontiers of this new empire. In the foilowing year, a map that showed
this new expansive area linking Angola to Mozambique in shades of rose was
presented to the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies They accepted Portugal's
plans for a West-East transcontinental empire, the "Rose Colored Map."67

Figure 1: The Rose Colored Map68
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Great Britain had a very different reaction. When presented with coast-tocoast Portuguese African claims, Lord Salisbury dug in. He argued that Britain
would only accept Portuguese claims to sovereignty in effectively occupied
African territories. Why did Britain take such an uncompromising stance with
Portugal? It turns out that Britain had her own vision of sub-Saharan Africa, one
that included an extraordinary Cape to Cairo British Empire. This South to North
transcontinental empire represented two aspects of British imperialism in Africa.
In the northern regions, British goals were strongly supported by both English
missionaries and Scottish Presbyterian missionaries. While in Cape Town, white
settlers and prospectors tied their fate to the expansion of British rule in Africa.
Thus, Portuguese and British ambitions in Africa were at crosscurrents.69
Tensions between the two countries came to a head in December of 1889.
While traveling in the Valley of Shire (in Nyasaland), Major Serpa Pinto—on
expedition in the service of the King of Portugal—found a raised British flag and
the native peoples, the Makololos, in revolt against Portugal. The governor of
Mozambique sent Joao de Azevedo Coutinho to subdue the natives and required
their African chiefs to submit to Portuguese sovereignty. The British government
viewed this Portuguese action as an act of war because these tribes were
supposedly under the protection of the British—hence the raised Union Jack.
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After a brief exchange of diplomatic notes, Her Majesty's Navy was positioned
along key ports in Mozambique and Portugal/0
Finally, on 11 January 1890, Queen Victoria's government sent a
memorandum to the Portuguese government, historically known as the British
Ultimatum of 1890. It was brief and to the point It insisted that the governor of
Mozambique was to be telegraphed that same day with instructions to withdraw
all Portuguese military forces from Shire and all lands pertaining to the Makololos
and the Machonas. It then went on to state that, should a satisfactory response
not be received that afternoon, Her Majesty's government would be forced to
withdraw her legation from Lisbon. Added to this was the not so subtle threat
(reminder) that the H.M.S. Enchantress in Vigo was awaiting orders to take the
minister home as part of closing the legation. The Portuguese government felt it
had no choice but to accede to the demands of the British. This it did that
afternoon. However, in its response, the Portuguese government noted that it
had the right to pursue the matter further by seeking outside arbitration in the
near future.71
Great Britain did not accept Portugal's claim to a right of arbitration or
mediation. Therefore, negotiations proceeded directly between both countries.
The immediate diplomatic results of the British Ultimatum was the negotiation of
two treaties—one on 20 August 1890, the other on 11 June of 1891. Portugal did
not ratify the former, but did ratify the latter "with a view to settle definitively the
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boundaries of their respective spheres of influence in Africa...."72 Portuguese
dreams of a transcontinental Luso-African Empire were lost to other ambitions
such as the establishment of Rhodesia, Malawi, and Zambia.73
Besides establishing the boundaries for Angola and Mozambique, this
treaty also satisfied religious and commercial considerations. According to
Article X, "missionaries of both countries shall have fuii protection...[and] all
forms of divine worship and religious teaching are guaranteed."74 Article XI put a
twenty-five year, three percent duties cap on British goods being transported
across Portuguese territories. It guaranteed "freedom for the passage of
subjects and goods of both Powers across the Zambesi...." It also allowed one
Power the right "for the purpose of communication" to construct roads, railways,
bridges, and telegraph lines 'across the district reserved to the other."75 In
essence, the majority of the sixteen articles that make up this treaty sought to
foster and facilitate trade across colonial boundaries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The same government that acceded to the British Ultimatum, Minister
Barros Gomes' government, did not sign this treaty. That government failed. It
resigned in disgrace. Whereas prior to the British Ultimatum the merits of the
African colonies were debated among the Portuguese elite, now it became a
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question of national pride. The Portuguese had been humiliated on an
international stage.
The political consequences of the British Ultimatum in Portugal cannot be
overstated. There was the failure of the Barros Gomes' government and the call
for new elections. Concurrently, there were widespread anti-British public
demonstrations. Across Portugal newspaper editorials called for an end to the
alliance, an end to the Progressive government, and, in some cases, an end to
the Portuguese monarchy itself. There was even a patriotic call for funds to be
raised for the construction of warships to defend Portugal's national honor.76
Current patriotic sentiment was best expressed in a song titled, A
Portuguesa. In the lyrics there is an unnamed "enemy," that enemy was Great
Britain. The chorus follows,
To arms, to arms
On land and sea!
To arms, to arms
To fight for our Homeland!
To march against the enemy guns!

This song is Portugal's current national anthem. Composed in 1890, it was
adopted as the national anthem in 1911 by the new Republican government. On
31 January 1890, there was a Republican Revolution in Porto. Although it failed,
it foreshadowed things to come.77
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There were both immediate and long-term political consequences as a
result of the British Ultimatum. Overall a new sense of nationalism reinvigorated
the colonial movement in Portugal. The colonies were not simply a matter of
national interest, they were now tied to Portugal's sense of national pride and
national identity. The Republican Party-formerly anti-colonial—expertly used the
British Ultimatum time and again to wear down the opposition. Finally, it was this
issue which set the stage for the demise of the Portuguese monarchy in 1910
and the establishment of the First Republic.
In the two decades that followed the British Ultimatum, the drive for
African colonies among the European powers reached its apex. Of particular
concern for Portugal was the German desire for "a place in the sun." Germany
coveted the Portuguese colonies in particular because she felt that-Portugal was
not developing tfiose areas to their full potential. To this end, she approached
Great Britain many times regarding the partition of Portuguese Africa.
Meanwhile; Portugal strove to maintain effective control over her African
territories. Political instability coupled with several economic crises restricted
Portugal's options.78 Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau all required
extensive development of their infrastructure to reach their full mercantile

78The Portuguese economy had experienced a decline beginning around 1870. The
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potential. Yet, Portugal lacked the funds to do so herself. Worse still, fear of
defaulting on foreign loans kept her from seeking funds elsewhere.79
Publicly, Anglo-Portuguese relations were at the breaking point. The
regicide of the Portuguese King, Carlos I, and his heir, Prince Luis Filipe, in
Lisbon on 1 February 1908 strained relations between the two governments.
After only two years, King Manuel ll's monarchy fell victim to a successful
Republican revolution. The revolt began on 3 October 1910 with the assistance
of two compromised military units in Lisbon. Fighting continued throughout the
next day between monarchist units and both compromised military units and
revolutionary gangs of Lisboetas who relentlessly harassed the loyalist troops.
By 2 p.m., 5 October 1910 King Maliuel received word that his troops had
surrendered. He and his family retired to England where he eventually
abdicated.80
This revolt marked the end of the monarchy in Portugal and the beginning
of the Republic. A clear sign of the strained relations between the two powers
was the delay on the part of Great Britain in recognizing Portugal's new
government. Great Britain reserved formal recognition of the Portuguese
Republic until 11 September 1911. She did so for three reasons. First, the
Republican Party was closely associated with the earlier regicide. Second,
Britain's government—along with many other European powers-took a dim view
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of the new Republic's anti-clerical laws. These laws were so harsh that they
appeared to be aimed at suppressing religion altogether, rather than simply
separating church from state. Finally, they delayed recognition as an expression
of criticism of Portugal's failing colonial administration, especially in Mozambique
where British commercial interests were concentrated.81
Ironically it was Mozambique, or more precisely the location of its capital
Lourengo Marques, which privately brought the two allies back to the negotiating
table. In 1899, the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State
went to war with Great Britain. An earlier treaty (1875) signed between the Boers
and Portugal would allow the use of Lourengo Marques for the transport of arms
and munitions. Seeing an opportunity to regain some lost confidence, Portugal's
Minister in London, the Marquis of Soveral, opened secret negotiations with
Britain for a new treaty.82
By 14 October 1899 that treaty was signed in London. Remarkably, the
Treaty of 1899 confirmed the first article of the Treaty of 1642 and the final article
of the Treaty of 1661. Thus, it reaffirmed the perpetual peace and amity between
both nations, while it also reaffirmed the commitment of Great Britain to defend
Portugal's colonies as though they were her own. For Portugal this was critical
because she knew full well of the details of the secret treaty between Germany
and Great Britain (1898) in which both nations planned to offer Portugal financial
assistance with the caveat that should she default on her loans her African
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colonies would be divvied up between them. At the time, Portugal had
understandably turned instead to France for financial assistance. With this new
treaty signed between herself and Britain, she no longer had to fear that her old
ally had abandoned her colonies to the desires of the Germans.83
For her part, Portugal also had several commitments required of her by
the Treaty of 1899. Contrary to the aforementioned Treaty of 1875, Portugal
would not allow the Boers to use Lourengo Marques as a port for the transport of
arms and munitions. Instead, Britain would gain that exclusive right. Beyond
this, Portugal also agreed to not declare herself neutral for the duration of the
Boer War. Given the nature of the alliance, this turned out to be a great tactical
advantage for the British.84
This advantage was not lost upon the British Foreign Office and was most
clearly revealed in a series of letters dated 1911 exchanged between Winston
Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and British Foreign Secretary Grey
over the issue of recognition of the Portuguese Republic. Churchill had no love
for the newly established Portuguese Republic or its government. In a private
letter to his wife dated 25 June 1911, he referred to that government as
"sanguinary swine."85 On 21 June 1911, Churchill sent Grey a letter in which he
argued that Spain was strategically and militarily more important to Britain than
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Portugal.86 The Foreign Office compellingly retorted that Britain's best interests
were still served by an independent Portugal and the subsequent continuation of
the Anglo-Portuguese alliance87
In late 1912, Churchill was joined by Prince Louis Battenburg, First Sea
Lord, in arguing once again that Spain could be the better ally for Britain. These
discussions resulted in a memorandum from the Admiralty War Staff to the
Foreign Office which was highly critical of a continuation of the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance. In February of 1913 Eyre Crowe, a senior Foreign Office official, wrote
a counter-memorandum. In this memorandum Crowe noted that an independent
Portugal (and her colonies) were paramount to British interests. He argued that
British withdrawal from the alliance would not only leave Portugal's colonies
vulnerable to both Germany and France, but also leave Britain with no legal
recourse to defend them. He then reminded the Admiralty that the appeal of the
alliance was not merely strategic. Continuation of their role in the alliance
assured Britain extensive political and economic privileges in these regions, for
example granting Britain privy access to Portuguese coaling stations and
wireless stations around the globe.88
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Old Alliances. New Challenges
The Threat of a Greater Germany
This debate on the merits of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was
temporarily interrupted by the start of World War I. On 7 August 1914,
Portuguese Prime Minister Bernardino Machado publicly announced that
Portugal would attempt to maintain friendly relations with all nations while fulfilling
her obligations to Great Britain. Although many of Portugal's elite wanted her to
join in the fight against Germany, Foreign Minister Freire d'Andrade was in
complete agreement with the British Foreign Office in their assessment of
Portugal's lack of military preparedness to do so Portugal's Navy consisted of
five ships. Her Army was ill equipped and ill trained. Morale within the armed
forces was low due in large part to the political divisions still present since the
inception of the Republic—the officers were monarchists; the non-commissioned
officers were Republicans. Worse yet, the government had made a habit of
using political spies within the armed services. Promotions were commonly
politically based rather than performance based. These political machinations
only served to further demoralize the troops.89
Portugal maintained her nominal neutrality, while discretely giving aid to
Great Britain and France in the European theatre, and engaging in outright
armed conflict with Imperial German forces in both Angola and Mozambique.90
In December of 1915, Britain invoked the treaty and requested that the
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Portuguese government seize and transfer to her seventy-six German vessels
(totaling 240,000 gross tons) which were in the Lisbon harbor at the time.
Portugal complied with the request on 24 February 1916 knowing full well the
consequences of her actions. As expected, on 9 March 1916, the German
Minister to Lisbon delivered an ultimatum to the Portuguese government which
became their de facto declaration of war against Portugal.91
Battlefield losses for the Portuguese were high both in the European and
in the African theatres of war. The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps was sent to
Flanders where it served with no relief from April 1917 to April 1918. At the
Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, the Portuguese presented staggering
figures for losses, particularly those of non-combatant Africans used for portage
and iabor duties. It is also estimated that Portuguese spending for the war
ranged from £60,000,000, conservatively, to possibly £80,000,000. The costs of
the war were such that it remained as one of the underlying factors which
contributed to the financial crisis of 1926 and the consequent coup of 28 May
1926.92
Yet, for all of their sacrifices they received little in reparations at the Peace
Conference. In the end, the Reparations Commission deemed that Portugal-like
Japan, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia-would receive 0.75% of the total
German reparations payment.93 Beside reparations, Portugal demanded the
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southern portion of German East Africa, but was denied. Instead, they were
granted a small portion of territory known as the Kronga Triangle. This small
addition extended Mozambique's northern frontier to a natural barrier, the
Rovuma River.94
Portugal's early neutrality was a direct result of her alliance with Great
Britain. Military weakness notwithstanding, many within the Portuguese
government did not want to remain neutral in large part because they thought
that real neutrality would be impossible to maintain. They also argued that
Portugal would be in a better position to protect her interests, particularly her
colonial interests, after the war if she participated as a belligerent. Finally, many
also wanted to join the fray out of a sense of national pride, i.e. they wanted the
newly established Portuguese Republic to prove herself internationally by
participating in the Great War.95
These setbacks at the negotiations table did nothing to bolster support of
the First Republic at home. Indeed, the Portuguese government seemed
incapable of solving the critical economic and social ills of the time. Of course
this task was made all the more difficult because politically its Parliament was a
hotbed of ideological discontent and personal rivalry. The First Republic lasted
fifteen years and eight months. In that time the Portuguese saw the rise and fall
of no fewer than forty-five governments.96
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The British were highly critical of Portugal's political instability, as well as
the ongoing social and economic turmoil in Portugal. Their main concern
stemmed from fears over the safety of British investments in Portugal and in the
Portuguese Empire. Indeed that instability was one of the key factors in the
continued call for a reassessment of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. In 1927, Sir
Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote the Foreign
Office asking for clarification regarding the benefits for Great Britain in the
centuries old alliance. He argued that not only was the Portuguese government
far too volatile, their constant suspicion of British motives in Portuguese Africa
undermined the relationship. The Foreign Office reiterated Crowe's countermemo of 1913 and then continued with a lengthy discussion of all the benefits
derived by the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Included was Portuguese assistance
rendered during both the Boer War and the First World War. It also argued that
the stability of the alliance allowed Britain to create defensive plans in which their
warships, submarines and aircraft had access to and use of the Tejo River and
the Portuguese Atlantic Islands. The Foreign Office response then went on to
say that ending the alliance could potentially lead Portugal into the arms of a
British enemy. Finally, the counter-memo closed with the rather insightful
observation that continuing in the alliance gave the British Foreign Office "a
certain measure of control" over Portuguese foreign relations. In effect, the
counter-memo argued that with Portugal Great Britain had a sure thing—
militarily, politically, strategically, and commercially.97
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By the time of this exchange, Portugal's political situation changed rather
dramatically. Her political instability led to a military coup on 28 May 1926. What
followed was a military dictatorship lasting from 1926 until 1933. In the last years
of the military dictatorship a young economics professor from the University of
Coimbra was recruited to act as the Minister of Finance. From this post, Antonio
de Oliveira Salazar began establishing his own power base. By December of
1932, he was appointed Prime Minister. The following year he helped write a
new constitution for Portugal which was accepted in a general national plebiscite.
This new form of government was known as the Estado Novo (New State). From
this point forward, Salazar ruled as dictator of Portugal until his incapacitation
resulting from a cerebral hemorrhage in September of 1968.
Salazar's regime was welcomed in more than a few British circles. First
as Minister of Finance, then as Prime Minister, Salazar had a clear plan to bring
monetary stability to Portugal. Later, his ability to establish political and social
order in Portugal came as quite a relief to many members of the British
Parliament. By 1937, the same Sir Austen Chamberlain who a decade earlier
had called for British withdrawal from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was now
willing to provide a forword for a book of translated published interviews of Prime
Minister Salazar.98

Portuguese-German Colonial Rivalry of the 1930s
The British historian Glyn Stone has argued that "the single greatest threat
to the Portuguese empire during the 1930s came from the revival of German
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colonial ambitions which had surfaced during the Weimar period."99 Between
1933 and 1935 Adolf Hitler pursued a public policy which seemingly dismissed
the idea of colonial expansion. He did so in an effort to gain an alliance between
Germany and Great Britain. Although his efforts failed, the British did begin to
favor the idea of revising the Treaty of Versailles so as to placate Germany.
They knew that any European conflict involving Germany would eventually lead
to another world war. With their military resources already strained, the British
knew they must try to avert this outcome at all costs.100
From 1936 on, the German government began to reverse its original
policy by demanding colonial revision. Hitler launched a new propaganda effort
in which Germany was made to appear the victim in the colonial arena. Although
publicly Germany claimed to want only the restitution of its former colonies, in
private conversations with French and British representatives its demands
included the colonial possessions of many nations, but especially those of
Portugal.
When Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister of Great Britain many
British officials were already sympathetic to German grievances. This is not to
say that they were prepared to pacify Germany by surrendering British colonies.
They were not, however, indisposed to reorganizing the whole of central Africa to
assure peace on the European continent.
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The Portuguese were quite sensitive to this type of plan. Back in January
of 1936, Armindo Monteiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, had met with
Anthony Eden, United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations, for a rather
frank conversation regarding the state of Anglo-Portuguese relations and the
future of Portugal's colonies. Eden then relayed the details of the conversation to
Sir C. Wingfield, British Ambassador in Lisbon, in speaking with Eden, Monteiro
argued that his government desired better relations with Great Britain with regard
to both cultural and military exchanges. The focus of the discussion then shifted
to the Portuguese Empire, "...Speaking with the greatest emphasis, he [Monteiro]
stated that in no circumstances would Portugal yield one inch of her colonial
territory. They would fight to the last, if need be, for the preservation of their
colonial territories."101
To discuss renewed German colonial demands as well as other pressing
issues, an Anglo-French Conference was held on 29 and 30 November 1937 at
10 Downing Street Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, the First Earl of Halifax and
Lord President of the Council, presented a summary of a two-hour conversation
he had had with Adolf Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, a
few weeks earlier. At that meeting, Schacht had suggested to Viscount Halifax
the return of Togoland and the Cameroons from the French, as well as "a block
made up of parts of the Belgian Congo and Angola, under something like a
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mandate." He intimated that besides appealing to these countries' desire for
international peace, Britain might "consider compensating Portugal on the east
coast from Tanganyika."102
After hearing this report, the consensus among the French and British
delegates was that this proposal was indeed sound. However, they also noted
that because of the nature of the concessions this issue needed to be handled in
a very delicate manner. Indeed, the statement released to the press stated only
that, "A preliminary examination was made of the colonial question in all its
aspects. It was recognized that this question was not one that could be
considered in isolation and, moreover, would involve a number of other
countries...(and) would require much more extended study..." The smaller
European colonial powers, sensing that they were the unnamed "other
countries," were outraged.103
Contrary to public assurances, on 3 March 1938, Neville Henderson,
British Ambassador to Germany, presented Hitler with a British proposal for
German recolonization. Basically a new central German Africa was to be
created. The northern parameter was to be established by granting small
portions of the southern British and French territories. The demarcation line was
drawn below the Sahara, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Abyssinia, and Italian
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Somaliland. The southern parameter, however, fell just beyond Portuguese
West Africa, the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika, and Portuguese East Africa. The
only significant qualifier was that Hitler accept an arms limitation agreement, and
pacification in Czechoslovakia and Austria.104
Hitler did not accept the proposal. He would not agree to any proposal
based on quid pro quo in Europe. He told Henderson he would reply in writing to
the plan. He did not.
Anschluss put an end to all formal discussions of German pacification via
the redistribution of African colonies. British public opinion would no longer allow
for it. Nonetheless, Hitler did not dismiss the idea of German expansion into
Africa. Students at German universities continued to study "colonial science,"
German colonial police forces were undergoing training in Italian colonies, and
Franz Xaver von Epp, head of ihe German Colonial Policy Office, received
instructions to continue to formulate a strategy for the occupation of colonial
territories in Africa.105

Conclusion
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was
already four hundred years old. As kindred spirits in a Crusade against the

104Foreign

Office, "Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) to Viscount Halifax (Received March 4, 9:30
am)," C1474/42/18. Henderson repeated to Hitler the instructions given to him in a note from
Eden dated February 12, 1938. Foreign Office, "Mr. Eden to Sir N Henderson (Berlin),"
Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939, C995/42/18.
105Helmuth

Stoecker, ed., German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings Until the
Second World War, Translated by Bernd Zollnei (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1986), 375.

79

Moors, they had joined forces in Iberia and elsewhere. These early experiences
forged an initial bond between the two reaims that was reinforced by their
collaboration in all of the major European conflicts of this period. Throughout
their involvement in the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, and the War
of Spanish Succession, these two kingdoms depended upon one another both
politically and militarily.
This mutual dependence was first evidenced by the Treaties of 1373 and
1386, which established their perpetual friendship and alliance, in 1386 this legal
union was further enhanced by the marriage of King Joao of Portugal to Philippa
of Lancaster. Even the Spanish hegemony of the Iberian Peninsula from 1580 to
1640 was not enough to permanently breech this alliance. Although at first
circumstances were difficult, these ties were reinitiated in the Treaty of 1640.
With the reestablishment of the Stuart monarchy, the Anglo-Portuguese
alliance was reaffirmed once more in the Treaty of 1661 and the marriage of King
Charles II of Great Britain and Catherine of Braganpa. The Treaty of 1661 not
only reaffirmed the former treaties, but also brought into the relationship a formal
recognition of the importance of Portugal's colonies to both realms—i.e. the
promise of the British monarchy to protect Portugal's colonies in perpetuity
against all enemies as though they were her own.
While political and military concerns were paramount throughout this
period, commercial ties were evident from the very start. Portugal's geographic
location made her a commercial center for the exchange of Mediterranean
goods. This was a great draw for British merchants who engaged in both the
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sale of British goods to Mediterranean markets and the transport of
Mediterranean goods to British markets. Formal commercial ties were furthered
by the Treaty of 1703, also known as the Methuen Treaty, which established the
British woolens for Portuguese wines exchange. This understanding lasted for
well over one hundred years. It stimulated the rapid expansion of British
manufacturing, while allowing for the development of one of Portugal's most
important exports, Portuguese wine—particularly port. The development of this
export and the reforms of the late 1700s allowed for the stabilization of Portugal's
economy and for the first time a balance of trade between the two realms which
favored Portugal
Thus, in the first two phases of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, Great
Britain and Portugal were equal partners, in the sense that both gained great
advantages from the alliance—militarily, politically, and commercially. Both
called upon the alliance at critical moments in their kingdom's history. At times
this assistance took the form of direct military support or tactical advantage. At
other times, it was the simple recognition of the legitimacy of an ally's claim to
their realm. Ultimately, both nations also gained from having access to reliable
commercial markets.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Portugal faced formidable
challenges. Napoleon's Continental System, the Peninsula War, and the
consequent withdrawal of the royal family to Rio de Janeiro, placed tremendous
pressure on the Portuguese monarchy and his subjects. Thus began the English
century, a century of military, political, and commercial dependency which
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relegated Portugal to second-rate status worldwide. By the end of the nineteenth
century, British influence was felt in virtually every sector of Portuguese society.
While the political scene in Portugal remained chaotic, resentment over British
interference was the one sentiment common to all Portuguese parties This
dependency coupled with feelings of resentment permanently altered the AngloPortuguese alliance. The British lost all respect for their ally, and the Portuguese
mistrusted British intentions at every turn.
The "Scramble for Africa," with its inherent geopolitical and commercial
demands, only intensified this early rift. Portuguese claims to vast territories in
central Africa were based on "prior discovery." After the Berlin Conference of
1885 territorial claims had to be based on "effective occupation." Due to financial
instability and political unrest at home, the Portuguese were hard pressed to
meet this new standard abroad Moreover, she found herself at loggerheads with
the very ally she depended on to protect her colonies, Great Britain. Rather than
protecting Portuguese colonies as though they were her own—as promised in
the Treaty of 1661-Britain protected her own interests. Sometimes this meant
supporting Portuguese claims. At other times, this meant using Portuguese
claims as a tool for manipulating potential threats in the region, like the Boers
and later the Germans. Indeed, in the end, what preserved the alliance was
once again a common enemy—this time Germany—and a call to arms. Portugal
faced this challenge and suffered markedly for it.106
Portugal's Napoleonic experience had relegated her to the position of a
second-rate power. The only thing that saved her from slipping any further in
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international status was her African colonies. She had to preserve her colonies
in order to preserve her status. Ironically, it is the British Ultimatum and the
events surrounding it, which bring home this key point to the Portuguese. Prior
to 1890 some Portuguese elites had questioned the role of the colonies. After
1890, there was little question as to the vital importance of the colonies—not
necessarily from a practical sense, but from a sense of national honor. After
World War I, Portugal's attention once again shifted to her African colonies where
she hoped to reap some commercial benefit and build economic stability at
home. Instead of facilitating her colonial goals in Africa—the new standard of
greatness and prestige in European circles-Britain was thwarting or, at the very
least, undermining Portugal's efforts. In its centuries old existence, the AngloPortuguese alliance came under its greatest scrutiny at this time because rather
than furthering Portugal's national interests, it hampered them.
At the end of the World War II, Portuguese policy-makers came to the
conclusion that they could no longer rely on the assurances of the AngloPortuguese alliance to further their political, military and commercial interests.
Consequently, they cautiously began to shift their diplomatic energies towards
the United States. By 1951, Portugal came to embrace a series of American
initiatives—the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and M.D.A.P.—in order to meet those
interests and supplant the waning Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
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CHAPTER III

FAIR WEATHER FRIENDS

Well-established commercial ties between Portugal and Great Britain
facilitated the establishment of early trade networks between Portugal and the
British colonies in North America. The strongest commercial ties for the United
States economy—Great Britain excluded-were those that stretched across the
Atlantic into the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. This voyage required a stop in
Portugal's Atlantic islands for refitting. Both Portuguese and British merchants in
Lisbon, Porto, and other Portuguese port cities negotiated with colonial merchant
houses. More often than not, Portuguese merchants negotiated for British
colonial goods meant for re-exportation to Portuguese colonies, principally Brazil.
Though not remarkable in terms of tonnage, these early trade networks had a
permanent impact on the growth of the trans-Atlantic shipping lines and, to a
point, defined the extent of future Luso-American relations prior to WWII.
Prior to 1760, Portuguese imports from the North American colonies
included cod, grains, rice, timber, and barrel and pipe staves. After 1760, there
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was a steady increase of grain exports to Portugal from the colonies. New York,
Pennsylvania and Maryland sold wheat, maize and flour. Indian corn and bread
was also shipped from both New York and Maryland. For a brief time, South
Carolina traded in rice. Meanwhile, timber and pipe staves were shipped from
New Hampshire.1 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Portuguese
exports to the British North American colonies included—but were not limited tosalt, olive oil, fruits, wines (primarily from the island of Madeira, and Port), and
some Asian spices.
The Azores became an outpost of the Mediterranean trade. American
ships bound for the Baltic stopped in the Azores to top off their cargoes with
oranges, whale-oil, and wine. Whaling vessels also made port in the Azores for
several critical reasons. First, they were able to unload early oil acquisitions
which were then shipped back to Boston. Second, they needed to pick up both
supplies and men.2
Consequently, these family business connections had an impact on the
development of the North American trans-Atlantic shipping lanes. These islands
became part of the route. They were a regular port of call, not the exception.
New Englanders became familiar with the place-names Madeira, Azores, St.
Michael, and Fayal. Likewise, Madeirans and Azoreans alike knew the New
England place-names Boston, Providence, Newport and New Bedford. This may
1Harold
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have eased the minds of those young men who left these isolated islands and
joined the crews of American merchant vessels.
Indeed, it was not until the whaling industry took root in 19th century New
England that a steady stream of Portuguese began to arrive on American
shores.3 Conditions on whaling vessels were harsh—long voyages, mean
rations, and low wages. It became difficult for American captains to find the
necessary crewmen at home to fit out their ships. Instead they would set out
with only a minimal crew of about twelve. Once they reached a way station in the
Atlantic, they would take on supplies and sailors The two most frequent stops
were on the islands of Fayal (Azores) and Brava (Cape Verde)—both part of the
Portuguese realm. After the voyage, many of the Bravas remained as seamen,
but most of the Fayalense turned to other means of employment in New England.
They became a part of the history of Portuguese immigration to the United
States.4
These early commercial exchanges led to the development of several
immigration streams from Portugal to what would become the United States. It
was not until the post-Civil War period, however, that the Portuguese began to
3The
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migrate to the United States in what can be called a mass migration. Totaling
250,101, his first mass migration began circa 1870 and continued until 1921
when quota restrictions reduced migration to a minimum. A second wave, now
nearly matching the first, began in the 1960s and continues to this day.5
These early trade networks between the two nations and the resultant
immigration streams affected the development of Luso-American diplomatic
relations. Given her long-standing alliance with Great Britain, it should come as
no surprise that Portugal was the first European power to close her ports to rebel
ships during the American Revolution. Yet, no sooner had hostilities ended
between the belligerents than Portugal entered into talks for a favorable treaty
with the new Republic. These discussions resulted in the signing of the Treaty of
Commerce and Friendship of 1786. Although neither government ever ratified
this treaty, both parties lived up to the spirit of the treaty.
The nineteenth century was a remarkably turbulent period for both the
United States and Portugal. At times it seemed as though events were
conspiring to keep these potential allies apart. For the United States, it was the
War of 1812. During the course of the war, the General Armstrong incident of
1814 caused American diplomats and the American public to question Portugal's
integrity. For Portugal, her loss of Brazil in 1822 led to violent and troubling times
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at home. These domestic issues were both a distraction and a drain on the
Portuguese economy. Nevertheless, by the mid-nineteenth century LusoAmerican relations reemerged once again based on the completion of a solid
commercial treaty, The Treaty of 1840.
Ironically, it is the very nature of this relationship, which seems to be the
problem. By the end of the nineteenth century, Luso-American relations are still
by and large limited to trade and immigration. There is a brief period of political
and military interaction during World War I, and just after with the signing of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. With these exceptions in mind, Portugal did not
place great stock in the importance of a traditional political/military alliance with
the United States; nor did the United States want to pursue the same with
Portugal—or any European power for that matter. It was not until the Second
World War that the United States became a significant element of Portuguese
foreign relations, and vise versa. Until then, they remained fair weather friends.
This chapter provides a synthesis of Luso-American diplomatic relations
prior to the Second World War. It examines these relations from the Early
Republic to the 1930s. It gives evidence to the fact that, although there are
persistent commercial ties, these ties never bridge the political gap between the
two nations. Understanding the limits of Luso-American relations gives insight to
their strained relations during the Second World War. Moreover, it makes the
postwar shift in Luso-American relations clearer and more significant.
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Enter the Diplomats
The American Revolution
Formal diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United States of
American got off to a shaky start. When the British colonies of North America
rebelled, it stood to reason that Portugal would not be receptive. First, although
a colonial rebellion would be considered an internal matter, support for the rebels
would run counter to the spirit—if not the letter--of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.
Second, early Portuguese recognition of American independence might hinder
Portugal's attempts in South America to gain more favorable terms regarding her
borders with her rival Spanish colonies. Why would Britain advocate Portuguese
colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere, if concurrently the Portuguese
were promoting British losses in the same region? Lastly, Portugal was
concerned that revolutionary ideas might be contagious and spread south to
Brazil, a colony she could not afford to lose. Consequently, the American
Revolution challenged Portuguese foreign policy from both a practical as well as
an ideological standpoint.
The timing of the American Revolution could not have been worse for the
Portuguese. Brazil's significance within the Portuguese Empire was nearing its
apogee. During the eighteenth century, Brazil had become the key to Portugal's
Atlantic trade. Not only did she provide the metropole with a wealth of in-demand
commodities such as sugar, brazilwood, and tobacco but, beginning in 1699, she
provided Portugal with a steady stream of gold and diamonds. Within fifteen
years, Lisbon received as much bullion from her mines in Brazil as Seville had
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received from all her colonies in the Americas combined since the arrival of the
conquistador in 1493 until 1660.6
The rapid influx of gold brought tremendous wealth and prestige to Joao
V, the King of Portugal, and his court. It paid for the New World grains that
Portugal so desperately needed. It drove the extraordinary increase in demand
for foreign manufactured goods and luxury items in Portugal. Most importantly, it
paid for the reconstruction of Lisbon after the devastating earthquake of 1755.
As such, Portugal maintained strict control over Brazil. This had not
always been the case. Portuguese claims to Brazil were challenged by the
Dutch in the seventeenth century, and then again by the French in the early
eighteenth century Portuguese forces in the region successfully met both these
challenges. Yet, they were heavily criticized by their British allies for their
apparent lack of strong defenses. The security of Brazil being paramount to
Portuguese foreign relations, the Marques de Pombal set about the
reorganization of Brazil's defenses. In a note dated 20 June 1767, the Marques
de Pombal made clear the significance of Brazil to Portugal, "[on the defense of
Rio de Janeiro]...depended the security of this precious continent."7
By 1775, for the most part, Portuguese territorial claims in South America
went undisputed. The one exception to this was the area between Brazil and
present day Uruguay. This region had been a point of conflict between Spain
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and Portugal since the Portuguese had regained their independence in 1640.
Borders were negotiated and established in various treaties only to be tested and
breached. In May of 1774, Spain sent an overwhelming force along the Rio de la
Plata to try, once and for all, to establish Spanish dominance over this region.
Although at first highly successful, this assault became bogged down at the Rio
Grande de Sao Pedro.8
Portugal requested British support in order to repel the Spanish.
Unfortunately for the Portuguese, the British were pre-occupied by their own
American colonial problems. In an effort to show support for British action in their
North American colonies, the Marques de Pombal convinced the King Jose of
Portugal to issue a royal decree ironically dated 4 July 1776. The decree closed
all ports within the Portuguese Empire to American shipping. It required that
American ships currently in port set sail within ten days. Furthermore, the edict
ordered that, while in Portuguese waters, American ships "may not be given any
assistance in any form whatsoever," including those in distress 9
This tactic failed miserably. The British were not willing to bring any
pressure to bear on the Spanish whatsoever in regard to South America because
it did not suit her needs. With a colonial rebellion on her hands, the British did
not want to antagonize Spain. Spain was allied to France, and France was still
8Maxwell,
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seeking ways in which she could regain some of her losses from the Seven
Years War.10 Thus, by assisting Portugal in her South American border dispute,
Britain might have delivered two powerful European allies into the hands of her
enemy.
On the other side of the pond, the Americans were not pleased with the
harshness of the edict. Eighteenth century communications being what they
were, it was unclear to the Americans whether the rumors of the edict were true
or not. Some Americans, such as Silas Deane, the American representative at
Versailles, clamored for aggressive action. A declaration of war might be enough
to win over the Spanish and then the French. Fortunately for future LusoAmerican relations, Congress hesitated.11
In the spring of 1777, Congress asked Benjamin Franklin, resident
American diplomat in France, to compose a response to the edict. In true
Franklin style, the response was both insightful and persuasive. It began:
As a long Friendship and Commerce has subsisted between the
Portuguese and the Inhabitants of North America, whereby Portugal
has been supplied with the most necessary Commodities in Exchange
for her Superfluities, and not the least Injury has ever been committed
or even attempted or imagined by America to that Kingdom, the
United States cannot but be astonished to find not only their
commerce rejected, but their Navigators who may need a Port when in
Distress refused the common Rights of Humanity, a Conduct towards
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the said States not only unprecedented, but which we are confident
will not be follow'd by any other Power in Europe;12

As the first official communication between the United States of America and
Portugal, the response takes on added importance. Franklin's appeal for
revoking the Edict of 1776 was not based on support for the ideals of the
revolution—which certainly would have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, he first
appealed to the common commercial interests of both nations-trans-Atlantic
trade being crucial to the economic security of both countries. He then went on
to appeal to Portugal's sense of standing within the other seafaring nations of the
world when he voiced American dismay over the breach in common nautical
protocol regarding ships in distress.
Although Franklin's appeal went unanswered by the Portuguese
government, events in Portugal itself led to a series of changes in Portuguese
foreign policy. Most significant of these events was the death of King Jose I on
24 February 1777. Queen Maria I succeeded King Jose. One of her first acts as
monarch was to dismiss Pombal. As Pombal had been the key architect of
Portuguese foreign relations, his dismissal allowed for not only a change in the
direction of Portuguese foreign policy but also a quickening of the pace of that
change.
Queen Maria ordered the initiation of negotiations with Spain. This
resulted in the conclusion of two treaties. First on 1 October 1777, both parties

12Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros. "North American Formal Protest against the
Portuguese Edict of 5 July 1776, Paris: 16 July 1777," ex. 550, nr. 1, Arquivo Nacionai da Torre
do Tombo: as quoted in Walker, 16-17.
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signed the Treaty of Santo lldefonso which definitively set the colonial
boundaries of South America. This treaty was quickly followed by the Treaty of
Pardo, signed 11 March 1778, which conclusively ended hostilities between
Spain and Portugal in South America. Thus, in just over a year of her
predecessor's death, Queen Maria had diffused what she saw as the greatest
threat to the Portuguese state, i.e. open conflict with Spain.13
By 1779, Portugal managed to gain from Great Britain formal recognition
of her neutral status in the American Revolution. Regardless, the British
continued to use Portuguese ports and harbors as hunting grounds for French,
Spanish and American merchant ships. In the summer of 1780, after a series of
bold, and in fact illegal, actions taken by British privateers in Portuguese waters,
Queen Maria was forced to bar all privateers from her ports. In referencing
British privateers her edict specifically cited Article 18 of the 1654 AngloPortuguese Treaty. Such assertiveness on the part of the Portuguese monarch
was necessary in order to convince the Americans, French and Spanish of the
validity of Portuguese neutrality.14
Beyond this formal response, Queen Maria decided to finance the rescue,
housing and eventual repatriation of captured American sailors on several
occasions. When Franklin approached the Portuguese government with an offer
to reimburse the government for expenses, the offer was cordially rejected. It

13lbid.,
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was explained to him that the Queen enjoyed helping sailors in distress. This
response was interpreted by Franklin as clear evidence of a distinct change for
the better in Luso-American relations.15
Of course it was Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown on 19 October 1781 that
opened the door to Portuguese recognition of American independence. On the 1
July of the following year, Portugal finally joined the League of Armed Neutrality.
Since negotiations for a peace between Britain and the United States had begun
four months earlier, it was a foregone conclusion that America would indeed gain
its independence. Confident that Britain had come to terms with the loss of her
North American colonies and anxious to resume trade with North America, on 15
February 1783, Portugal formally opened her ports to the United States of
America. By issuing this edict, Portugal—along with France and Holland—
became one of three nations in the world to recognize American independence
prior to the Peace of Paris (3 September 1783).16
The events of the American Revolution had placed Portugal in a
precarious diplomatic position. Her geographic position had facilitated the
development of strong commercial ties with Britain's North American colonies.
The Atlantic Ocean—and to a great extent Portugal's Atlantic archipelagoes
(Madeira, Azores, and Cape Verde)--was the link between these two regions. It
helped shape their relations. Nevertheless, in order to maintain her position in

15Piecuch,

30. For further discussion of the unofficial efforts of Queen Maria's
government to ease the mounting tension between Portugal and the United States, see Walker,
24-28.
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the world and preserve her empire, Portugal could not have entered the fray as a
belligerent for either side.
Neutrality was her only option. It preserved the metropole and the empire,
particularly Brazil. As quoted above, Pombal thought the security of Portugal
depended on that of Rio de Janeiro. His political fall from grace did not alter this
perspective, just the opposite. Queen Maria's new Secretary of State for the
Overseas Dominions, Martinho de Melo e Castro, made clear the significance of
Brazil in a letter of instruction dated 1779. In this letter to the Viceroy of Brazil,
Luis de Vasconcelos e Sousa, regarding the governance of Brazil, de Melo e
Castro stated emphatically, "It is demonstrably certain that Portugal without Brazil
is an insignificant country."17
Thus, Portugal's actions during the American Revolution have little to do
with commerce and even less to do with enlightenment philosophy. Instead, her
actions can best be understood as the actions of an Atlantic power placing the
interests of her empire before all else. Brazil, and all she had to offer, was of
paramount importance to Portugal. After Portugal's losses in Asia, Brazil helped
her regain her status as a colonial power, not just economically but also
politically. Portugal was a great power because she controlled Brazil, a vast and
rich land.
The colonial gains or losses of Great Britain were of no direct
consequence to Portugal unless the resultant hostilities placed her own colonies

17"lnstrugoes

de Martinho de Melo e Castro to Luis de Vasconcelos e Sousa acerca do
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at risk. Portugal had a small navy and a huge empire. She depended on Great
Britain to uphold the military commitment sworn to her in the Secret Article of the
Treaty of 1661. Yet she could not and did not allow this naval dependency to
dictate her foreign policy because to do so would not only place her sovereignty
at risk but more importantly it would jeopardize her standing as a European
power. To this end, Portugal maintained her neutrality during the war. At war's
end, she could consider herself, if not an ally to all, at worse an enemy to none.

The Treaty of Commerce and Friendship of 1786
Early recognition of the United States of America removed any final
barriers to direct diplomatic contact between the two nations. America took the
first steps towards establishing normal relations. In a letter dated 7 June 1783
and addressed to Vicente de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese Minister to
Versailles, Benjamin Franklin began to lay the groundwork for a commercial
treaty.18 In the same month Congress resolved "that the treaty with Portugal be
entered on immediately."19 By the end of the summer, John Adams, the
American representative in the Netherlands, opened discussions with the
Portuguese minister, Joao Theolonica de Almeida, regarding common
commercial interests between the two nations. Thus, by the time the Peace of
Paris was signed in September of 1783, it was clear that the United States was
anxious to resume normal relations with Portugal. For both nations, normal
relations meant business relations. It comes as no surprise then that the focus of

18Walker,

30.

19Piecuch,

31.
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these negotiations was on drafting of a commercial treaty with the goal being the
quick resumption of trade.20
Yet for all their enthusiasm, negotiations for the treaty dragged on for
three years. Both parties shared fault for the delay in part because the parties
approached the negotiations from a different political perspective. Portugal
negotiated from the position of an empire. The United States did not. In the
spirit of the Model Treaty of 1776, American negotiators in both Paris and
London pushed for direct trade with Brazii.21 From the start, Portuguese
negotiators stated emphatically that direct access to Brazilian ports was not
possible, Only Portuguese merchants and their vessels had direct access to
Brazilian goods and ports. Portuguese negotiators noted on several occasions
that no nation, not even Great Britain—who was granted extraordinary privileges
within the Portuguese realm-had direct access to Brazil. This position reflected
not only Portugal's mercantilist policies towards her colonies, but also the real
fear held by the Portuguese court regarding America's revolutionary influence in
the region.22
This fear was evidently well founded. While serving in Paris, Thomas
Jefferson was twice approached by Jose Joaquim Maia e Barbalho, a native of

20lbid„
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Brazil. Originally Maia had written to Jefferson under the alias "Vendek." In his
letter he spoke of the potential for a Brazilian revolution based on the same
ideals as that of the American Revolution. When the two men finally arranged a
meeting, Maia posed the question of American support for a Brazilian uprising
directly to Jefferson. While privately exhibiting enthusiastic support for such a
rebellion as expressed in a letter dated 4 May 1787 to the Secretary for Foreign
Relations John Jay, Jefferson told Maia that the United States could not risk
another war.23
Besides her demands for equal access to Brazilian ports, the United
States also wanted Portugal to accept imports of American flour rather than
cereals. The United States argued that flour kept longer and therefore was a
less risky commodity for trans-Atlantic transport. Portuguese negotiators pointed
out that they needed to protect the interests of their own domestic mills which
ground American cereals into flour for a fee. As in the case of access to
Brazilian ports, neither the Portuguese nor the Americans was willing to
compromise on this issue.24
After negotiations in Paris came to a standstill, London was chosen as a
new venue for talks. Negotiators were selected: John Adams representing the
United States; and Luis Pinto de Sousa representing Portugal. From the onset
these diplomats made a clear case for the primary commercial interests of their
respective countries. Portugal desired American grain, barrel staves, wood for

23Maxwell,

24Walker,
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use in naval construction, masts and spars, pitch, potash, hides, ginseng and,
above ail, salted cod. On the other hand, the United States wanted wines from
Madeira, Carcavelos, and Oporto, fruits, olive oil, and salt. By initiating the
negotiations based on what each nation wanted to purchase from the other
rather than what they wanted to sell, these talks moved forward at a quick
pace.

oc

By 25 April 1786, The Treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed by
both representatives in London. Of the twenty-eight articles of the treaty, twenty
dealt directly with the issues arising from trade. These issues included a
declaration in support of freedom of the seas (with some restrictions), the
standardization of trade regulations, and the establishment of consulates, as well
as the mutual gi anting of most favored nation status. "T wo more articles dealt
with foreign merchants in residence and their right to freedom of conscience—
with a direct reference to Article 17 of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1642—as
well as the protection of merchants, their families and their goods in the case of
war.26
One article of the treaty clearly stood apart from the others in terms of
both context and motive. Article 24 demanded the humane treatment of
prisoners of war. It maintained that prisoners should be well fed, housed befitting
their rank, and quickly repatriated. Contrary to contemporary Portuguese
practice, the article also prohibited the transfer of prisoners to "the East Indies, or
25Calvet
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any other parts of Asia, or Africa."27 In a report to his superiors, Luis Pinto de
Sousa argued that the principles represented in the article were "very just, and
very advantageous for humanity..." and so he could not in good faith suggest
their alteration.28
In part, Article 24 reflected each nation's cultural framework at work. The
idealism inherent in this article spoke to America's early Republic sensibilities.
Thus, although desirous of a world absent of violent revolution, the United States
chose to limit the negative consequences of war—i.e. the mistreatment of
prisoners of war. The quote above from Luis Pinto de Sousa reflected a desire
by the Portuguese to go beyond the standard negotiated self-interests inherent in
most treaties and, instead, to produce a document which served the greater
good.
Idealism aside, this treaty also plainly demonstrated what was most
important to these two Atlantic nations at this time, commerce. The mutual
benefit of trade is what originally drew them to each other, and that is what
brought them back together Ail that was necessary now was the formalization of
relations via the exchange of diplomatic representatives and the ratification of the
treaty. Portugal made it clear that without this exchange she would not ratify the
treaty. Jefferson and Adams both understood this fact. Yet the Continental
Congress could not or would not act.

27lbid.
28Ministerio
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The United States was challenged by the dilemma of trying to establish a
working government at home while at the same time trying to negotiate treaties
with several foreign powers. The Articles of Confederation stood for a weak
federal government which consequently made foreign relations difficult at best.
Early on Portugal stated her desire to appoint a minister to the United States.
She then expected the United States to reciprocate in kind. Much to her chagrin,
the United States hesitated, wanting instead to appoint only a charge d'affaires.
Given Portugal's quick recognition of American independence and the fact that
Queen Maria I had issued orders protecting American vessels in the Straits from
Barbary pirates, both she and her court interpreted this hesitation on the part of
Congress as an affront.29
In reality, this decision had more to do with the pecuniary virtues of the
early Republic as well as an attempt by anti-federalist Congressmen to rein in the
powers of the executive, than a critical assessment of Portugal. Even after
establishing a new constitution which granted the executive body new sweeping
powers, Congress insisted on limiting the number of ministries. It was not until
21 February 1791, that David Humphreys received Senate confirmation of his
post as American Resident Minister to Portugal. Humphreys was selected by
President George Washington himself. Colonel Humphreys, a Yale graduate,

29lt

should be noted that at this time there were four classes of heads of diplomatic
missions: ambassadors; ministers plenipotentiary; resident minister; and charge d'affaires.
Consequently, Portugal's insistence on a resident minister was not excessive. See, Calvet de
Magalhaes, Historia das Relagoes Dipiomaticas, 48-50.

102

had distinguished himself during the Revolutionary War and was a close friend of
President Washington.30
It was Portuguese action, however, that led to Humphrey's appointment as
resident minister. Growing impatience in Portugal forced the Portuguese to take
the lead in this tug of war between the Congress and the Executive. In 1790,
Queen Maria appointed Cipriano Ribeiro Freire as Portuguese Resident Minister
to the United States. Freire was a well-respected member of the Portuguese
diplomatic corps and had been serving as charge d'affaires in London prior to
this new appointment. Once Portugal appointed Freire at this diplomatic level,
eighteenth century protocol dictated that the United States reciprocate in kind.
President Washington sent a message to the Senate explaining the
circumstances and the need for a diplomat of this rank in Portugal. Only then did
Congress finally accede to the request. In terms of the treaty, this action was too
little, too late. Neither government ever ratified the Treaty of 1786. Instead, both
governments soon became preoccupied by other world events.

31

For the United States that situation was the conflict erupting between
themselves and the Dey of Algiers, commonly know as the Barbary Pirate Crisis
of 1793. Thus, although Humphreys' appointment did not have its intended
results-i.e. ratification of the commercial treaty with Portugal-it was nevertheless
advantageous to have a well-trusted individual of high diplomatic rank at the
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ready during the crisis. Whenever possible, during this regional crisis Portugal's
fleet did its best to help the United States merchant fleet.
The perilous events at the end of the eighteenth century foreshadowed the
violence of the nineteenth century in which both nations faced the possibility of
loss of national sovereignty. The United States would once more be challenged
by Great Britain in the War of 1812, sometimes known as the "Second American
Revolution," whereas Portugal faced possible destruction at the hands of
Napoleon's armies.

Challenging Times: the Nineteenth Century
The War of 1812
In the first half of the nineteenth century Portugal faced a series of
formidable challenges-the Napoleonic invasions with the consequential transfer
of the seat of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, the loss of Brazil, and the
War of the Two Brothers. In aggregate these events weakened Portugal
politically, socially and economically. She spent the remainder of the century
trying to reassert herself internationally.
Meanwhile, the United States was drawn into yet another war with Great
Britain, the War of 1812. The end of this war reaffirmed American independence
around the globe, and initiated a period of tremendous expansion for the United
States. Domestically, expansion meant sweeping territorial gains across the
North American continent which culminated in the United States reaching her
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continental boundaries, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Externally, expansion
resulted in an ever-increasing American presence in world trade.
Until 1820, Portugal and the United States maintained strong relations at
the highest diplomatic levels. Both the United States and Portugal raised the
rank of their respective ambassadors to Minister Plenipotentiary—the highest
level in the foreign service. President John Adams invited Portugal to select the
location of her residence in Washington, D.C. along the much-esteemed Ellipse
(the area between the White House and the Washington Monument). Although
this project was never completed, it marked the acme of Luso-American relations
in the nineteenth century. Soon historical events would conspire to spoil the
good will built up between these two nations during the Barbary Pirate Crisis.32
The greatest challenge to Luso-American relations during the War of 1812
involved an American privateer, the General Armstrong. Samuel Chester Reid
commanded the General Armstrong, a brigantine of 246 tons carrying nine guns
and a compliment of ninety men. Captain Reid was Connecticut born and began
his life at sea at the age of eleven. By the time he took command of the General
Armstrong, he had already spent nearly twenty years at sea. After slipping past
the British blockade of New York, the brig began her search for prizes.33
On 26 September 1814, Captain Reid made the fateful decision to put in
to the port of Horta on the island of Fayal (Azores) for fresh water and other
provisions. Portugal was a neutral power in the War of 1812. Yet Captain Reid
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made a special visit to American Consul John D. Dabney to gain assurances of
both the safety of his ship and his men. Consul Dabney informed the Captain
that it had been weeks since a British man-of-war had been spotted in Fayalense
waters.34
That very evening three British warships arrived-the 74 gun Plantagenet,
the 38 gun frigate Rota, and the 18 gun war brigantine the Carnation. Worried,
Captain Reid moved the General Armstrong closer to the protective guns of the
fort at the port of Fayal. Under a beautiful moonlit sky, Captain Reid watched
with increasing trepidation the movement among the British vessels. When he
finally saw several British boats being lowered and approaching his vessel,
Captain Reid gave orders to open fire upon them with both grape and musket
fire.35
These boats retreated only to be followed by many more in a full-fledged
attack by the British. Twice that night the General Armstrong repelled boarders.
At roughly 3 a.m., during an extended lull in the fight, the Portuguese governor
implored Captain Lloyd of the Platagenei to respect Fayal's status as a neutral
port. Much to the governor's chagrin, this request was soundly rejected.
Instead, the Carnation moved into position for a direct assault. After her second

^Ibid., 1226.
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attack, Captain Reid ordered all aboard to abandon ship and then he scuttled his
ship.36
Captain Lloyd, not content with the scuttling ot the General Armstrong,
pressed the Portuguese governor to send a force into the hills to collect the
American sailors. He argued that among them were British deserters. When
they were rounded up, it was determined that none of the men of the General
Armstrong was a British deserter. Soon after the affair, Captain Reid and his
men returned home. Meanwhile, Captain Lloyd resumed his original mission
which was to deliver three thousand British regulars to re-enforce General
Pakenham in preparation for the attack on New Orleans; he arrived ten days
late. The time spent waiting for re-enforcements might have cost the British the
battle.37
The attack upon the General Armstrong in a neutral port was naturally
seen as a gross indiscretion on the part of Captain Lloyd. The Americans looked
to the Portuguese for reparations and argued that the port authorities were
responsible for the safety of the vessels therein moored. At first the Portuguese
agreed. They in turn looked to the British for reparations in payment for
damages done to private homes along the shore as well as the cost of the
General Armstrong. The British agreed to make good on Portuguese losses, but
not American losses. They argued that, according to the provisions of the Treaty
of Ghent, the United States had relinquished ail such claims against Great

36Robinett,
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Britain. Thus, the legal issues came full circle with the United States once again
pressing Portugal for compensation.38
The Convention on the Settlement of Certain Claims was signed in
Washington, D.C. on 26 February 1851 by Daniel Webster of the United States
and J. C. de Figaniere e Morao representing Portugal. It clearly and succinctly
stated the United States' claims against Portugal and the indemnity for which it
was suing. By signing the Convention Portugal accepted the terms and accepted
the right of the United States to bring this case up for arbitration. Louis
Napoleon, acting as arbitrator, decided against the United States.39
In the United States, the General Armstrong affair was a public relations
disaster for the Portuguese Captain Reid and his men had received a hero's
welcome upon their return. As such, the affair stayed in the public memory for
quite some time At first, the Portuguese government was sorely criticized for not
providing the proper defense of Fayal, one of her key ports in the Atlantic.
American shipping lanes, established during the colonial period, depended on
this secure and friendly port. Later, the American public seemed confused over
Portugal's inability or unwillingness to demand the funds from Great Britain.
Finally, American criticism centered on Portugal not taking responsibility for
American losses suffered while in her port and ostensibly under her protection.
The United States was clearly disappointed in Portugal's actions.
38Robinett,
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Brazil
Portugal, however, had more pressing concerns at the time. During this
period the Portuguese monarch, King Joao VI, was still in residence in Brazil. In
the King's absence, Marshall Beresford, British Army Commander in Portugal,
governed Portugal. The Portuguese Cortes pressed for the return of their King.
Meanwhile, in Brazil, rumors of independence worried King Joao and his heir,
Prince Pedro.
The crisis of Brazilian independence revealed the weaknesses in LusoAmerican relations. This situation was made all the more remarkable given the
fact that the initial transfer of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro was well
received in the United States. On 22 January 1808, Prince Regent Joao VI
declared Brazil's ports open to international commerce. Thus, the ports of the
largest colony in the Americas were now open to non-Portuguese vessels. Direct
access to Brazilian ports was a concession American merchants had hoped to
gain during the negotiations for the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between
Portugal and the United States of America of 1786. Americans were also
pleased that Joao VI had granted the United States most-favored-nation status in
Brazil.40
The transfer of power from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro also meant that all
diplomatic negotiations with the Portuguese crown would take place in Brazil.
The United States wasted no time in selecting Thomas Sumter, Jr., as Minister to
Portugal with residence in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, Sumter became the first
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American diplomat to serve in Latin America receiving his commission in March
of 1809.41
On 16 December 1815, then Prince Regent Joao VI raised Brazil to the
status of kingdom. In the following year, when Joao VI finally ascended the
throne, he did so as King of the United Kingdoms of Portugal, Brazil, and the
Algarves. The decision to elevate the status of Brazil from colony to kingdom
was praised in both Europe and in the United States, though for differing
reasons. In Europe, the elevation of a colony to a kingdom was seen as a
possible solution to the destabilizing influence of both the American Revolution
and the French Revolution. By making Brazil an integral and equal member of
the Portuguese realm, it was thought that the House of Braganza could suppress
the liberal forces within Brazil. On the other hand, the United States saw this as
a step forward in the gradual progression of Brazil from colony to independent
nation

42

On the surface, diplomatic relations between Portugal and the United
States seemed cordial. Over the next five years, however, the issue of American
privateers stalking the waters off the coast of Brazil troubled the relationship.
This practice of hiring American privateers for actions against the Portuguese
began shortly after Portuguese forces in South America conquered Montevideo
and threatened the Barida Oriental (the "Eastern Shore" of the Plata River, which
is modern Uruguay) in 1816. Both the Spanish and the Portuguese had claimed
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this region for centuries. After the conquest of Montevideo, local insurgents hired
American privateers to harass Portuguese shipping.43
Almost immediately the Portuguese Minister to the United States, Abbe
Correia da Serra, initiated an extended discourse with the American Secretary of
State—first, James Monroe and then: John Quincy Adams—and sought either
intervention by the American government or satisfaction for losses suffered by
Portuguese citizens at the hands of these American privateers. The United
States argued that it could do neither to satisfy Portuguese demands. In 1818,
after the capture of three Portuguese vessels, Correia da Serra wrote a more
forceful note to Adams. In his reply Adams argued that the United States was
doing all that it could to stop the outfitting of privateers in her ports. He
concluded by reminding the Portuguese Minister of the fate of the General
Armstrong in Horta and of Portugal's own stand regarding her nation's
responsibilities towards American citizens' claims.44
In 1820, even after being called to Rio de Janeiro to take up his new post
as Finance Minister, Abbe Correia da Serra was still trying his utmost to sway
both President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams on the
issue of indemnities. In his argument he often linked the indemnities issue with
the possibility of a new commercial treaty, or more directly with the possibility of
commercial reprisals against the United States if the latter did not comply with
Portugal's request to act in concert with Portugal in condemning what she
considered acts of piracy. He left instructions with the Portuguese Charge
43lbid.,
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d'affaires Amado Grehon to continue to bring pressure to bear upon the United
States. In an effort to put this question to rest, John Quincy Adams wrote a
succinct and forceful letter to Grehon indicating:
It is a principle well known and well understood, that no nation is
responsible to another for acts of its citizens, committed without its
jurisdiction, and out of the reach of its control...When brought within
the jurisdiction of the United States the pirates have been punished by
their laws and restitution has been made to its owners of property
captured by them. Should any citizen of the United States, guilty of
piracy, be captured by the Portuguese government, the United States
will in no wise interfere to screen them from punishment...The laws
and the tribunals of the United States are adequate to the punishment
of their citizens who may be concerned in committing unlawful
depredations upon foreigners on the high seas; at least to the same
extent as the laws and tribunals of other nations...[Finally, to the issue
of reprisals] your government will perceive that they cannot grant
commercial favors to any other nation to the detriment of the United
States, without injuring their own subjects more than the people of this
Union.45

Both men failed to convince the other of the validity of their arguments.
John Quincy Adams understood full well Portugal's frustration over the losses.
Nonetheless, up until this point, the United States had declared herself as a
neutral in the face of a series of Latin American revolutions. The leaders of these
movements and their cohorts were the very individuals who were hiring the
American privateers. Consequently, any joint action against the privateers might
be interpreted as a stand by the United States against the revolutionary
movements in Latin America. This possibility was unacceptable to Adams. Yet
this position remained incomprehensible to Correia da Serra who failed to see
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how an American might come to view the Latin American revolutions as mirror
images of their northern counterpart's.
Despite mounting concerns regarding the stability of South America, the
Portuguese Cortes insisted on the King's return. Finally, on 26 April 1821, King
Joao VI quit Rio for Lisbon. Upon his arrival in Lisbon in early July, he was
presented with a new liberal constitution as a fait accompli. Nonplussed, King
Joao swore an oath to uphold this new constitution46
The Portuguese Cortes never fully accepted Brazil's new status. Finally,
on 7 September 1822, Prince Pedro received word that the Lisbon Cortes had
reduced his powers in an effort to induce him to return to Portugal. Riding along
the banks of the Ipiranga River, Pedro was suddenly overwhelmed by a sense of
his own—and by extension, Brazil's-destiny. He unsheathed his sword and
cried out "Independence or death!"47
Within three months he was crowned, "Constitutional Emperor and
Perpetual Defender of Brazil." Unlike her South American counterparts, Brazil's
independence movement was initiated by a European prince. In some ways this
seemed inevitable since it was the Braganzas who had acted as a unifying force
in Brazil. Prior to their presence in Brazil, this colony had had several distinct
disjointed regions which vied for power. After the royal family settled in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazilians gained the habit of turning to Rio for direction. Therefore, the
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Braganzas gave Brazilians a sense of political continuity and stability even as
Brazil changed from colony to kingdom to empire.48
American recognition of Brazilian independence came rather swiftly in
1824—a year before Portugal recognized the loss of one her kingdoms. By 27
May 1824, Jose Silvestre Rebelo stood before President James Monroe with his
credentials in hand as the first Brazilian ambassador to the United States.
Joaquim Barroso Pereira, interim Portuguese minister to the United States,
quickly protested this act. In his response, John Quincy Adams stated that the
United-States was merely recognizing the de facto status of Brazilian
independence and that this should in no way effect the progress of negotiations
on the Luso-American commercial treaty currently under way in Lisbon49
This rather unenthusiastic response reflected John Quincy Adams' view of
Brazilian independence or, more to the point, it reflected America's view of what
shape the governments of the western hemisphere should take. In 1822 the
United States gave full recognition to Argentina, Chile, Gran Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. In a letter of instruction to Richard C. Anderson newly appointed
American ambassador to Colombia, John Quincy Adams eloquently penned
America's view of the South American revolutions. He stated that "The revolution
which has severed the colonies of Spanish America from European thraldom,
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and left them to form self-dependent governments as members of the society of
civilized nations, is among the most important events in modem history...."
Furthermore, he argued that, "voluntary agreement is the only legitimate source
of authority among men, and...all just government is a compact."50 Thus, the only
legitimate system of government in the western hemisphere was that of a
republic.
In Adams' vision of the Americas, Mexico and Brazil were only temporary
exceptions to this republican vision of the future. This vision becomes clearer
still when later in the same letter, Adams commented on the on-going conflict
between "Buenos Ayres and Brazil for Montevideo and the Oriental Band of La
Plata...[Here Adams affirmed that,] the republican hemisphere will endure neither
emperor nor king upon its shores."51 Thus; from America's perspective, Brazil's
transformation from colony to kingdom to empire was incomplete. The final
stage of metamorphosis would take it from empire to republic; only then would
Brazil have achieved a truly legitimate form of government.
The first fifty years of formal diplomatic relations between the United
States and Portugal reveal the dynamic elements of this relationship Both
nations shared a common commercial interest, which could have served as the
basis for good diplomatic relations. Yet their differing political systems and
consequent differing world views resulted in a distinct lack of common ground.
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With the exception of the Edict of 1777, Portuguese-American relations
were relatively strong in the eighteenth century. The actions of Queen Maria
almost immediately mitigated the effects of this edict. The Treaty of Commerce
and Friendship between Portugal and the United States of America of 1786
reflected both countries' commitment to fair and open trade across the Atlantic.
The Barbary Pirate Crisis of 1793 further emphasized their common maritime
interests and concerns by presenting them with a common enemy, the Dey of
Algiers. Early correspondence by Franklin, Jefferson, and even Adams
emphasized the commonalities between the two nations, e.g. common trade
interests and an adherence to a generally accepted code of international law. In
sharp contrast to this cordial correspondence were the letters penned by John
Quincy Adams which although erudite were cool and, sometimes,
condescending. Although apprehensive towards violent revolution, the United
States was invigorated at the thought of the western hemisphere becoming a
home to free republics. Brazil simply did not satisfy this vision. While a kingdom,
her ports offered great commercial potential to American merchants. As an
empire that commercial gain still existed, but was not sufficient to overcome the
American ideal of liberty in the New World.

The End of a Turbulent Century
The new commercial treaty so desired by the United States would not be
concluded until 1840. In part, treaty negotiations were slowed by Portuguese
domestic upheavals. On the other hand, so tenuous were the relations between
Portugal and the United States at this time that it took a breach in Anglo-
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Portuguese relations to create a sense of urgency on the part of the Portuguese.
After all, Edward Kavanagh, Minister Plenipotentiary to Portugal, had been
attempting to initiate talks leading to a commercial treaty since his arrival in
Lisbon in July of 1835. Although Kavanagh was well respected not only within
Portuguese diplomatic circles, but also by members of the Portuguese
Parliament, personal reputation alone would not be sufficient to convince the
Portuguese monarch of the need for a commercial treaty. Instead, what
facilitated these negotiations was the rupture in Anglo-Portuguese relations
resulting from the infamous Lord Palmerston bill of 1839.52
In July of 1839, Kavanagh was informed that the Queen had selected
Joao Baptista d'Almeida Garrett as her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary. Almeida Garrett was one of the leading figures in Portugal's elite
society. He was the Historian to the Queen, a published poet and dramatist and
an experienced diplomat. Almeida Garrett was granted all rights to negotiate and
sign a reciprocal commercial treaty with the United States, save only that of
ratification. With these broad powers in hand, and as a credit to the abilities of
both men, the provisions of the Treaty of 1840 were negotiated and concluded
within a month.53
The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of
America and Portugal was signed in Lisbon on 26 August 1840. Comprised of
14 articles, it dealt largely with commercial matters. It was a treaty of reciprocity

52This

bill called for the unilateral authority of British captains to board Portuguese
vessels at sea suspected of trafficking slaves. For a fuller discussion, see above Chapter III.
53Calvet

de Magalhaes, Historia das Relagoes DiplomAticas, 125-136.

117

with nearly every article calling for equal treatment or reciprocal treatment of
vessels and goods. It also addressed the installation of representative agents—
i.e. Consuls, Vice-Consuls, etc.-as well as their jurisdiction, and their rights as
private citizens/subjects, it stipulated that the provisions of this treaty would not
be applicable to those ports within the Portuguese Empire that were closed to
foreign vessels.64
There was one exception to the genera! commercial tone of the treaty.
Article 9 dealt with granting safe-haven to both merchant and war vessels:
Whenever the citizens or Subjects of either of the Contracting Parties
shall be forced to seek refuge or asylum in any of the Rivers, Bays,
Ports or Territories of the other, with their Vessels, whether Merchant,
or of War, through stress of weather, pursuit of Pirates, or Enemies,
they shall be received and treated with humanity, giving to them all
favor, facility and protection for repairing their ships, procuring
provisions and placing themselves in a situation to continue their
voyage, without obstacle or hindrance of any kind.56
The expectation was that both parties would provide the others' vessels with
safe-haven regardless of cause of distress and that they would take responsibility
for the care of said vessels while in port. This was a rather undisguised
reference to the General Armstrong incident which at this time remained
unresolved. The Treaty of 1840 remained in effect for more than fifty years.56
It was not until 22 May 1899 that another Treaty of Commerce was signed
between the United States of America and Portugal. Signed in Washington,
54Department
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D.C., this treaty was negotiated by John A. Kasson for the United States and the
Visconde de Santo Thyrso for Portugal. Composed of oniy four articles, this
treaty placed a cap on the rates of duty for goods from Portugal, the Azores and
Madeira—particularly wines and art work Reciprocally, it also placed a cap on
rates of duty on goods to Portugal, the Azores, and Madeira—particularly grains,
agricultural machinery and manufacturing machinery.6'
Before the termination of the Treaty of 1899, there was a formal exchange
of notes in Washington, D C. on 28 June 1910 which granted both nations
reciprocal most favored nation status. This status was maintained and extended
throughout the twentieth century. It was at this same meeting that the United
States formally recognized the names "Porto" and "Madeira" as designations of
origin. Consequently, in the United States the Douro region and the island of
Madeira became recognized demarcated wine producing zones. Accordingly,
wines labeled "Porto" for saie in America had to have been produced in the
Douro region of Portugal. Likewise, by law, wines labeled "Madeira' for sale in
America had to have been produced on the island of Madeira.58
As discussed in Chapter Two, the nineteenth century saw a steady decline
in Anglo-Portuguese relations. African policy, including but not limited to the
slave trade, furthered tensions between Portugal and Great Britain. Overall, a
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marked trade disparity between the two realms also contributed to resentment on
the part of the Portuguese. Jose Estevao Coelho de Magalhaes best expressed
this mounting frustration over Anglo-Portuguese relations during the ratification
process of the Treaty of 1840. A well-known, out-spoken member of Portugal's
Parliament he passionately declared, "I vote for the Treaty...because it
contributes to the emancipation [of Portugal]...from that Nation [Great Britain],
that has vexed us."59
The bilateral agreements of 1899 and 1910 served to strengthen the
traditional commercial ties between Portugal and the United States. Although
they did nothing to expand trade—i.e. the types of goods exchanged remained
the same—they did ensure that established trade goods would be protected by
treaty. For Portugal, American recognition of the Douro River and the island of
Madeira as areas of demarcation were significant since the wines of both regions
were key national exports.
The regicide of 1908 did not hamper commercial relations between
Portugal and the United States; nor did the revolution of October 1910. The
United States did wait a full year before recognition of the newly established
republic. However, this delay in recognition did not coincide with any official
statements either in favor of or denouncing the new government. Instead, the
United States waited for the election of the Portuguese Constitutional Assembly.
This Assembly met for the first time on 19 June 1911. At that first meeting it
abolished the monarchy and announced Portugal's new form of government as
590riginally,
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that of a Democratic Republic. That same day the United States formally
recognized the new Portuguese government60
Although the United States had waited for the Constituent Assembly to
meet, they acted well before their European counter-parts. France was the first
European country to recognize the new Republic on 24 August 1911. By that
time, Edwin V. Morgan had already presented his credentials and become the
first American Minister to the Portuguese Republic.61 Thus, throughout this
violent and tumultuous period in Portuguese history, there was no withdrawal or
reduction in American diplomatic personnel in Portugal nor was there a
suspension of most favored nation status. Instead the United States government
took a wait and see attitude and then, when the provisional government made
good on its promises of a Constituent Assembly, America quickly established full
diplomatic ties.

The Twentieth Century
World War I
World War I should have been the acme of diplomatic activity between the
governments of Portugal and the United States. After over one hundred and fifty
years of diplomatic relations, a common enemy and a common fight should have
been all that was needed to finally bind the two Atlantic powers. Nothing of the
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kind happened Instead, formal diplomatic communication was minimal. This
fact is made all the more remarkable when the story of the World War I American
Naval installation on the island of St. Michael, Azores is told.
At the behest of the British government, Portugal had remained neutral at
the start of World War I. Portuguese and German forces had clashed in Angola
as early as October 1914.62 It was not until the spring of 1916, however, that
Portuguese action forced Germany's hand. In December 1915 Great Britain
invoked the Treaty of Windsor and requested that her oldest ally confiscate
seventy-six German vessels—some 240,000 tons—then in Portuguese ports.
On 24 February of 1916, Portugal obliged. Within two weeks, Germany declared
war on Portugal. Portugal would now face her enemy, not only in Africa but also
in Flanders.63
Portugal's decision to go to war was initially met with mixed reviews. As
the war progressed and the cost of the war was increasingly felt, public opinion
turned more hostile. This situation brought great pressure to bear on the
Portuguese government which was already at its tether. Even with the
assistance of British loans, the Portuguese economy was on the brink of disaster.
Throughout the course of the war, there were continuous food riots, social unrest,
attempted revolutions, and governmental reprisals.64
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Nevertheless, America's entry into World War I on 6 April 1917 was very
well received in Portugal. Within a week the Portuguese Minister in Washington
was meeting with his counterpart at the U.S. State Department. At that meeting
he said his government was prepared to offer the American Navy the use of
Portugal's global network of ports for the purposes of re-supplying its ships. All
the Portuguese government needed to know was what supplies were needed
and where they were needed. They would then do their best to comply. This
message was forwarded to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy who answered that no
such plans were in place but that the Navy would keep Portugal's offer in mind.65
In the following month, the U.S. State Department began negotiating with
foreign governments for permission to establish overseas American coaling
depots. To this end, the American consul in St. Michael, Azores was asked for
an analysis of the storage facilities in the Azores. On 4 June, the consul replied
that Ponta Delgada (on the island of St. Michael) had the best protected harbor in
the archipelago and, therefore, was the best choice. This information was then
passed on to the Navy Department. Much to the surprise of the State
Department and the American consul in St. Michael, on 18 June the American
collier Orion arrived off the shores of Ponta Delgada with ten thousand tons of
coal. More surprising still was the fact that local coal companies had received
instructions from the British Admiralty as to the handling of the Orion's coal
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shipment. Much to the chagrin of the American consul, the validity of these
instructions was confirmed by the British consul in St. Michael.66
The appearance of the Orion, though off-putting for the American consul,
proved fortuitous for the Michaelenses. On 4 July 1917, a large German
submarine, which had been hunting the waters around the Azores, surfaced just
outside of the Ponta Delgada harbor. She used her deck guns to open fire upon
the unsuspecting town. The Portuguese garrison was caught off-guard and was
unable to return fire. Instead, it was the guns of the Orion which fired back and
quickly drove the U-boat below surface. The entire exchange only lasted twenty
minutes. Still, the effects of this skirmish were far-reaching67
From that point forward the local leaders could not do enough for the
American sailors who frequented their island. The men of the Orion were given
a parade in their honor. The following year, the Fourth of July was celebrated on
the island of St. Michael with great enthusiasm. The Portuguese government in
Lisbon was a bit unnerved by the outpouring of goodwill, and eyed with suspicion
any overt increases in the number of sailors stationed on the island.68
At an Allied Naval Conference, held in London on 4 September 1917, the
Allies came to two resolutions concerning the Azores. First, It had been agreed
that, because of its critical position along the Atlantic shipping lines, the Azores
should be defended against possible German attack. Second, it was also
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determined that an American Naval base should be established in the Azores to
help counter U-boat activities in the area. The British also agreed to establish a
high-powered radio station in the same archipelago to help track those U-boat
operations.69
In October of 1917, the State Department inquired once again as to the
intentions of the Navy Department in regards to the Azores. They wanted to
know whether or not there was a concrete plan of action so that the Portuguese
government in Lisbon could be brought on board. In their response the Office of
Naval Operations was still quite vague:
The Navy desires only such facilities ashore and privileges
afloat during the war which will enable them to efficiently prosecute
the campaign against the submarine. .If the Portuguese government
would only understand just what we intended lo do, and that it is only
a base for the duration of the war, and that we are working with them
and not against them in the campaign against the submarine.70

Several telegrams later it was agreed that Ponta Delgada would be the site of an
operating base. On 19 January 1918, the army transport Hancock arrived at
Ponta Delgada with Rear Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, his staff, and fifty marines.
The next day Dunn assumed command of the Azores Detachment of the United
States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. According to naval records,
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when the war ended, there were twelve vessels present at the Azores base—two
yachts, one tender, one oiler, two minesweepers, five submarines and one tug.71
During the course of the war, however, there were many more vessels
and a greater variety of vessels present at the base. The quantity and variety of
vessels required a substantial number of shore facilities to store the necessary
equipment and supplies. Remarkably, the United States never received formal
permission from the Portuguese government for the establishment of a base.
Early discussions regarding the base were stalled when Premier Afonso Costa's
government was ousted by a revolutionary coup d'etat on 8 December 1917.
The new Premier, Sidonio Pais, offered no formal objections to the project, nor
did he give written consent for it/2
In typical fashion, the Department of the Navy moved forward and hoped
that at some point the State Department would catch up. This modus operandi
for Luso-American relations during World War I was not well received by the
Portuguese. At times, it seemed to the Portuguese people that their government
was being too conciliatory to the Americans. This was used as a political tool
against the Costa regime and was one of the contributing factors leading to the
December coup.
Regardless of how it may have seemed to the Portuguese, the Costa
government and later the Pais regime cooperated with the Americans not
because they were pawns, but instead to serve the common cause of winning
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the war. By doing so, Portugal once again fought beside her old Atlantic partner,
Great Britain, in the European theater, while simultaneously fighting for the
protection of her colonies in Africa. For President Wilson, winning the war had
everything to do with ideology. This was the war to end all wars and armed with
his "Fourteen Points" Wilson hoped to shape the world in the image of the United
States without territorial gain, without revolution, but instead through international
agreements establishing the rule of law. This vision ultimately failed. America
was not fully prepared to take a direct role in global politics and European
leaders were not prepared to put aside past rivalries. Yet the next two decades
would bear witness to an American foreign policy that was beginning to envision
a causal link between global political and military tensions and American
wellbeing.

Luso-American Relations, 1920s and 1930s
Between the Great War and the Good War, Luso-American relations could
be described as minimal at best. During this twenty year period, Portugal and
the United States concluded two treaties of Arbitration, both of which were
merely extensions of the Convention of 6 April 1908.73 On the part of Portugal,
this diplomatic inertia was quite understandable as she was wrestling with everincreasing political and social unrest. Between November 1918 and 30 May
1926, Portugal's First Republic saw the rise and fall of no fewer than thirty-one
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governments. From 1920 to 1925, she also experienced an unprecedented 325
bomb incidents. As discussed in Chapter Two, Portugal's First Republic came to
an abrupt end with the successful military coup of 28 May 1926.74
After the military coup of 1926, a Military Junta governed Portugal until
1932. Although relations between Portugal and the United States were not
broken off, they were subdued. On 24 July 1929, when the Kellogg-Briand Pact
of 1928 became effective, Portugal was one of the thirty-two additional parties to
that Pact75 Later that same year, President Hoover proclaimed the signing of a
new broader Treaty of Arbitration between both nations. The language of the
Treaty itself reinforced the ideals of the Kellogg- Briand Pact stating:
Eager by their example not only to demonstrate their
condemnation of war as an instrument of national poiicy in their
mutual relations, but also to hasten the time when the perfection of
international arrangements for the pacific settlements of international
disputes shall have eliminated forever the possibility of war among
any of the Powers of the world;
[Portugal and the United States] Have decided to conclude a
new treaty of arbitration....76

Thus, Luso-American relations at the time reflected the interests of both parties
in achieving world peace. American foreign policy, however, targeted those
nations who presented the greatest threat to world peace by their aggressive
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weapons development programs. This policy was best reflected in the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The resulting Four Power and Five
Power Treaties had several favorable effects. They placed the United States on
a more equal footing with Great Britain while eliminating the threat of the AngloJapanese Alliance, and, just as important, they reduced the tonnage of those
nations which the United States identified as a threat to world peace. Portugal's
military global impact was limited. She posed no real threat to world peace.
She did, however, have possessions in Asia which explained her
presence in the Nine Power Treaty. In Article I of this Treaty, signed on 6
February 1922, the powers agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the
independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."77 For the
United States this treaty supported her foreign policy measures in Asia known as
the "Open Door Policy." China, by this time, had already been carved into many
spheres of influence by a number of European powers. America hoped to level
the playing field, so to speak, so that her merchants could gain equal access to
the China market. American diplomats also felt that the Nine Power Treaty might
ease not only the commercial tension in Asia, but also the ever-increasing
military tensions in that region. For the United States, the development and
implementation of these treaties were informed by their desire to spread the ideal
of liberty by limiting the possibility of a global arms race. For the Portuguese,
participation in the Nine Power Treaty confirmed her place at the table with other
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colonial powers, while also ensuring recognition of her colonies by those same
nations.

Conclusion
Relations between the United States and Portugal prior to World War II
can be characterized by two elements, commerce and immigration, and one
common factor—the Atlantic Ocean. Throughout her long history with the United
States, Portugal's Atlantic Islands served as a common point of commercial
interest. These commercial interests also served as a framework for early
migratory patterns of the Portuguese to the United States. The end of the
eighteenth century saw the continuation of good relations between the United
States and Portugal. In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century,
commercial and migration ties all centered on the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal was
still one of America's top five trading partners—surpassing both Sweden and
Denmark. Although these relations were founded on mutually beneficial
commerce, during this time the balance of trade favored the United States nearly
two to one. Minister Freire prepared a detailed annual report of all Portuguese
imports to the United States—wine, salt, spirits, cheese, coffee, cotton, wax,
coal, soap, pepper, shoes, bindings and cordage—their point of origin and their
value in U.S. dollars. Consequently, the Portuguese government was well aware
of the trade situation. Trade continued unaltered between Portugal and the
United States because Portugal was experiencing an overwhelmingly favorable
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balance of trade with her European partners. These earnings more than made
up for the trade imbalance with the United States.78
For Portugal, the United States showed great potential as a compatible
ally. Like Portugal, the United States was clearly affected by her proximity to the
Atlantic Ocean. This great ocean framed the entire length of her eastern border.
America's trade network was developed on the Atlantic Ocean. Her economic
survival depended on the expansion of that network. Those Atlantic shipping
lanes, discussed earlier in this chapter, took her past Portugal's Atlantic islands,
making them a favorite port-of-cal! for American merchant ships.
Yet for all that the United States brought to the table as a potential Atlantic
ally, Portugal would not aliow America direct access to her colonies. This is
something that American negotiators desired from the start, particularly direct
access to Brazilian markets. Portugal's colonial empire was a key national
interest. She could not allow another country' to gain a foothold in what had
become her most precious possession, Brazil. Furthermore, The United States
was a former British colony turned democratic republic. Portugal saw the
potential for that spark of liberty and did not want Brazil to be consumed by it.
By the late nineteenth century all of this had changed. Brazil was an
independent kingdom. Portugal was focused on her African colonies. America
spanned the North American continent. America's commercial interests were
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becoming global. She had her own navy and a strong sense that she had to
stand up for herself. A century of expansion taught her that lesson.
Just after the turn of the Twentieth Century, political events changed again
for Portugal when she became a troubled, weak and flawed republic. She had
spent much of the last century embroiled in war, as well as intense periods of
civil and social unrest. Worse yet for the United States, Portugal's entrance into
the small circle of republics—the others being France and Switzerland-was a
bloody mess-first a regicide, followed by a coup. Some Americans questioned
the legitimacy of such a government The constant change of governments and
the seemingly endless acts of political terrorism during Portugal's First Republic
did nothing to convince those Americans that the Portuguese were ready to
embrace the rule of law.
For the Portuguese, the turn of the century had wrought wrenching
political changes complete with political and social violence at a pitch never
before experienced and, worse yet, her economy was nearing collapse. On the
other hand, unlike Spain, she was now a republic. Politically, she stood with
France, Switzerland and, of course, the United States of America.

Although

controversial at the time, when Great Britain invoked the provisions of their
medieval alliance, Portugal did not hesitate to enter World War I. She fought the
good fight in the Great War and won. She fought in defense of her African
colonies and won. Portugal was still able to not only maintain her sovereignty,
but also ensure the protection of her colonies during World War I. Colonial
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interests would shape Portugal's foreign policy well into the latter half of the
Twentieth Century and impact its relations with the United States.
Unlike the British, Americans had no sympathy or empathy for Portuguese
colonial woes. Prior to the Second World War, with some exceptions noted in
the previous chapter, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance affirmed not only
Portuguese continental sovereignty, but also Portugal's empire. Both Portugal
and Great Britain had overseas empires. The policies of both nations were
shaped so as to, at the very least, conserve their empires and protect their
interests around the globe.
The United States was a democratic republic whose foreign policy did not
support the concept of empire. Its desire for "free trade" and "open seas" ran
counter to the mercantile system of colonial empire. This was a real stumbling
block for Luso-American relations prior to the Second World War. Yet, after the
Second World War, American policy-makers will put aside this issue in the face
of what they perceive as a much greater threat, Communist Soviet expansion. In
order to check this threat to the West, they launch a series of initiatives—the
Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and M.D.A.P. Portugal avails herself of these proposals
in order to fulfill her own postwar goals of economic, political, and military
security. This marks the beginning of the shift in Luso-American relations.
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CHAPTER IV

"COLLABORATIVE NEUTRALITY"1

On 1 September 1939, the Portuguese government declared its
neutrality in the impending war by stating: "Happily the obligations of our alliance
with England, which we do not wish to shirk from confirming at so grave a
moment, do not oblige us to abandon our position of neutrality during this crisis."2
The immediate crisis that Prime Minister Salazar was referring to was the
German assault on Poland. Many European nations feared that German action
would lead, at the very least, to a continental war. The decision to declare
neutrality was not a quick decision for Portugal. During the course of the year,

1During a speech before the Portuguese National Assembly on 18 May 1945, Salazar
used the term "collaborative" to describe Portugal's neutrality at the start of the war. Recently,
historians described those nations that sided with the Axis as "collaborators." In this case,
however, the term was meant to describe Portuguese neutrality within the constraints of its
alliance with Great Britain—at that point nearly 600 years old. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Discursos e Notas Politicas, 1943-1950L vol. 4 (Coimbra: Coimbra Editors, n.d.), 105.

2Originally,

"Felizmente os deveres da nossa alianga com a Inglaterra, que nao
queremos eximir-nos a confirmar em momento tao grave, nao nos obrigam a abandonar nesta
emergencia a situa?ao de neutralidade." Translation mine. "Nota Oficiosa do Governo
Portugues (Lisboa, 1 Setembro de 1939)," Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de
Polltica Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II (Lisbon
Impresa Nacional—Casa de Moeda, 1973), document number 917.
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Portugal had been engaged in talks with many nations including Great Britain.
Both the British and the Portuguese understood the likely results of growing
tensions within continental Europe because together they had experienced it
many times before.
In 15 February 1939, the British Ambassador handed a Memorial to
Salazar on the subject of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. It offered to open
discussions relative to the provisions of the alliance with the hope of amending it
to suit the current political exigencies in such a manner so as to benefit both
parties.3 In his response in June of that same year, Salazar stated that the
events of March 1939, particularly the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and
the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Third Reich had absorbed the
attention of the Ministries of Europe, Portugal included. After much
consideration, Salazar communicated the following in regards to the alliance:
Of all the other treaties in existence, the anglo-portuguese [sic]
alliance has distinct characteristics—one of which is her age. This is
not only a matter of historical interest, but in the opinion of the
Portuguese government an element of practical reach because it
gives value to the alliance and it presents itself in the eyes of both
populations as a permanent factor in their foreign policy, and not an
accidental instrument of both countries' diplomacy...For the
Portuguese Government it seems preferable...to interpret them [the
clauses of the treaty] in whatever manner may be strictly necessary....
[Although some clauses may be obsolete and others vague] taking
from the alliance that elasticity which has made it possible over the
centuries to adapt itself to the most divergent circumstances would not
be suitable.4
3Ministro

dos Neg6cios Estrangeiros. "Do Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros ao
Embaixador de Portugal em Londres (Lisboa, 18 de Fevereiro de 1939)," Dez Arios de Politica
Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II, document
number 553.
4Originally,

"A alianga anglo-portuguesa tem caracteristicas distintas de toudas as outras
existentes—uma delas a sua antiguidade. Esta nao e somente elemento de interesse historico,
mas na opiniao do Governo Portugues elemento de alcance pratico porque da valor a alianga e a
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In their reply dated 16 August 1939, the British government completely agreed
with Salazar's conclusion adding that recent joint declarations reasserting the
alliance were satisfactory.5
On 1 September 1939 at 5 pm, The German Minister to Portugal met with
Salazar. In this meeting the German Minister explained that he was obliged to
render a communique to Salazar similar to a communique being rendered to
other nations such as Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. He stated that up to this
point Germany had maintained friendly relations with Portugal and hoped to
continue to do so. He stated that, if Portugal remained neutral in the current
Polish-German conflict, Germany would respect that neutrality and the integrity of
Portuguese territory both continental and abroad. If, however, Portugal broke
with that neutrality, Germany would defend her interests with every means
possible. Salazar retorted that Portugal had already communicated in May her
desire to remain aloof from continental conflicts that did not directly affect her,
while still remaining faithful to her British alliance. The German Minister
requested clarification on the British issue to which Salazar replied that the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance was a defensive alliance, the text of which was
apresenta aos olhos dos dois povos como factor permanent da politica externa, e nao apenas
como instrumento acidental da diplomacia dos dois paises....Parece por isso ao Governo
Portugues que seria preferiveL.interpreta-los no que for estritamente necessario.... Nao conviria
tirar a alianga certa elasticidade que Ihe tem tornado possfvel adaptar -se no decorrer dos seculos
as mais diversas circumstancias." Translation mine. Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Do
Ministro dos Neg6cios Estrangeiros ci Embaixador BritSnica em Lisboa: Memorial (Lisboa, 5 de
Junho de 1939," Dez Anos de Politica Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda
Guerra Mundial, vol. II, document number 745.
5Ministro

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Da Embaixada Britanica em Lisboa ao Ministro
dos Negocios Estrangeiros: Nota verbal (Lisboa, 16 de Agosto de 1939," Dez Anos de Politica
Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II, document
number 814.
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public—i.e. this was not a secret pact. The German minister continued this line
of conversation by stating that Portuguese neutrality today couid later be
abandoned—an unstated, but clear reference to Portuguese action in World War
I. Deciding to take the bait, Salazar fully agreed with the Minister citing the
historical precedent of the past war in which nations freely entered into the war in
succession. At this point the German Minister repeated his earlier statement
regarding the assurance of a German response to Salazar, but this time in a tone
which Salazar interpreted as a veiled threat to Portugal. Nonplussed, Salazar
replied that, "If Portugal was at war with Germany, [evidently] Germany would be
at war with Portugal."6 Thus, Salazar was making it clear to the German
Ambassador that Portugal's decision not to enter the war was based on
Portuguese national interest, not fear of German attack. When, and if, Portugal
entered the war she fully understood that German reaction would be harsh.
Portugal would indeed be neutral throughout all of the Second World War.
Throughout the war, she would always remain an ally to Great Britain. This
tightrope performance would demand the very best of her diplomats and, at
times, a little luck.
Over the past two centuries the concept of neutrality has changed. In its
simplest form, neutrality can be defined as "non-involvement in war."7 For
Portugal during World War II, this concept was inadequate. In a radio broadcast

6Ministro

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Apontamerito de conversa eritre o Ministro dos
Negocios Estrangeiros e o Ministro da Alemanha (Lisboa, 1 Setembro de 1939," Dez Anos de
Politica Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II,
document number 897.
7Peter

Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), 20.
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of 25 June 1942, Salazar stated, "...the desire for neutrality cannot be superior to
the interest of the nation."8 Saiazar's form of neutrality carefully balanced
national interests, international alliances, and international law
The consequences of this declaration of neutrality would be felt in every
corner of the Portuguese empire. The geographic location of both mainland
Portugal and her Atlantic islands once again placed her in a precarious position.
Spain was Portugal's first concern. Should General Francisco Franco decide to
ally Spain with Germany, Portugal's entire eastern border would be open to
invasion. Beside Spain, Portugal had a very real fear of assault by Germany.
Her western coastline and her islands were open to blockade and/or
bombardment by the German Navy and, in particular, by her Air Force. German
air raids from bases in France would be facile and, as for land-to-air defensive
weapons, Portugal had little to none. By using her submarine forces, Germany
could blockade Portuguese ports which were also virtually defenseless.
Portuguese colonies, so long coveted by the Germans, were too far away and
too vast for Portugal to protect them.
Portugal's Prime Minister, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, directed
Portuguese foreign policy from 1936 to 1947. In fact, throughout World War II,
he held the posts of both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. As such,
the importance of Saiazar's role in shaping Portuguese foreign policy during

8"...o

desejo de neutralidade nao pode ser superior ao interesse da Nagao." Translation
mine. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Discursos e Notas Politicas, 1938-1943, vol. 3 (Coimbra:
Coimbra Editora, n.d.), 342. Salazar gave this broadcast four months after Portuguese Timor had
been overrun by Japanese forces intent on expelling a Dutch-Australian force that had crossed
into Portuguese territory two months earlier. The events surrounding the Japanese invasion of
Portuguese Timor are discussed in the next chapter.
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WWII cannot be overstated. While publicly proclaiming Portugal's adherence to
her old alliance with Great Britain, he guided Portugal on a path that would
eventually lead her towards closer diplomatic relations with the United States.
Though keenly suspicious of American motives, Salazar had early on
concluded that only the United States could assist Portugal in reaching her
wartime goals. These were threefold. First, she needed to protect her own
sovereignty. Second, she had to maintain both herself and Spain as neutrals for
as long as possible. Finally, she wanted to protect her empire. Salazar's
wartime neutrality, and her postwar diplomatic actions would reflect this new
vision of Luso-American relations.
Concurrently, and to Portugal's benefit, policymakers in the United States
had concluded that Portugal, particularly her Atlantic islands, was a valuable
asset to America's wartime strategic goals. Access to airbases in the Azores
would not only help protect United Nations convoys from submarine attack, but
could also serve as a staging area for sorties to Europe and Asia. Consequently,
Portugal went from being a friendly, yet marginalized country in the 1920s and
1930s, to both a wartime and post-war ally.
This chapter will examine the start of this dynamic shift in Luso-American
relations. It will begin with a brief look at British and German attempts at courting
favor with the Portuguese in the 1930s. This period of Anglo-German rivalry in
Portugal was a bit unnerving to the British, and the Portuguese sometimes
played upon this to their advantage. Portugal's wartime policies will then be
studied through an analysis of the Iberian Pact of 1939; Operation Bracken, and
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the sale of Portuguese wolfram. The results of the Spanish Civil War had both
short and long term consequences throughout Iberia. For the Portuguese
government General Franco's regime was preferable to a communist regime.9
Nevertheless, Franco's new military machine and his debt to Germany and Italy
made Spain a real threat to Portugal. Portuguese diplomats sought a peaceful
solution to what might have been a volatile problem, which resulted in the Iberian
Pact of 1939. Furthermore, prior to 1944, in adherence to her policy of
"collaborative neutrality," Portuguese policies favored the British—and by
extension the Americans. First, during Operation Bracken Portugal built the
Lagens airbase in the Azores. The British were then given command of the
base, while later the Americans were given the use of it under British command.
The Portuguese also sold wolfram to both the Allies and the Axis, but did so in
such a manner as was advantageous to the Allies, until its complete embargo in
June of 1944.

Anglo-German Cultural and Military Rivalries
While from 1936 on Germany secretly pushed for the acquisition of
Portuguese territories, publicly she engaged in a policy of courting favor with the
people of Portugal. In 1937 and 1938, there was a tremendous increase in

9The

Spanish Civil War pitted the Nationalists (center-right) against the Republicans
(center-left). Both groups had support from foreign powers The Nationalists received support
from Fascist Italy and the National Socialist Germany. The Republicans received support from
the Communist Soviet Union. Although they also received support from more centrist nations, the
fact that the Republicans received support from the Soviet Union confirmed Salazar's fears of a
radical element too close to home.
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German activity in Portugal. These actions were all approved and coordinated
by the German Embassy in Lisbon. New German cultural centers were
established at Portuguese universities. German social ciubs became quite
popular. Even German nannies were becoming more common among Portugal's
elite.10
Most disturbing to the Portuguese government was the slow and steady
co-option of the Portuguese news media outlets by the Germans. The latter was
being pursued by two methods. First, a major German agency called D.N.B. had
begun selling international news at a very low price to a majority of the
Portuguese news agencies. This meant that the average Portuguese citizen was
getting his international news from German correspondents, not British
correspondents—as he had been accustomcd to. Besides this attempted
manipulation of the international news, small local Portuguese newspapers were
being kept afloat through the sale of advertising space to German merchants.
Thus, German name brands were now becoming more commonplace in
Portuguese households than ever before, and German imports were slowly
increasing in Portugal/1

10Lord

Elibank, "Memorandum: Conversation with Portuguese Ambassador, Dr. Armindo
Monteiro (19 October 1938)," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Selby (2.8
October 1938, Lisbon)," British Documents on Foreign Affairs, W14364/153/36.
11lbid.

The British did not immediately grasp the particulars of this increase in GermanPortuguese trade which was not a broad general increase in commodities, but instead an
increase in certain areas, such as coal and automobiles. For a more detailed study of the
German economic influence in Portugal see, Arthur H. King, "Memorandum by the Commercial
Secretary, Lisbon, respecting Portuguese Trade (16 November 1938)," Inclosure in Foreign
Office, "Sir W. Selby to Viscount Halifax—(received November 30)," British Documents on
Foreign Affairs, W15733/152/36.

141

Besides the cultural rivalry, there was also the possibility of a GermanBritish military rivalry. Portugal's military preparedness, or lack thereof, was
keenly felt by the Portuguese and quite obvious to the British. In 1935 Sir
Charles Wingfield, British Ambassador to Lisbon, described the current military
state of the Portuguese as follows:
The equipment and armament of the Portuguese army have been
allowed to fall into a scandalous state, so that it is no longer capable
of taking the field; its rifles are the war ones which are now worn so
smooth as to be unfit even for target practice, whilst the equipment is
so old, worn out and exiguous that not one out of the four divisions of
the army could be put on a war footing.1'

Soon thereafter, the Portuguese Parliament voted 5 million pounds sterling for
the re-equipment and modernization of the Portuguese army. It was their hope
to eventually have at the ready a small but well-equipped army of eight
divisions.13
In order to meet these goals the Portuguese made inquiries at various
munitions houses in Great Britain. They were, at first, rebuffed. In September of
1936, Armindo Monteiro, Portugal's Minister of Foreign Relations, wrote directly
to the British Ambassador in Lisbon requesting that the British government
facilitate these purchases. He reminded Wingfield of the long-standing alliance
between the two countries. He then went on to argue that, given that they were
allies, it was preferable to have both armies similarly outfitted so as to facilitate

12"Sir

C. Winfield to Sir Samuel Hoare (14 October 1935, Lisbon)," British Documents on
Foreign Affairs, W9280/387/36.
13Mr.

Eden to Sir C. Wingfield, United Kingdom Delegation to the League of Nations (22
January 1936, Geneva}," Inclosure in Foreign Office, "Anthony Eden, Despatch No. 1 to Lisbon
(24 January 1936, Geneva)," British Documents on Foreign Affairs, W771/762/36.
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any possible future cooperation between the two. Moreover, Monteiro stressed
the importance of acting in a timely fashion.14 The British hesitated in part
because they were trying to create their own stockpile of weapons for possible
future action on the continent.
The Portuguese became anxious and began feeling out German and
Italian arms dealers. By the middle of 1937, these activities were brought to the
attention of the British government in a memo by Robert Vansittart of the British
Foreign Office. He argued that both Germany and Italy were trying to take
Britain's place in Portugal. Not only did he see them replacing British influence in
the cultural and political realms, but he also saw them encroaching upon the
traditional British role of supplying Portugal with arms and trained instructors.15
Losing patience with perceived British indifference to Portugal's vulnerable
status, Armindo Monteiro—now Portuguese Ambassador in London—wrote what
he called an "entirely unofficial letter" to Sir Robert Vasittart, Permanent
Undersecretary to the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He hoped to remind
Vasittart of the strategic significance of Portugal and her colonies to the British
Empire. This note was a clear, concise, and dramatically forceful argument for
joint Anglo-Portuguese military planning. Monteiro affirmed:

I am of the opinion that now, more than ever before, the AngloPortuguese alliance is a vital element of security to the British Empire,

14Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Do Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros ao
Embaixadorde S. M. Britlanica em Lisboa (4 September 1936, Lisbon)," Ministerio dos Neg6cios
Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de Politica Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda
Guerra Mundial, vol. I (Lisbon: Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1973) document number 1.
15Stone,

The Oldest Ally, 60.
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and, simultaneously, to Portugal. It is an essential element of
common defence.
If you look at the map, you will easily see that the great lines of
communications between the United Kingdom and the British
Dominions and over-seas possessions may without difficulty be
dominated by sea and by air from Portuguese territory. There are
three positions to be considered at the present time:
a) The Portuguese coast, in the Mother-Country;
b) The port of Lisbon;
c) The line Lisbon (or Lagos)—the Azores—Cape Verde
Islands. To these should be added, in certain
eventualities, the Port of Lobito and its railways
connection with the Indian Ocean (Beira).
Should an eventual common enemy ever obtain possession of any
of the three positions mentioned, the danger to Great Britain during a
conflict might be of the gravest character. Imagine for one moment
that during the last war the enemy had succeded in gaining a foothold
in any of them, from which to carry on the fight at sea. Would the
easy and constant passage first of arms and munitions which came
from the United States in such large quantities, and, later the actual
transport of troops, have been possible in such circumstances?
Would it have been possible to maintain, without grave difficulties and
risks, the regular supply of food to the troops at the front and even to
the civil population of the British Isles?16

As a result of these exchanges and many more, the British Chiefs of Staff
requested approval by the Cabinet for a military mission to Portugal. After a
series of delays the mission date was confirmed for February of 1938. The
British saw this as an opportunity to establish personal contacts with Portuguese
"naval, military, and air authorities," with an end towards "the appointment of
resident attaches to [their] respective Embassies." The Portuguese hoped to
arrange for a Portuguese military mission to Britain to continue these talks.
Meanwhile, both parties regarded the mission as a necessary step towards

16Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao
Subresecretario de Estado permanerite britSnico dos Negocios Estrangeiros (20 July 1937,
London)," Dez Anos de Politics Externa vol. I, document number 37.
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planning joint military action, including measures to "improve facilities available
for Great Britain in the joint defence of the two countries in a war in which they
were engaged as allies."17
One month prior to the mission's scheduled arrival in Lisbon, Sir W. Selby,
British Ambassador to Lisbon at the time, reiterated the importance of the
mission to the Portuguese in a note to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. He
closed with a rather somber reminder of what was at stake, "Finally, I would point
out that the eyes not only of Portugal, but of most of Europe, will be on the
mission while they are here, and that failure to accomplish something will have
consequences that it is not pleasant to contemplate."18 For the Portuguese,
there were severe consequences from the very start. Germany, Italy, and Japan
reacted harshly to the news. The Portuguese minister in Berlin was personally
harangued by Hermann Goering. Both the German and Italian Ambassadors to
Lisbon protested vehemently. Japanese newspapers went so far as to publish
articles claiming that the true goal of the mission was the establishment of British
air and naval bases in Macau.19
Despite the protests, the British mission continued as planned. It left
Portugal on 12 August 1938 confident that it had achieved its goals. Upon
reading its report, the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that there should be a
17Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Draft letter," Annexed to Foreign Office, "Do
Secretario de Estado dos Negocios Estrangeiros Britanico ao Embaixador de Portugal em
Londres (14 October 1937)" W18366/4864/G, Dez Anos de PoUtica Externa, vol. I, document
number 91.
18

"Sir W. Selby to Mr. Eden (5 January 1938, Lisbon)," British Documents on Foreign
Affairs, W445/146/36.
19Stone,

The Oldest Ally, 63-64.
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renewed emphasis placed upon the strategic importance of the AngloPortuguese alliance. They also concluded that a Portuguese mission to Britain
should be encouraged.20
Unfortunately for the Portuguese military, the mission report failed to
convince the committee of Imperial Defense to expedite certain arms requests
made by Portugal. In a telegram from the Foreign Office to Selby, the Office of
Imperial Defence and Cabinet had determined that some of Portugal's military
needs could be met by 1939. In reality, most of her requests would not be filled
until 1940 or, in the case of 45mm field guns, not until 1941.21 In the meanwhile,
the Portuguese grew increasingly dismayed and frustrated at what they viewed
as the British simply dragging their feet. As a result, Portugal awarded a contract
to Italy for a shipment of 75mm guns. The order itself was not large, but it did
send a message to the British that the Portuguese government would not simply
stand by while her equipment needs went unsatisfied. Finally, in the turbulent
month of March 1939, Selby met with Salazar and they came to a general
agreement over munitions, a schedule, and prices.22
The military mission report did come to some conclusions regarding the
defense of Portugal and her empire. After careful reading of the report, His

20lbid„

71-72.

21For

example, the British began delivery of the 45mm field guns at a rate of 4 per month
starting in June of 1940 and at an increased rate of 12 per month in 1941. "Foreign Office:
Viscount Halifax to Sir W. Selby (18 May 1938)" British Documents on Foreign Affairs,
W6124/1172/G.
22"Apontamento

de conversa entre o Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros e o Embaixador
Britanico em Lisboa (3 March 1939, Lisbon)," Dez Anos de Politica Externa, vol. II, document
number 560.
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Majesty's Government made clear to Portugal that, in the event of an attack,
Great Britain would be prepared:
a) To make such British naval dispositions as would secure
Portugal and her overseas possessions from seaward
attack. It is understood that the Portuguese authorities
realize that in the opening phases of a war against
Germany they cannot expect help by British land forces.
b) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom...would
be prepared to assist Portugal with air forces in addition
to naval forces in fulfilment [sic] of their Treaty obligations.

Two things can be discerned by this statement. First the British were willing and
able to render aid by sea and air. As expected, this assistance was extended to
Portugal's colonies. Later in the note it was argued that land support would only
arrive if circumstances allowed. Second, and most significant, in this scenario
naval assistance was offered to fend off an assault by Germany, not Spain.23
All of this anxiety over the state of the Portuguese armed forces came as
a consequence of both international and domestic factors. Germany's marked
increase in mobilization resulted in much of Europe mobilizing for war. This was
quickly followed by events in Spain. The Spanish Civil War and the
consequentially better equipped and well-seasoned Spanish armed forces stood
in stark contrast to Portugal's ill-equipped and poorly trained armed forces.
Finally, Salazar and the New State government understood that the Portuguese
Army was their greatest supporter. Accordingly, Salazar exerted as much

23Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. Da Embaixada Britanica em Lisboa ao Ministro
dos Negocios Estrangeiros: Nota verbal (Lisboa, 16 de Agosto 1939)," Dez Anos de Politica
Externa, vol. II, document number 814.
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pressure as possible upon the British government to follow up with a military
mission and a supply schedule that would satisfy the Portuguese Officers Corps.

The

Iberian Pact

of 1939

Portugal observed the Spanish Civil War with great trepidation. On the
one hand Portugal had not wanted what might become a Soviet supported
government along her eastern border. During the Spanish Civil War, many
Portuguese volunteers fought beside Franco's forces. Although they were not
recruited by the Portuguese government, they were allowed to exit the nation
freely for the express purposes of entering the war.
Portuguese foreign policy throughout the Spanish Civil War was based on
two concepts—one ideological and one practical. The driving force behind
Salazar's support of Franco's cause was his deep-rooted revulsion towards
communist ideology. Another legitimate fear was that a leftist Spanish
government would give aid to leftist elements in Portugal. Back in 1934,
Portuguese exiles had not only found safe haven in Spain, but had also been
offered covert assistance to help overthrow the Portuguese New State. Thus,
Salazar's position regarding the outcome of the Spanish Civil War was based on
both philosophical ideals as well as simple self-preservation24
On the other hand, General Franco's Nationalist Army had quickly become
an experienced fighting force complete with modern equipment—supplied by
24Filipe

Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: a Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books,

2009), 190.
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Germany and Italy. Franco naturally felt indebted to those countries that had
supported him. For this reason, Salazar remained acutely concerned over
Portugal's weakened military state even after General Franco's forces were
victorious. Salazar viewed Portugal's weakened military status in stark contrast
to Spain's newly upgraded military machine. Without the proper equipment and
training, Portugal's army could not protect the 750 mile border shared with Spain.
The British mission officers had emphasized that Britain could not ensure ground
support for Portugal

25

If Spain became the aggressor in another world war, continental Portugal
would once again be at risk of invasion from her traditional peninsular rival. Even
before the British mission, Salazar understood that Portugal and England had
differing military concerns, in a meeting in January of 1938 between Sir W.
Selby and Portugal's Prime Minister, Salazar illustrated these counterperspectives. Selby later related this point to Anthony Eden:
[Salazar said] that while we [Britain] had appointed an admiral to lead
our mission, he had appointed a Portuguese general as chief of the
Portuguese representatives. The reason was simple. While so far as
we were concerned, naval considerations were pre-eminent, with
Portugal it was otherwise. In matters of defence, the land forces took
precedence over the naval.26

Beyond these strategic considerations, Franco's regime was also viewed as
a potential threat to the New State's political stability. Extreme rightist elements

25"

Interim Report on the Work of the British Military Mission in Portugal, Rear-Admiral
Wodehouse to Sir W. Selby (6 May 1938, Lisbon)," Inciosure in "Lisbon: Sir W. Selby to Viscount
Halifax (13 May 1938, Lisbon)," British Documents on Foreign Affairs, W6321/146/36.
26"Lisbon:

Sir W. Selby to Mr. Eden (18 January 1938)" British Documents on Foreign
Affairs, W1087/146/36.
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in Portugal were quite excited by Franco's successes, and hostile towards
Salazar's domestic and foreign policy positions. At home Salazar opted to
downplay the return of those volunteer forces that had fought in the Spanish Civil
War—i.e. there was no victory parade. He also refused them government
benefits for their military service, a move that caused some of them to ask for
Spanish citizenship and remain in Spain. Abroad, Salazar needed a diplomatic
solution.27
The result was The Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between
Portugal and Spain. Copies of the treaty—one in Portuguese and the other in
Spanish-were signed in Lisbon on 17 March 1939. it contained six articles in
total. The first article stipulated that both parties would respect the other's
borders and territories Furthermore, both signatories were obliged never to
assist another country in an act of aggression against the other, "whether by
land, by sea. or by air." Both nations also agreed that any future alliances made
with a third party would not compromise the terms stipulated in this treaty. This
treaty was set to expire in ten years.28 In the language of both the original Treaty
and the subsequent Protocol, this Luso-Spanish alliance did not in any way

27De

Meneses, 191. For Salazar's public statements regarding the Spanish Civil War
see, Antonio Salazar, Discursos e Notas Politicas: v. II, 1935-1937, second edition (Coimbra:
Coimbra Editora, L.da, 1945). Nearly the entire volume is dedicated to the Spanish Civil War.
28

Originally, "tanto por terra como por mar ou pelo ar." Translation mine. Ministerio dos
Negocios Estrangeiros. "Tratado de Amizade e Nao-Agressao entre Portugal e Espanha,
assinado em Lisboa a 17 de Mar?o de 1939," Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de
Politica Externa, (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. V, (Lisbon:
Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1967), document number 1978.
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compromise the obligations of the signatories tc prior alliances—notably the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance.29
Within six months, German troops invaded Poland. Salazar understood
that this invasion meant the beginning of another world war, one in which
Portugal could ill afford to participate. Portugal issued a proclamation of
neutrality on 1 September 1939. Within two days, Britain and France declared
war on Germany. World War II had begun, and Portugal's hopes for selfpreservation lay in the hands of her diplomats.
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 19 August 1939, which provided for the
exchange of goods between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the Non Aggression Pact signed between the same parties only days later, seemed to
give both the Spanish government and its public cause for pause in regards to
their own relationship with Germany. Theotonio Pereira, Portugal's Ambassador
to Spain, reported that while German officials tried to dismiss the ideological
concerns of the Spanish government, "the shock suffered by public opinion was
quite severe and they remain unconvinced."30 This may have created a better
diplomatic environment for Portugal to further convince Franco's government of
the need for Iberian solidarity.

29Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Protocolo Adicional ao Tratado de Amizade e
nao Agressao entre Portugal e Espanha (Lisbon)," Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez
Anos de Politica Externa, (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundiai ,vol.
VII (Lisbon: Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1971), document number 1066.

30Originally,

"o choque sofrido pela opiniao publica foi muito grande e esta nao se
covence." Translation mine. Ministerio dos Negocios Eslrangeiros. "Do Embaixador de Portugal
em Espanha ao Ministro de Negocios Estrangeiros (San Sebastian, 30 Agosto de 1939)"
Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de Politica Externa, (1936-1947), A Nagao
Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol. II, document numbei 887
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As Europe became an increasingly volatile continent, both Portugal and
Spain decided to reinforce and extend the terms of the Luso-Spanish treaty. To
this end, a Protocol was signed in Lisbon between Portugal and Spain on 29 July
1940. This agreement obliged both parties to protect the interests of the other. It
also provided for the possibility of periodic meetings by the signatories to discuss
events and possible joint action. The Protocol attempted to strengthen solidarity
of the Iberian Peninsula. It also sent a clear message to other European nations
that both Portugal and Spain were determined to maintain peace in the
peninsula.31
The Iberian Pact worked well in terms of keeping Iberia neutral, but it did
have its drawbacks. Franco's interpretation of neutrality was not as legalistic as
Salazar's. Salazar's frustration with Franco are not well known, but are
documented One of the earliest and most telling documents was an intelligence
report for the Office of Strategic Services dated 1 October 1941. It was a
recounting of a conversation between Salazar and a friend on 13 September of
that year. The friend of the friend stated that,
(i) He (SALAZAR) was dissatisfied with the way SPAIN had been
behaving to PORTUGAL and had seen to it that FRANCO should
know how he felt.
(ii) He had allowed goods of various kinds to be exported to SPAIN
and, in order to avoid trouble had turned a blind eye to the fact that in
many cases they did not remain in SPAIN. The SPANIARDS
appeared to wish to disregard the sacrifices PORTUGAL was making.
Whether they did so owing to GERMAN pressure or out of sheer bad

31Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros. "Protocolo Adicional ao Tratado de Amizade e
nao Agressao entre Portugal e Espanha (Lisbon)," Ministerio dos Neg6cios Estrangeiros, Dez
Anos de Politica Externa, (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, vol.
VII (Lisbon: Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1971), document number 1066.

152

faith, should any threats be made to PORTUGAL or any attempts at
'shameful impositions," the PORTUGUESE government would remove
to some safer and more convenient locality than LISBON.
(iii) In his opinion, FRANCO was pursuing or permitting a foolish
policy, with a consequent waning of prestige. He had a low opinion of
FRANCO'S capacity.32

Regardless of Salazar's personal opinion of Franco, Franco's habit of taking
Portuguese goods and covertly transporting them across the Pyrenees was a
point of irritation between the two. It became an issue not only to the
Portuguese, who thought it needlessly placed them in a precarious position, but
additionally to the British and the Americans who could not agree on how to solve
the problem. As much as they both may have wanted to simply cut off supplies
to Iberia they could not risk pushing these neutrals—especially Spain--into
enemy hands.

Operation Bracken
The Protocol of 1940 came at a particularly critical moment. France had
fallen only one month earlier. Tensions ran high throughout Europe. Rumors
were already circulating that Spain would be the next target, followed by
Portugal. On 17 December, Portuguese Ambassador Armindo Monteiro met with
Lord Halifax to discuss the possibility of the Iberian Peninsula being drawn into
the war. Monteiro thought that the most probable sequence of events would be
an invasion of Iberia in support of, or in consequence of, a German assault on
320ffice

of Strategic Services, "PORTUGAL: DR. SALAZAR on GENERAL. FRANCO (1
October 1941)," file 3053, microfilm (M1499) reel 11, RG 226, National Archives.
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Gibraltar. He noted the "not very successful efforts since 1937 to obtain
armaments which might serve as the basis of [Portugal's] military preparation."
He then went on to state that, given Portugal's lack of preparation, "we are under
no illusion as to the need for very considerable aid on land and the air from the
onset."33
The perceived urgency of the situation on the continent resulted in Halifax
meeting with Prime Minister Churchill later that same day. Churchill agreed that
immediate steps should be taken and then authorized Halifax to welcome a
Portuguese military mission to England. Due to the politically charged nature of
such an exchange, it was suggested that the Portuguese send only one trusted
military representative in plain clothes. The exchange should begin immediately
and under the veil of secrecy.34 On 28 January of 1941, the British Ambassador
to Portugal met with Salazar to discuss a variety of issues of mutual interests.
During that meeting, he extended an official invitation to the Portuguese to visit
England to study their defense works, in particular their anti-aircraft and coastal
defenses.35

33

"Aide-memoire. Guia da conversa referida no oficio de 19 de Dezembro de 1940,
Annexed to: London: Do Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negocios
Estrangeiros. Conversas com Lord Halifax acerca da posigao de Portugal em face dos perigos
que ameagam o Pais, em 17 e 18 de Dezembro de 1940, no foreign Office, as 3 horas e 30
minutos da tarde (19 December 1940, London), Dez Anos de Politica Externa, vol. Vll, document
number 1376.
34:"Do

Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros (18
December 1940, London)," Dez Anos de Politica Externa, vol. Vll, document number 1371.
35

First mentioned in: "Telegrama do Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador
de Portugal em Londres (29 January 1941, Lisbon)," Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez
Anos de Politica Externa (1936-1947), A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial ,vol.
VIII (Lisbon: Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1973), document number 1462; and, later, in
more detail in "Telegrama do Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Portugal em
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This mission left Portugal on 20 February 1941. Contrary to earlier British
thinking, Colonel Santos Costa, the Portuguese Minister of War, had concluded
that the mission should be composed of six officers under the command of Staff
Colonel Jose Filipe de Barros Rodrigues. They were airmen, and engineers, as
well as artillery and infantry officers. Their goal was to study British defenses in
order to emulate the British model in Portugal, particularly in the defense of
Lisbon against aerial assault and in the defense of the Portuguese coastline.
Colonel Santos Costa had also concluded that there was no reason to keep the
«

mission and its goals secret. For security reasons the newspapers were notified
of the mission two days after its departure, but were given all pertinent
information at that time.36
The British delegation, which met with Colonel Barros Rodrigues, was led
by the former military attache in Lisbon, Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Fenton.
Colonel Fenton was chosen not only because of his former position in Lisbon, but
also because of his ability to speak Portuguese. Nevertheless, Ambassador
Monteiro indicated that his government preferred the discussions to move
forward in English. Antonio Potier of the Portuguese Embassy in London served
as interpreter.37

Londres (3 February 1941, Lisbon)," Dez Anos de Politics Externa, vol. VIII, document number
1468.
36:"DO

Secretario-Geral do Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de Sua
Majestade britanica em Lisboa (5 February 1941, Lisbon)," Dez Anos de Politica Externa, vol.
VIII, document number 1473.
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Embaixador de Portugal em Londres ao Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros.
Conversa com o Subsecretario de Estado Parlamentar para os Negocios Estrangeiros, Butler (4
March 1941, Lisbon), Dez Anos de Politica Externa, vol. VIII,. document number 1555
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The talks progressed slowly. In the following month the Portuguese
delegation received the British mission in Lisbon. In both cases these talks
focused primarily on the defense of Portugal and her Atlantic Islands. A second
series of meetings between the British and Portuguese took place in London
between October and November of 1941. As a result of these deliberations a
plan for the defense of Portugal and the Atlantic Islands was adopted. This plan
had two phases. The first, and most vehemently debated phase, required the
Portuguese government remove itself to the Azores when it could no longer
remain neutral. This meant the virtual abandonment of the continent prior to an
enemy attack The second phase required Britain to assist Portugal in the
development of her defenses in the Azores, especially the airfields

38

The Portuguese immediately placed certain limitations on the
development of phase two. No British officers were to be allowed on Azorean
soil. Instead, the Portuguese would furnish the British with all the necessary
information. The British would then delineate the course of action. The
Portuguese would oversee the work and make certain it was completed
according to British specifications. The British code name for this operation was
Bracken39
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Wing Commander Vintras, an original member of the British mission, was
to work with Staff-Major Humberto Delgado, of the Portuguese Army Air Force, in
the construction of a runway capable of taking "very long range reconnaissance
aircraft." Since Major Delgado was only responsible to Salazar and Santos
Costa, there was no foreseeable bureaucratic stalling to hold up the project.40
The island of Terceira was chosen because it had an existent airstrip and
a port at Angra. Work commenced immediately. Delgado was summoned by
Minister Santos Costa and asked to explore the feasibility of constructing an
aerodrome on the island of Terceira. This included requests for detailed surveys
of ports, highways, medical supplies, water supplies and so on. Major Delgado
left for Terceira on 10 December 1941. Working alone he completed his study
and within one month had returned to Lisbon. By the end of January 1942,
"Deigado's Blue Report Number One" was in R.A.F. headquarters.41
Two months later he was handed a second set of questions. On 26 March
1942 Major Delgado was back on Terceira. This time he was creating extensive
survey and relief maps—incredibly enough, with contours given to the nearest
yard. He was also reporting on the electrical installations, sewerage and other
general facilities available on Terceira. Several months later, he was back in
Lisbon putting the finishing touches to "Deigado's Blue Report Number Two." He
arrived in London in mid June. There he remained for the next three months
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while collaborating with Wing Commander Vintras on the final technical
agreements

42

By 1943 most of the work had been completed on the air base in Lagens,
Terceira. However, these new facilities were useless to the British. Portugal, as
a neutral, could not offer Britain the use of the base Britain would have to
request or even demand the use of the base by invoking the Treaty of 1373.
Portugal waited for Britain to initiate the process by invoking the provisions of the
Treaty.
Unfortunately, Churchill was unaware or anything that had transpired after
his initial agreement to military talks back in March of 1941. Consequently, there
followed several months of diplomatic confusion on the part of the British
Because of the veritable pounding the British convoys were experiencing along
the coast of Europe, elements of the British Navy and the United States'
government exerted pressure for the seizure of the Atlantic Islands.43
As early as 22 February 1943, a memorandum by Admiral Dudley Pound,
First Sea Lord to the War Cabinet, summarized tne need for the Atlantic bases.
Admiral Pound began his assessment by stating that:
So long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the
greater part of each day, U-boats cannot operate effectively.. Air
facilities in the Islands would therefore have a vital and, possibly,
decisive effect on U-boat operations, (sic) would very greatly increase
the security of the lines of supply to all our overseas forces.
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He then continued with a detailed list of the advantages which facilities on the
Atlantic Islands would offer. The most significant disclosure made by the Admiral
was:
We are now confident of mastering the enemy on sea, land and in the
air, but the U-boats are undoubtedly delaying the development of the
full offensive required for final victory. Dr. Salazar's assistance in
helping us to combat the U-boats by the grant of facilities in the
Portuguese Islands would be a decisive factor in the anti-U-boat
campaign and would measurably shorten the war.44

These arguments were reiterated in the aide memoire of 16 June 1943
from Sir Ronald Campbell, contemporary British Ambassador to Portugal, to
Salazar. In paragraph twelve of this note, Campbell invokes the Treaty of
Alliance and asks "the Portuguese Government to extend to them their
collaboration by according to them the facilities of which they stand in need in the
Azores."45 These included "facilities in S. Miguel and Terceira for operating
general reconnaissance aircraft... (and) unrestricted fueling facilities for naval
escorts at either S. Miguel or Fayal." Unfortunately, Campbell could not give any
assurances as to Britain's ability to assist Portugal should an angry Germany
unleash her bombers on Lisbon in retaliation.46
In his response dated 23 June 1943, Dr. Salazar asserted that Portugal
would, in principle, allow the British the use of its facilities in the Azores. Of
^War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff, "Use of the Portuguese Islands. Memorandum by the
First Sea Lord (22 February 1943) as published in Appendix X of Vinlras, 164.
45"De

Sir Ronald H. Cambell ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (16 June 1943, Lisbon),"
Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeirs, Documentos Relatives aos Acordos entre Portugal,
Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da America para a Concessao de Facilidades nos Agores durante a
Guerra de 1939-1945 (Lisbon. Imprensa Nacionaie de Lisboa, 1946), 4.
46lbid„
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course, the conditions for this would first have to be negotiated until a mutual
accord could be signed by both parties. The Prime Minister also expressed his
gratitude in regard to the assurances made by His Majesty's Government: First,
that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Portuguese territories as soon as
the hostilities ceased; second, that Portuguese colonial sovereignty was assured
by both the British government and the Union of South Africa. However, Salazar
noted that these guarantees were not sufficient. He insisted that the Australian
government and the government of the United States of America make these
same assurances

47

Before Campbell's aide memoire was sent to Salazar, a British military
mission—in plain clothes—had already been assigned to the British embassy in
Lisbon It was composed of three officers and one civilian representing the
Foreign Office. Wing Commander R. E. Vintras was included in the group
because of his earlier involvement in Operation Bracken. The mission was
instructed to assist Ambassador Campbell in whatever way necessary, but
specifically to help with the negotiations for the use of the base.48
Talks began in early July. Progress was slow. Commander Vintras noted
that "the Portuguese Chiefs of Staff appeared to be influenced by all manner of
political and pseudo-chauvinistic pressures, while neither Salazar nor Santos
Costa was inclined to intervene." The talks took place with the Portuguese
Chiefs of Staff because they attended to the necessary military considerations.

4'"De Doutor Oliveira Salazar a Sir Ronald H. Cambell (23 June 1943, Lisbon),"
Documentos Relativos aos Acordos, 12.
48Vintras,

52.

160

These negotiations identified which of the military facilities in the Azores would
be used by the British, as well as to what extent they would be used. Salazar
had already agreed that the base would be conceded; that was the political
consideration. By the end of July, Churchill was growing impatient. He sent
Campbell a note threatening to take matters into his own hands if an agreement
were not reached by 15 August.49
On 17 August 1943, the Accord Relative to the Use of the Facilities in the
Azores was signed in the Naval Ministry. Later that, same day, Dr. Salazar
approved the Accord. The most significant features of the Accord were that:
British troops were allowed fuii use of several Island installations in the Azores,
not just the airfield at Lagens, Terceira; and the Accord was effective as of 8
October 1943.60 Portugal did not receive the assurances regarding the
maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty which it had demanded from Australia
and the United States until September and October of that year respectively.5'
Surprisingly, in a city filled with spies, there were no leaks during the entire
negotiations process. Consequently, several days after the signing, many Axis
nationals were shocked to find themselves ousted from the Azores with neither
warning nor explanation given. Secrecy, however, came at a price. Portugal

49lbid.,
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Relativo ao Uso de Facilidades nos Azores," 17 August 1943, Documentos
Relativos aos Acordos, 19-23.
51"DO

Senhor H. L. Hopkinson ao Doutor Oiliveira Salazar (14 September 1943, Lisbon),"
Documentos Relativos aos Acordos, 24-25; and "Do Senhor George Kennan ao Doutor Oliveira
Salazar (25 October 1943, Lisbon)," Documentos Relativos aos Acordos, 30. These assurances
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now had to contend with what it considered two potential diplomatic crises—its
relationship with Spain and the reaction of Germany. Salazar felt that the
Protocol required him to inform Spain before the public announcement.
Meanwhile, a team of Portuguese and British officers developed a plan to
counter a possible Spanish attack. As of 5 October 1943, three Portuguese
divisions were sent to reinforce the border. Two British divisions were placed on
alert to be sent in support of the Portuguese divisions.52
Two days later, Salazar met secretly with Count Jordana, Spanish Minister
of Foreign Affairs. The two men spoke alone for three hours. When the two
emerged, Jordana stated that he fully understood Portugal's decision and that he
did not believe it conflicted with Spanish interests. He assured all present that
not only would Spain maintain her neutrality, but she would aiso repel—by force,
if necessary—any German forces which crossed the Pyrenees with the intent of
besieging Portugal's frontier.53
Finally, Portugal was ready to face Germany. The German Ambassador
to Portugal, Baron Hoyningen-Huene, was notified that Britain had played the
Alliance card and had asked for the use of the facilities on the Azores. Portugal,
he was told, could not refuse. Huene asked many questions but stated that final
judgment would be left to Berlin Several days later, Huene handed Salazar a
note of strong protest. Although he accepted the note. Salazar rejected its
accusation that Portugal had succumbed to British pressures and had,
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consequently, relinquished its status as a neutral. This diplomatic measure was
the only action taken by the Germans who were now preoccupied with a Soviet
offensive and the defection of Italy to the Allies.54
On 12 October 1943, Churchill informed Parliament of the Accord. Similar
announcements were made in Portugal. By the time the Accord was made
public, British troops had already spent several nights in their new Azorean
barracks. In Portugal the news of the Accord was well received, and was a boost
to Salazar's public standing. An American spy reported, "Salazar, for whom the
people had accumulated the feeling that he was coasting on his past reputation,
has now strengthened and re-established his position by the Azores deal."55
More important than public prestige, with the signing of the Accord Salazar
was closer to achieving a key wartime goal, protecting the empire. In the
aforementioned September note from H. L. Hopkinson: acting in the absence of
the British Ambassador to Portugal, he wrote:
I am authorized to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's
Government in the Commonwealth of Australia are glad to associate
themselves with the assurance already furnished by His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom in the Union of South Africa
regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all
Portuguese colonial possessions after the war.56

"ibid., 214.
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More than a month later, George Kerinan delivered a very brief note stating that
"in connection with the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and
Great Britain the Government of the United States of America undertakes to
respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies."57 Thus, Portugal
now had written assurances of Portuguese sovereignty over her colonial
possessions from Great Britain, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of
South Africa, and the United States.

Portuguese Wolfram
The final test of Portuguese neutrality was the wolfram question. Wolfram
is a tungsten ore that has a wide variety of military uses, the most significant
being its use in the production of armor-piercing shells. The largest deposits of
tungsten ore are found in the Far East—China, Burma, and Korea. The German
invasion of the Soviet Union, however, blocked access to the trans-Siberian
route, which was the established wolfram trade route from the Far East to
Europe.58 Thus, the smaller deposits in Spain and Portugal became
disproportionately significant. The following map shows the regions of Spain and
Portugal in which there were wolfram deposits.

s'"Do Senhor George Kerinari ao Doutor Oliveira Salazar (25 October 1943, Lisbon),"
Documentos Relativos aos Acordos, 30.
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Figure 2: Wolfram deposits in Spain and Portugal.59

Accordingly, the majority of the wolfram producing mines were in Portugal.
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Portugal allowed both British-owned and German-owned mining
companies to continue to operate in Portugal during the war. In 1941 and 1942,
Portugal's output amounted to nearly eighty percent of European production.
During that time, the price of wolfram soared from 300 pounds sterling to 6000
pounds sterling per ton. This had a tremendous impact upon the Portuguese
economy.60
In an attempt to contain inflation, Salazar created a system of
governmental controls to monitor the mining, sales, pricing and export of
wolfram. These controls were to be enforced by a new governmental agency,
the Metals Regulatory Commission established in February of 1942. Only the
Metals Regulatory Commission could purchase and sell wolfram to exporters61
The Germans felt certain the Metals Regulatory Commission would be
advantageous to them because of their intimidation tactics. They knew that the
Portuguese government was feeling particularly vulnerable after German U-boats
sank several of her freighters. Consequently, German negotiations for wolfram
usually included veiled threats against the Portuguese.52
An example of this negotiation tactic was the Corte Real incident, in the
fall of 1941 German-Luso talks regarding wolfram purchases had stalled. The
Germans were growing impatient. On 11 October 1941, a German submarine
sank the Portuguese freighter, the Corte Real. The freighter had only sailed
^Stone, 142-143.
61Douglas
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about eighty miles off the coast of Portugal before being signaled to stop by
cannon fire from the submarine. Once stopped, her manifests were vigorously
examined. Her captain, Jose Narciso Marques Junior, was informed that she
was carrying contraband goods whose final destination was Canada. The fact
that the Corte Real would take these goods only as far as New York was
inconsequential. Captain Marques was given half an hour to abandon ship. Both
crew and passengers fled the freighter in a small whaleboat. After the sinking of
the Corte Real, the passengers—two women and two children—were taken
aboard the submarine and remained there while the submarine towed the
whaleboat twenty miles towards land. The passengers were then transferred
back onto the whaleboat, and Captain Marques was given a flare gun. The
submarine captain assured Captain Marques that the proper Portuguese
authorities would be notified of their exact location. Thirteen hours later the
exhausted and frightened crew and passengers were found by a Portuguese
vessel and returned to Lisbon.63
Although the Portuguese launched an investigation and filed a strong
protest, the German government stood by its U-boat captain's decision. This
incident reinforced the notion of Portuguese vulnerability. The German military
machine could easily attack Portuguese interests both at sea with their U-boats
and on land with their bombers. Portuguese merchant vessels were particularly
vulnerable because Portugal no longer had the capacity to protect her own
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vessels at sea. Both the Portuguese people and her government feared German
reprisals. This incident proved to them that this fear was not paranoia but the
reality of war.
Negotiations for Luso-German wolfram accord were finalized on 24
January 1942. The terms of the accord were set to terminate on 1 March 1943.
By the terms set in this accord, the Germans would receive a total of 2,800 tons
of wolfram distributed over a twelve month period. This wolfram would be culled
from German owned mines. In payment for said deliveries the Portuguese would
receive a variety of necessary supplies, such as: 60,000 tons of partially finished
steel products (wire, plates, etc...); 2,000 tons of paper for newspapers; 10,000
tons of ammonium sulfate; as well as some of the necessary equipment and
tools for wolfram mining (at 10-15 installations). The prices for these goods were
set at 1938 levels. The Germans would also be given the opportunity to buy fifty
percent of any "free" wolfram for that same period.64
It was the British and, by association, the Americans, however, who held
the real advantage. They owned the largest mines. More significantly, the
Germans had to pay in cash or kind. The British, on the other hand, were
allowed to purchase on credit because of the special commercial advantages
traditionally granted to the British within the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. On 24
August 1942, after a lengthy exchange of notes between all three parties—the
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Portuguese, the British, and the Americans, Safazar sent a final settlement of the
terms regarding the sales of Portuguese wolfram to both the United States and
the United Kingdom. The latter would be aliowed to import up to four thousand
tons of wolfram per year They would also each be granted at least one-quarter
of the "free" wolfram produced in that year.65
While the Germans were required to pay in cash or kind, the British
negotiated the terms of wolfram sales to her government based on credit, she
then could reserve her hard currency for preemptive purchases of wolfram.
These purchases were made by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation
and the United States Commercial Company. The former was a business front
created by Britain's Ministry of Economic Warfare. The latter was a similar
corporation developed by the American government. They shared the same
office in L isbon. Their purpose was to deny Germany wolfram by purchasing as
much of it as they could.ob
They were quite successful. In a memorandum from the Committee of the
Combined Boards (Combined Chiefs of Staff) dated 21 August 1943, this
program of restricting the enemy's access to Portuguese wolfram was clearly
spelled out:
The continuance of supplies from the United States and United
Kingdom is essential to the maintenance of Portuguese economy and,
65State
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therefore, both on political and strategic grounds, the British
authorities consider that the necessary materials should be made
available.
Moreover, in exchange for the supplies made available to
them, the Portuguese would be required to furnish to the United
States and the United Kingdom certain materials such as sisal,
wolfram, rubber, sardines, beeswax, etc., which are required by the
United States and the United Kingdom on supply grounds. In addition,
the bargaining power which is put into the hands of the United States
and the United Kingdom by furnishing supplies to Portugal is being
used to restrict the export to the enemy of Portuguese supplies which
are of great importance to him. Thus it is hoped that if the supplies on
the attached lists can be offered to the Portuguese they will continue
the present interim agreement under which Germany's share of
Portuguese wolfram would be limited to about one-third of the
quantities available and the balance would go to the United States and
the United Kingdom.67

Indeed, by the end of 1943, Germany had not received more than thirty-seven
percent of its negotiated portion of Portuguese wolfram. Meanwhile, the Allies
acquired both the British negotiated quota as weil as that wolfram which the
United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the United States Commercial
Company had purchased.68
The Germans were understandably irate. Yet, it was the Allies who were
more insistent in their demands. They wanted nothing less than a wolfram
embargo against Germany. Remarkably, on 29 May 1944, Sir Ronald H.
Campbell, the British Minister to Lisbon, wrote Salazar a note requesting an
embargo of wolfram sales to Germany. He stated, 1have been instructed to
make on the behalf of His Majesty's Government a solemn and earnest appeal to
67Joint
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the Portuguese Government, in the name of the Alliance, to take the necessary
steps to prevent any further export of wolfram from Portugal to Germany... ,"69 In
his reply of 3 June 1944, Salazar argued that Portugal could not claim neutrality
while instituting an embargo against a single belligerent. Furthermore, he stated
that the Portuguese Council of Ministers expressed "great doubt" as to the
legitimacy of invoking the Alliance over the question of wolfram exports.
Consequently, Salazar was writing to inform His Majesty's Government of
Portugal's decision to close all of the wolfram mines.'0
This was a difficult decision for Portugal. She had opted for a total
embargo rather than risking her status as a neutral. Portugal was well aware of
the economic cost to herself. In his note to the British Ambassador, Salazar had
clearly and succinctly expressed the cost tc Portugal in pounds sterling. Closing
the mines meant that eighty thousand Portuguese would lose their employment.
The national economy would lose an estimated 9 to 10 million pounds sterling
per year The national Treasury would lose approximately two million pounds
sterling. The news of the embargo did not hit the Portuguese newsstands until 7
June 1944—one day after the Allied landing in Normandy.71
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Conclusion
By declaring herself neutral at the beginning of the war, Portugal knew
that she had placed herself in an uncertain position. This was especially true
since that declaration had also included a reaffirmation of the 600 year old
alliance with Great Britain. However, time would show how even neutrality could
be molded to maintain national sovereignty while rendering assistance to an old
ally.
Portugal's first diplomatic feat was inviting Spain to enter into the "Iberian
Pact," followed by the "Protocol." After the Spanish Civil War, Franco was quite
indebted to both Germany and Italy. If Spain had joined the Axis at the beginning
of the war, both Portugal and Gibraltar would probably have fallen with dire
consequences for the British. The Iberian Pact offered Spain more diplomatic
flexibility. She now had a partner with whom she could confer and rely on. In
theory, Portugal and Spain would work together throughout the war, i.e. they
would not have to stand alone, as most neutrals do, over the course of the war.
These treaties also gave Portugal the diplomatic means to influence—and limit—
Spanish participation in the war.
Indeed, before the war had even begun, the British Ambassador to
Portugal confided to Salazar that, "maintaining Spanish neutrality in the case of
war is the greatest service which [Portugal] could render.'"2 This she did and did

"Originally, "conservarmos Espanha neutral em caso de guera e o melhor servigo que
podemos prestar." Translation mine, "Do Ministro de Negocios Estrangeiros ao Embaixador de
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well. In 1943, E. R. Stettinius, Jr., the U. S. Under Secretary of State, laid out the
"political considerations" involved in America's economic policy towards Spain
and Portugal. In his note to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Stettinius reaffirmed this wartime
policy by stating, "As you know, a principal objective in our policy toward Spain
and Portugal has been to keep the Iberian Peninsuia neutral."73 This policy of
trying to maintain a neutral Iberia would remain constant up until 1944.
The lease of the airfields in the Azores to the British came at a critical
juncture in the "Battle of the Atlantic." T he fall of France in June 1940 meant that
U-boats could roam freely along the Atlantic coast of Europe. Their favorite
hunting grounds spanned from France west to the coast of the United States,
north to Iceland, and just south of the Atlantic Islands. There were no particular
targets. As Admiral Karl Doenitz wrote in his U-Boat Command War Diary on 15
April 1942:
The enemy's shipping constitutes one single, great entity. It is
therefore immaterial where a ship is sunk. Once it has been
destroyed, it has to be replaced by a new ship; and that's that. In the
long run the result of the war will depend on the result of the race
between sinkings and new construction.,. I am therefore of the
opinion that tonnage must be sought in those localities where, from
the point of view of U-boat operations, it can most readily be found,

Portugal em Londres (Lisboa, 25 Augusto de 1939)" Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez
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and where, from the point of view of keeping down our own losses, it
can most easily be destroyed.74

This plan had worked with spectacular success for the Germans up until the
spring of 1943.
Throughout the war, the Allies were slowly gaining a series of practical
and technological advances which effectively countered the U-boats. First, they
began rerouting their convoys. Then, in December of 1942, the British broke the
U-boat code. Concurrently, they developed a better radar system. Merchant
ship escorts were made more effective by reorganizing them into permanent
support groups of five, with two escort carriers including twenty anti-submarine
aircraft. By May 1943 U-boat losses reached forty-three (more than twice the
number launched for that year.).7s In his Memoirs, Doenitz recalled, "Wolf-pack
operations against convoys in the North Atlantic...were no longer possible. They
could only be lesumed if we succeeded in radically increasing the fighting power
of the U-boats....I accordingly withdrew the boats from the North Atlantic."'6
When the reequipped U-boats returned in October, the allies were
established in the air bases in the Azores. This meant that the "air gap" was
finally closed.77 Allied merchant ships would enjoy air escorts throughout their

74Karl

Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, translated by R. H. Stevens (New
York: The World Publishing Company, 1959), 228.
75John

Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 120

76Doenitz,

341.

77See

the attached map regarding the additional coverage which would be gained from
bases in the Azores. This study was prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee for the
consideration of the J.C.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Seizure or Peaceful

174

voyages. Many of the British aircraft were fitted with a Leigh Light for night
operations. The Germans could no longer refuel and restock U-boats by using
their "milch cow" submarines in the surrounding waters of the Azores.78
Finally, although Portugal did sell wolfram to the Germans, she did so at a
disadvantage to them. The Germans were never allowed to purchase on credit,
whereas the Allies purchased on credit. The embargo, which the Allies
demanded, would have constituted a clear breach of neutrality. According to
Chapter 1, Article 7 of the Hague Peace Conference, "A neutral power is not
called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the
belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or in general, of anything which can be of
use to an army or a fleet."79 In the case, of wolfram sales, Salazar chose to follow
the letter of the law.
In June of 1944, Portugal opted for a complete embargo on wolfram sales.
This hurt her economically and also placed her at risk of Axis reprisals; albeit that risk had diminished significantly. Since the summer of 1943, the Allies had made
great gains in the war effort. They were victorious in North Africa. They had
made great gains in Russia—where wolfram mines also existed. Consequently,
the Allies had greater stores of Portuguese wolfram and possible access to
Russian wolfram mines. The Germans had little reserves, and were facing a two
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front war. In a telegram from then Acting Secretary of State Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr. to R. Henry Norweb, Ambassador to Portugal, Stettinius stated that
this, "action of the Portuguese Government should prove a factor in shortening
the war, inasmuch as it will deprive the enemy in Europe of important quantities
of a vital war material...The United States has been active in the negotiations
which have led up to this satisfactory conclusion...."80
The choice of a complete embargo rather than a limited embargo was the
logical choice for Portugal. The Portuguese were not privy to D-Day plans. Even
if they had been, the Portuguese were well aware that there are no guarantees in
war. They could not have projected a swift Allied victory, nor could they have
projected the timeframe for Germany's withdrawal from France. At this point,
American forces had proven themselves in Africa, but Africa is not Europe, The
embargo allowed Portugal to maintain her status as a neutral in Europe, while it
did not diminish her role in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
From 1939 to 1944, Portugal never waivered in her adherence to the
alliance. She worked with the British in developing a policy of Iberian neutrality.
Great Britain was fully engaged in the design and construction of the Lagens
airbase in the Azores. Beyond that, Great Britain was also offered numerous
military resources in the treaty for the use of the bases that followed. Finally, in
terms of wolfram sales, Great Britain had a tremendous advantage over the
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Germans in that she was able to buy on credit. These three elements—political,
military and commercial—were all fundamental to the alliance.
Meanwhile, by 1944, Portugal had also met two of her three wartime
goals. She had maintained both herself and Spain as neutrals, and in so doing
had protected Portuguese sovereignly on the continent. Although this came at a
cost, the benefit was that Portugal was not a battleground as she had been in so
many previous continental wars. Portugal also gained assurances from Great
Britain, Australia, South Africa and the United States for the protection of her
colonial possessions. These assurances came in the wake of a severe blow to
Portuguese national self- esteem. The loss of Timor, in February of 1942, to the
Japanese was shocking. Publicly, Saiazar's response, i.e. diplomatic action,
diminished his standing with the Portuguese masses who expected him to take
stronger action, or at the very least make a case for stronger international
condemnation of the Japanese. Behind the scenes Salazar worked tirelessly to
achieve a military solution to the situation. Portuguese participation in the United
Nations liberation of Timor became the Portuguese foreign policy goal of 1944. It
was also the issue that ultimately led to direct negotiations between Portugal and
the United States.
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CHAPTER V

1944: THE TURNING POINT

The year 1944 is often referred to as a turning point for the Allies during
the Second World War. The successful invasion of Normandy spelled eventual
victory for them. The phrase "turning point," however, may also be applied to
1944 when referring to Luso-American relations. As stated earlier in this study,
prior to the Second World War, relations between the United States and Portugal
were at an all-time low. It is not that the two countries were hostile towards one
another. Rather, neither country met the needs of the other—politically,
economically, or strategically. World War II changed that but that change came
slowly.
For all intents and purposes, from 1939 to 1944 Luso-American relations
were largely indirect. From the President of the United States to the Secretary of
State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general consensus was that Great Britain
should take the lead in talks with Portugal because of their special relationship.
Ultimately, this resulted in American frustration and Portuguese suspicion
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because neither side was engaging in direct diplomatic talks. As shown in
Chapter IV in both Operation Bracken and in the negotiations regarding wolfram,
talks with Portuguese officials were primarily handled from London.
This chapter will first show how this method failed to produce a
satisfactory end, particularly when applied to the securing of American use rights
in the Azores. While the British were initiating talks with the Portuguese
regarding the Azores, in the United States the strategic significance of the Azores
was a topic for media discussion. Demands for the occupation of the Azores by
a variety of high placed public officials did nothing to ease the minds of
Portuguese leaders regarding the good intentions of the United States. It was,
however, the 1941 crisis in Portuguese Timor which became a fulcrum for LusoAmerican relations in the second half of the twentieth century. The negotiations
for the creation of an American airbase on the island of Santa Maria, Azores
hinged upon Portuguese participation in the liberation of Portuguese Timor.
These talks brought to the forefront many challenges for both the Americans and
the Portuguese. Nonetheless, the results were that both parties were not only
satisfied with the final agreement, but had also established the foundation for
stronger diplomatic ties in the future.

American frustration. Portuguese suspicion
From the beginning of the war, the Portuguese government was wary of
American intentions and did everything possible to respond quickly to even the
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hint of American encroachment. Take for instance when, in 1941, rumors began
circulating in the news service agencies of an impending Amer ican invasion of
the Azores. Between January and July of 1941, there were literally hundreds of
articles in the Washington Post, The New York Times and other newspapers.
Some of these articles reflected the perspective of the foreign press. Of those,
the reports in Italian and German newspapers made various claims on either the
British intent on a pre-emptive strike in the Azores, or on the plan to establish
American air and naval bases in the Azores.1
Most articles, however, focused on the strategic importance of the Azores.
As early as 5 January 1941 The Washington Post reported that, according to a
bulletin from the National Geographic Society, "the Azores are a crossroads
between North America and. Europe...a busy center of commerce between two
hemispheres, the main junction point of transatlantic cables and a regular
stopping place for clipper planes flying between New York and Lisbon."2 Later,
Hanson W. Baldwin, a New York Times reporter, spelled out the air and naval
base needs of the Western hemisphere. Several maps, such as the one below

1See," Designs on Azores Charged," New York Times (1923-Current File), 18 February
1941, http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February 2012); "Germans Say They Hear British Will
Grab Azores," New York Times (1923-Current File) 16 March 1941, http//proquest.com/
(accessed 18 February 2012); "British Menace Portugal, Says Roman Press," The Washington
Post (1923-1954), 17 March 1941 http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February 2012); and "U.S.
Accused of Azores Designs," The Washington Post (1923-1954), 29 January 1941,
http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February 2.012), respectively.

2"Canaries,

Azores Important in U.S. Defense Strategy," The Washington Post (19231954), 5 January 1941, http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February 2012).
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that clearly showed the importance of the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific and the
Azores Islands in the Atlantic, accompanied this article.3
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Figure 3: Importance of Hawaiian Islands and Azores Islands

Concurrently, there was loose talk in the Senate regarding American military
action. On 6 May 1941, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Claude Pepper
(Democrat) of Florida gave a long and bellicose speech demanding that the
United States occupy Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verde and
3Hanson

W. Baldwin, "Defense of Our Ocean Ramparts: A map on the two pages
following illustrates the strategic principles of America's sea and air defenses. The article on this
page discusses those principles," New York Times (1923-Current File) 30 March 1941,
http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February 2012).

181

Canary Islands, Dakar and Singapore.4 In a radio address that very evening,
American Secretary of War Stimson called for the use of the Navy to "render
secure all of the oceans...which surround our continent."5
To the Portuguese, these rumors seemed confirmed by President
Roosevelt's fireside chat of 27 May 1941. In the now famous "We Choose
Freedom" radio address, Roosevelt made a compelling argument for an
increased American air and naval presence in the Atlantic, even though the
United States was not yet a belligerent in the war. Roosevelt argued:
...the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, it occupied by Germany,
would directly endanger the freedom of the Atlantic and our own
American physical safety. Under German domination those islands
would become bases for submarines, warships, and airplanes raiding
the waters that lie immediately off our own coasts and attacking the
shipping in the South Atlantic. They wouid provide a springboard for
actual attack against the integrity and the independence of Brazil and
her neighboring Republics.6

Thus, the loss of the Portuguese Atlantic islands would not only endanger the
United States, but also put into question the security of the entire Western
Hemisphere. It stood to reason then that Roosevelt felt the necessity to:
...extend our patrol in North and South Atlantic waters. We are
steadily adding more and more ships and planes to that patrol...These
ships and planes warn of the presence of attacking raiders, on the
"Robert C. Albright, "Florida Senator Asks Occupation of Dakar, Azores and Singapore,"
The Washington Post (1923-1954), 7 May 1941, http://proquest.com/ (accessed 18 February
2012).
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sea, under the sea, and above the sea...We are thus being
forewarned. We shall be on our guard against efforts to establish Nazi
bases closer to our hemisphere.7

The United States was willing to protect those islands with force, if necessary.
This speech was well-received by the American press. Two days after
Roosevelt's speech, The Now York Times devoted a full page to excerpts from
newspapers across the United States supporting the President's stand.8
The problem with Roosevelt's reasoning was that it did not take into
account that the islands were the sovereign territory of Portugal. Furthermore,
the implication was that Portugal was unable, or unwilling, to protect her own
territories. On 30 May 1941, the Portuguese Embassy in Washington issued a
stern diplomatic note taking exception to these statements, and firmly declared to
what lengths Portugal would go to defend her sovereignty. "From their own part,
the Portuguese Government reassert their indefectible {sic} determination to
defend to the limit of their forces, their neutrality and their sovereign rights
against all and any attack to which they may be exposed..."9
The events that followed offer insight as to the gap in communication
between the Executive Office and the State Department, and the same between
the State Department and the Portuguese Embassy. In an article dated 11 June
1941, The New York Times reported that at the recent press conference
7lbid„
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President Roosevelt confessed that he had not been informed of the Portuguese
protest, nor had he been informed of the response to that note by Secretary of
State Cordell Hull. In that response, Hull assured the Portuguese government
that the United States "harbors no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty
or territorial integrity of any other country....Our policy today is based upon the
inalienable right of self-defense."10 Portuguese newspapers published a series of
editorials decrying the response as both insufficient and unclear.1' Portuguese
Ambassador to the United States Joao Antonio de Bianchi reflected that same
sentiment when he asked for clarification. To that end, on 14 June 1941, Hull
and Bianchi met for half an hour to finally put this issue to rest.12
In the meantime, German submarines had the upper hand in the Battle for
the Atlantic, According to the Joint War Plans Committee, Allied use of the
Azores could change all that.13 Negotiations between Portugal and Great Britain
regarding base rights in the Azores were progressing at a snail's pace. President
Roosevelt had chosen the arbitrary deadline of 22 June 1941 for AngloPortuguese negotiations to bear fruit.

10Bertram
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If not, Roosevelt had ordered that an American expeditionary force
prepare to invade the Azores. Under the direction of Major General Holland M.
Smith USMC, a force of no fewer than 25,000 ground troops—both Army and
Marines—was training along the eastern coast of the United States. A change of
orders was delivered on 4 June 1941 when it became obvious that British forces
in Iceland were in need of relief. One month later, these same troops traded in
their tropica! attire for cold-weather gear, and were landing in Iceland.14
In broad terms, American concerns centered on maintaining open
shipping lines in the North Atlantic. More particularly, they were determined to
maintain the flow of munitions to Britain. German submarines were making this
more difficult by the day. I he location of the Azores was perfect Iceland,
however, was a good runner up. The establishment of American troops in
Iceland moved the region under U.S protection decidedly to the East and within
the German war zone. Concurrently, American forces were also deployed to
Trinidad and British Guiana. This action seemed to temporarily ease some of the
tension between the United States and Portugal15

14For a brief but detailed account of the mission see, Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the
United States Naval operations in World War llx vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic: September
1939~ May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1947) 67; and Kent Roberts Greenfield,
gen. ed., United States Army in World War II. The War Department: Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1940-1943. (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995) 70. For
a much more comprehensive and well documented study of American interests in the Azores
during the Second World War see, Norman Herz, Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in
the Atlantic (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004).
15Frank
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Figure 4: American troops in Iceland.10

Throughout these events, Portugal's concerns centered around
maintaining international recognition of her status as a neutral and her sovereign
rights. Publicly, Portugal needed to maintain a strict sense of neutrality. Portugal
was not as concerned about the British—and, to a limited extent, to her wartime
allies-because the Anglo-Portuguese alliance offered mutual assurances.

_______
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Nonetheless, give an inch to the Allies and the Germans might want to take a
mile. The British Foreign Office seemed to be more sensitive to Portugal's
predicament, probably because she and Portugal had danced this waltz before.
The State Department did not always share the Foreign Office's sense of
forbearance. This resulted in a sense of mistrust between Portugal and the
United States.
What added to the growing misunderstanding between the two nations
was the lack of communication between American diplomats stationed in
Portugal and the Portuguese government. Upon his arrival in 1942 in Lisbon,
George F. Kennan assumed the duties of counselor of legation. He was
immediately stunned at the lack of diplomatic contact between the two nations
•»
concerning the war. in his Memoirs, he stated that:
So far as I could learn from the official files .at no time since the entry
of the United States into the war had there taken place anything
resembling a political discussion between the American Minister and
the Portuguese Prime Minister. At no time had we discussed with the
Portuguese at a responsible level such things as the compatibility of
our interests generally, in the face of the wartime situation, or the
prospects for our postwar relationship.17

When Kennan questioned American Ambassador Bert Fish as to why there had
been no discussions between himself and Salazar, the southern gentleman
simply replied, "Ah aint goin' down there and get mah backsides kicked around.

17George

F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston. LitHe, Brown & Company, 1967;
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He's too smaht for me." Kennan decided that it was best not to pursue the issue
with Ambassador Fish.18
Ambassador Fish's sentiments aside, this indifference on the part of the
United States can be explained by their propensity to allow the British to act as
an intermediary between the two. Nevertheless, Kennan fully realized that
Portugal's position as a neutral could change rather rapidly and not necessarily
at the time of Portugal's choosing. Thus, he had concluded that stronger
diplomatic ties could and should be established between the two as soon as
possible. As Kennan would soon realize, however, this was easier said than
done. Another major stumbling block towards better diplomatic relations
between Poitugal and the United States was the rather pronounced lack of
communication and coordinated action between the State Department and the
Executive.
As stated earlier, on 17 August 1943, an Accord was signed between the
British and the Portuguese for the use of the Lagens Airfield in Terceira, Azores
as well as other island installations within that same archipelago. Portugal had
asked for assurances regarding the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty. Yet
it took several months before the United States could decide what steps to take.
In Kennan's Memoirs, he recalled the evident lack of coordination between the
State Department and President Roosevelt on this issue and the resultant
diplomatic difficulties which he faced.

13lbid..
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On 5 October, Kennan was forwarded instructions giving him permission
to grant Portugal every assurance that the United States respected Portuguese
sovereignty in all her possessions. The caveat was that Kennan was only to
offer those assurances "If (but only if) Dr. Salazar should approach the Charge
d'Affaires {Kennan} with a request for such an undertaking "19 Three days later,
Kennan was forwarded new orders telling him to proceed at once with the
assurances.20 Kennan left immediately for Portugal's Foreign Ministry to arrange
for a meeting between himself and Salazar. The meeting was set for that
Sunday at 10 am.21
That Sunday, before his scheduled meeting, Kennan stopped at the
American Embassy and, much to his consternation, found new instructions
stating that under no circumstances was he to give those assurances to Prime
Minister Salazar. Kennan decided to meet with Saiazar and explain-as best he
could-what had happened. He then decided to take the time to initiate a
dialogue regarding Luso-American common security interests in the Atlantic.
Kennan described Salazar as cautious and a bit puzzled at the turn of events—
as was Kennan!22

19"The
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Washington 4 October 1943," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943,
vol. II, Europe (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1964) 741.53/124a.
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The following Sunday, 17 October, Kennan was astonished to find new
instructions from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, this time by direction of
President Roosevelt himself. The orders indicated that Kennan was to approach
Salazar immediately with a request for the use of
a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: Sao Miguel Island. One operating
and supply base at Ponta Delgada.
b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:
(1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta.
(2) Sao Miguel Island. One landplane base.
c. For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft.
(1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field for air
transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for personnel.
(2) Flores Island. One landplane base for air transport and ferry
operations, if the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air
base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island.
Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate personnel.
d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities...
e. Observation posts, Radar, etc., as required...
In connection with these {Lagens Airfield and Rabo de Peixe Airfield}
facilities we shall require:
(1) Unrestricted port facilities;,..
(2) Prompt admission of necessary American personnel for the
improvement, construction and operation of these facilities;
(3) Prompt customs clearance for necessary material and
supplies...
The telegram went on to state that "the request for these facilities should be
based upon the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373 and particularly upon the
'Friends to Friends' phrase therein."23
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This new set of instructions clearly reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff
evaluation of the 1943 Anglo-Portuguese Accord. In a meeting of the J.C.S.,
General Arnold acknowledged that,
the Americans had carried out their agreement not to approach the
Portuguese while the British and Portuguese negotiations were being
carried out but the result of these negotiations was certainly not
satisfactory and...the possible results to be obtained were well worth
the effort to open up the matter again with the Portuguese.24

The Joint Staff Planners also found the 1943 Accord unsatisfactory because they
felt that the rights granted the British only satisfied the anti-submarine aspect of
the Atlantic problem. Their October "Memorandum" asserted that the
"importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United
Nations war effort cannot be overemphasized, but, as indicated by results,
appears not to have been recognized in British-Portuguese negotiations." It then
listed what was to be gained by the addition of the new air route in terms of
savings in fuel consumption, engine hours, as well as a release of transport
aircraft and ground personnel for duty elsewhere.25

This same argument was

reiterated nearly word for word in a letter dated 10 October 1943 from the J.C.S.
to the President.26

24Joint
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Nonetheless, Kennan was unaware of the J.C.S. assessment. The
combination of these extraordinary demands and the fact that Portuguese
sovereignty had not, as yet, been guaranteed by the United States would notKennan surmised-sit well with Salazar. Kennan feared the worst. If Salazar
agreed, the situation in the peninsula could turn volatile depending on the
reaction by Spain and/or the Axis powers. If he refused, the United States might
decide to invade the islands by initiating operation Alacrity. The latter might then
lead to the case of Portugal invoking the same Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and
calling for Great Britain to assist in defending her isiands against the United
States. What a diplomatic quagmire!27
Kennan wired the State Department requesting a meeting with President
Roosevelt to personally explain his reservations. The President instructed him to
cable his views Kennan sat down and wrote one of his classic long messages
detailing not only why he thought this approach would fail, but also what in his
view was the best course of action. Simply stated Kennan thought the best the
United States could hope to gain was equal use of the facilities which had been
granted the British. Kennan also thought it was ill advised to use American
assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty as leverage for use of the

to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy to the President, Enclosure C (9 October
1943)" RG 218, Geographic Re, 1942-1945, Box 10. folder: CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2.,
J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives.
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installations in the Azores. Instead he thought those assurances should be
offered first and without condition.28
Unknown to Kennan, British Prime Minister Churchill had telegrammed
Roosevelt with a similar—though much more succinct—conclusion. Churchill
noted that upon learning "from Lisbon" of the demands, they came as quite a
surprise. He reminded Roosevelt that these same demands had been rejected
months earlier by the Joint Staff Mission as unreasonable. Churchill concluded
by stating that Britain could not assist the United States in her request.29
In Portugal, the iack of assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty had
already become a roadblock to further communication between the two
countries! When Kennan tried to schedule a second meeting between himself
arid Salazar—as instructed by the President—he was told point blank that unless
he was delivering American assurances in hand no meeting would take place. At
that point Kennan made a remarkably bold decision. He returned to the
American embassy and typed out a communication in which he assured the
Portuguese government that "in connection with the agreement recently
concluded between Portugal and Great Britain the United States of America
undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies." After
dispatching this communication to Britain's Foreign Office, Kennan sent a wire to
Washington explaining what he had just done and why. The next day, Kennan

28Kennan,

153-154.

29"The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt, London 19 October
1943," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943, vol. II, Europe,
741.53/10-2143.
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received word that Salazar would receive him on Wednesday next. That meeting
never took place because that same day Kennan received word that he was to
take the very next plane out of Lisbon. He was being recalled to Washington.30
In reality Kennan had nothing to fear regarding his hasty recall to
Washington. When Kennan was finally able to meet with President Roosevelt to
discuss his perspective on Luso-American relations, he found the President both
open to his interpretation and supportive of him personally. The President then
suggested that he would write a letter to Saiazar to try and ease any misgivings
regarding American intentions in the Atlantic. Kennan left Washington for Lisbon
letter in hand and hopeful that he could drive the negotiations with Portugal
regarding the use of the Atlantic island bases towards a positive end.31
Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Kennan hastened to meet with Salazar. As he
had surmised, American assurances regarding Portuguese sovereignty had
eased tensions between Portugal and the United States. True to his usual style,
President Roosevelt had written a letter , which was both charming and poignant.
He reminded Salazar of the importance of the Azores to the United States during
the First World War. He also spoke of the good relations between both nations
both during and just after the war. He placed the issue of trust on a personal
level by reminding Salazar that he had been Under Secretary of the Navy during
World War I and:

30Kennan,

155-156.

31Kennan
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In those days there was never any question about the good faith of the
United States in carrying out their pledge that as soon as possible
after the war the bases would be dismantled and the shore batteries
abandoned. I personally inspected everything and the relationship at
that time between Portugal and the United States was on a basis of
mutual confidence and great friendship... I do not need to tell you that
the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its
possessions.32

When Kennan next met with Salazar, on 23 November 1943, the Prime
Minister was much more open to pursuing direct Luso-American negotiations At
the meeting, Salazar seemed deeply impressed by the President's letter. After
Kennan expressed the nature of America's needs. Salazar explained that he had
always expected the American fleet to make use of any naval facilities in the
Azores granted the British. In terms of the facilities in Terceira, Salazar proposed
that American aircraft:
being delivered to England by Ferry Commands {could have the}
status of British craft from {the} time they left our country {the United
States} until they had passed through Portuguese territory, .{in which}
case he {Salazar} would not care about nationality of crews or of
ground forces which might serve them... {including} engineering and
construction crews.

At the end of this two hour meeting, Salazar reminded Kennan that, as a neutral,
he could not extend to the United States facilities in the Azores beyond those
granted the British. In his lengthy discussion regarding Portuguese neutrality, he

32"President

Roosevelt to the President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers (Salazar),
Washington, 4 November 1943," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943,
vol. I!, Europe, 564-565

brought up the case of Timor.33 He reminded Kennan that Portugal could have
maintained civil control over Portuguese Timor if she had willingly allowed the
Japanese to use the airfield on that island. Salazar said "he could not see
Portugal as a neutral starting out to bargain with the belligerents over the
facilities of the Portuguese Empire." Then again, Kennan reported, that when
and if Portugal were to enter the war, "he would as a matter of course extend to
us every facility we might need in his colonies." Everyone involved, both British
and American, agreed that it was best to keep this momentum going by first
following the suggestion laid out by the Portuguese—i.e. in Portuguese territories
American airplanes would fly with British markings—and then asking for more.34
By year's end, Kennan was reassigned to London R. Henry Norweb, who
replaced Ambassador Bert Fish, arrived in Lisbon on 22 November 1943.35 It
was simply a matter of protocol to have the final negotiations carried out by the
American Ambassador in Lisbon rather than one of his subordinates. On New
Year's Eve, Norweb was happy to report that the Portuguese government had
accepted the U.S.-British formula for Lagens. The key to the formula was set out
in paragraph three of Cordell Hull's telegram to Norweb which stated, "United
States and United States personnel activities at Lagens will be directed toward

33This is the first time that Timor was mentioned in high-level diplomatic talks between
Portugal and the United States.
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the assistance of the British, under whose control those operations will be."36
With these constraints in place, Norweb assured the State Department that the
Portuguese felt confident that they could maintain their claim to neutrality while
upholding their responsibilities as Britain's oldest ally.37
The Americans were finally in. As stated earlier, gaining access to the
facilities in the Azores was a top priority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the letter
from Admiral William D. Leahy to President Roosevelt in October 1943, the
importance of the Azores to the United Nations war effort was clearly spelled out:
a A saving over a six month period (November 1943 - April 1944), if
the route {the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route} were in full
operation, of approximately fifly-one and one-half million gallons of
high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber
sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one
month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and
USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.
b. A saving, under the same circumstances, in engine hours of each
bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more
additional combat missions before engine over-haul.
c. The release of approximately *150 transport aircraft, which could
thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area or
other theaters of operation where they are so urgently needed.
d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty
elsewhere.

36"The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb), Washington, 23 December
1943," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943, vol I!, Europe,
811.34553B/42b.
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Obviously, this assessment of what was to be gained by the United States went
far beyond the initial desire to use the Azorean facilities as a base to monitor and
curtail German submarine action in the Atlantic. Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were already foreseeing the value of the central air route and the island facilities
in preparation for operation Overlord, and in the execution of the consequential
Allied offensive action in both Europe and the Pacific theatres.38

Santa Maria
The next diplomatic task for the Americans was to convince the Portuguese
to buiid a second airfield in the Azores this time under American control. Given
Salazar's legalistic nature, at face value this might have seemed a daunting task
for the Americans. Indeed, at the meeting between Saiazar and Kennan on
November 23, Saiazar had explained that the Anglo-Poituguese Alliance gave
the Portuguese the necessary diplomatic out to allow for British control of a base
on Portuguese soil. There was no such agreement between Portugal and the
United States. Yet, in this same conversation it was Saiazar himself who
revealed what was for Portugal a critical wartime goal—the preservation of her

38Joint

Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Occupation and Use of the Azores,
Memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners, William D Leahy, Admiral U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff
to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy to the President, Enclosure C (9 October
1943)" RG 218, Geographic File, 1942-1945, Box 10, folder CCS 381 Azores (5-7-43) Sec. 2.,
J.C.S. 319/5. National Archives.

198

empire. More to the point, it was at this meeting that Salazar spoke at length
regarding the loss of Portuguese Timor03
Unbeknownst to Kennan, more that a month before his conversation with
Portugal's Prime Minister, Salazar had sent the British Ambassador to Lisbon a
secret note. In this note he reiterated an earlier request on the part of the
Portuguese Armed Forces to be included in a joint action with United Nations
forces against the Japanese Army of occupation in Timor. He concluded this
note by asking, "how and with whom can this subject be addressed?..." Of
course it was the Americans who coordinated and controlled Allied action in the
Pacific theatre. Thus, for the Portuguese, the Timor issue became the
cornerstone for negotiations regarding the construction of an airfield on the island
of Santa Maria, Azores.40
Timor is an island which sits four hundred miles northwest of the northwest
coast of Australia and is part of the Indonesian archipelago. The Portuguese had
established a trading post in Timor in the sixteenth century. In the nineteenth
century, the island was divided into two colonies. The western portion was
controlled by the Netherlands. The eastern half, with an area of 18,989 square
miles, was a colony of Portugal.41

39"The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, L isbon, 23 November
1943," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943, vol. II, Europe,
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Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros a Embaixada Britanica, Lisbon 4 October 1943,''
Documentos Relativos aos Acordos, 34.
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The Japanese assault on Portuguese Timor needs to be placed in the
context of the Pacific theater in December of 1941. The initial attacks of the
Japanese occurred on December 7 and 8 of that year, beginning with the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and then continuing the next day with Hong Kong, Singapore,
the island of Wake, the island of Guam, as weli as the Philippine islands of Luzon
and Mindanao. The sheer breadth of the otfacks was a shocking blow to the
region.
Figure 5: Initial Japanese attacks.4?
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Although they later declared war, this Japanese action was a de facto
declaration of war. On 8 December 1941 the United States declared war on
Japan. Two days later, the United Kingdom declared itself in a state of war
against Japan Under the obligations of the Tri-Partite Pact, on 11 December
1941 Germany and Italy declared war ori the United States. Yet, even before the
attacks, tensions were very running high in the Pacific theater.
On 5 December 1941, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Armindo
Monteiro, sent a reply to a British Aide-memoire dated 2 December. In it he
stated that the Portuguese government would consent to send an "officer to
Singapore to discuss with a representative of the British High Command, Far
East, the question of the defense of Timor in the event of a Japanese attack." It
went on to state that the Portuguese Government would also allow this officer "to
exchange views with a representative of the Netherlands East Indies."43 The
tone of this note was cautious. Three days later Salazar sent a telegram to
Monteiro to further clarify Portugal's position. In this telegram, he asserted that
direct talks could "only take place between Portuguese and Englishmen." The
British High Command could transmit to the Portuguese any information that the
Dutch wished to communicate. Monteiro was also instructed to speak directly

43Minist6rio
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with the Foreign Office to try and ascertain where this line of thinking was
leading

44

On 10 December, as instructed, Monteiro sought out Eden in the British
Foreign Office. Unfortunately for Monteiro, most higher level British officials were
absent. He met instead with Sub-Secretary Sargent and communicated
Salazar's instructions Furthermore, he asked for the British Government's
opinion regarding the offer from the Australian and Netherlands governments
regarding military aid in the event of a vlapanese attack upon Portuguese Timor.
In his response Sargent stated that he thought it was simply a matter of
proximity, i.e. the Australian and Dutch forces were there in the region and
therefore could quickly offer aid to the Portuguese. Monteiro agreed but, in the
same breath, questioned whether the offer was being directed from the British
government or the Dutch government. Sargent hesitated and then argued that
this was simply a diplomatic technicality. Monteiro replied this was not a
technicality, but fundamental. He pointed out that while the Anglo-Portuguese
alliance has mutual obligations, it also has mutual safeguards—Portugal has no
alliance with the Netherlands and, consequently, no safeguards in place. In his
telegram to Salazar relating the conversation with Sargent, Monteiro confided
that his concern was two-fold. First, Monteiro feared that once Dutch or
Australian troops were in Portuguese Timor they would never leave In addition,
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Monteiro added "it seems to me absolutely inconvenient that we should be
dragged into war by virtue of Dutch intervention or due to motives which, above
all, are in the interests of the defense of the Netherlands or of Australia

46

Ironically, that is exactly what happened. On 17 December 1941, a joint
Dutch-Australian force landed in Portuguese Timor. The next day the following
communique was published by the Information Bureau of the Government of the
Netherlands Indies "In view of Japanese submarine activities off Portuguese
Timor, it became an unavoidable necessity to take steps to safeguard this
territory against Japanese aggression and to forestall use of it as a base from
which attacks couid be made on Allied territory and communications." The
communique assessed that this action on the part of the Allied nations was
"purely a measure of defense "/f6 The Portuguese government was irate.
Monteiro went to the Foreign Office that same day. In a heated discussion with
Sargent, Monteiro pointed out that the Portuguese governor neither asked for
assistance from the Dutch-Australian force, nor did he acquiesce to their
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presence. When pressed by Sargent, referring to the defensive needs of the
British realm and Portuguese loyalties vis-a-vis the Anglo-Portuguese alliance,
Monteiro retorted "We in Portugal have been for many years under the
impression of little loyalty in the relations of England with us."47
What was at stake was Australian security. As stated above, Timor sits
only 400 miles off the coast of Australia. It was her proximity to Australia, in the
context of the earlier Japanese surprise attacks, which caused the pre-emptive
Figure 6* The ABDACOM area.43
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move by the Allies. One glance at the American, British, Dutch and Australian
Command (ABDACOM) area map above and the potential risk to Australia
becomes clear.
As couid be expected, the Portuguese government filed a series of formal
protests. These protests went to the British and Dutch governments for their
incursion-on Portuguese Timor. In a long statement by the British Ambassador,
Sir Ronald Cambell, to the Portuguese Government, the British government
shifted responsibility for the incident on the Allied military commanders in Timor.
They recognized the fact that this assistance was unwelcome by the Portuguese
Timorense government. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government was "especially
grieved to have caused this offence to the Government of their ancient ally, the
success of whose policy in the present conflict has won both their approval and
their admiration:'49 Portuguese newspaper editorials reflected an acceptance of
the British apology, avowing to not let this misunderstanding over Timor prejudice
their centuries old friendship.50 The Portuguese public, on the other hand, did
not seem convinced. In an unusual public demonstration of protest, the
Portuguese movie going public booed when presented with the screening of
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views of Sydney, Australia. The uproar was such that it caused the cessation of
presentation of the film in several theaters in Lisbon.5'
In an effort to contain the situation, and in coordination with Britain, Portugal
decided to send its own troops from Mozambique to Timor.52 Upon their arrival, it
was expected that all foreign forces would be withdrawn. The Portuguese
transport ship, Joao Delo, sailed from Louren?o Marques and was expected to
arrive in Deii—the capital of Portuguese Timor, on 27 February 1942.53 The
Joao Belo never arrived in Timor. On 20 Febtuaty 1942, Japanese Army and
Naval forces invaded Portuguese Timor. The .Japanese government declared
that "it is prepared to insure the integrity of Portuguese Timor and will
withdraw , from the said territory on the attainment of the objective pursued in
self-defense so long as the Portuguese Government maintains a neutral attitude,
as Japan harbors no design on Portugal."54
The events surrounding the Japanese invasion of Timor in February of
1942 caught the Portuguese government completely off guard. Even as Salazar
addressed the National Assembly on 21 February to explain the events

51"Strange Act in Lisbon," New York Times (1923-Current File) 24 December 1941,
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surrounding the assault, he admitted that he was not yet fully satisfied. Besides
giving a synthesis of the December events in Timor, Salazar appraised the
Members of the recent Japanese communications. On 19 February, the
Japanese Ambassador to Portugal informed Salazar that the Japanese were
obliged to initiate operations in Portuguese Timor out of self-defense because of
the presence there of an Anglo-Dutch force. Salazar unequivocally and forcefully
denied the legitimacy of Japanese military action in Portuguese Timor. He
contended that the Portuguese reinforcements were en route from Mozambique
and that their installation wouid lead to the withdrawal of any foreign troops on
her sovereign territory. Salazar concluded his speech by stating that the
government would continue to reaffirm Portugal's legitimate rights in Timor.55
The occupation of Timor was not only a source of outrage for the
Portuguese government, but was also a source of both anger and fear on the
part of the Portuguese public.56 A British intelligence source commented that,
"the situation strikes at the foundations of their carefully preserved policy of
absolute neutrality."57 Portuguese territory had been transformed into a
battleground. This was exactly what a policy of strict neutrality was supposed to
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avoid. Most of 1942 was spent in fruitless diplomatic pursuits trying to convince
the Japanese government to work in coordination with the Portuguese
government to find a peaceful end to this crisis.58
In early 1943 things went from bad to worse in Timor The Governor of
Timor was imprisoned and incommunicado. There were numerous reports of
mass executions. Finally, although some women and children had been granted
refugee status in Australia, many more were thought to be hiding and foraging in
the jungles of Timor.59 By late 1943, there were rumors circulating in
Mozambique linking the loss of Timor with Portugal's imminent entrance into the
war on the side of the Allies.60 These rumors were, of course, unfounded but
they did reflect the sense of dissatisfaction and resentment that was growing
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within the Portuguese empire. The Portuguese government needed to take
some action, particularly in relation to the war in the Far East.
It was under these circumstances that direct negotiations began between
the United States and Portugal for the construction of a base in the Azores.
During that 1943 New Year's Eve conversation between Norweb and Salazar
mentioned above, Norweb was struck by the "spirit of personal and official
cordiality" expressed by Salazar. He also noted that during this meeting the
conversation had turned to Timor. Upon relating the context of this conversation
to Cordell Hull, Norweb stated that,
The participation of Portugal in a Timor expedition was discussed and
Salazar wanted to know when a reply would be furnished....{Salazar}
drew a contrast between the position of his country and that of
Switzerland, Sweden and other neutrals of Europe by stating that for
the others the war would end with the termination of the war in
Europe, but that for his country it would continue until the close of
hostilities in the Pacific.61

Thus, at this point, the Portuguese government clearly was determined to
participate in some future military action in the liberation of Timor.
On the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their interest in the Azores remained
constant. They wanted extended facilities which would allow them to use the
Azores for, among other things, large air ferrying services. Yet, the J.C.S.
remained unconvinced of the necessity to link the construction of the airbase in
Santa Maria with American assurances of eventual Portuguese participation in
61Joint
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Timor. Regardless of several petitions by ths State Department and an Aide
Memoire by the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the diplomatic and military
advantages of offering Portugal these assurances, Admiral William D. Leahy
wrote a short, clear response to Cordell Hull in which he asserted:
In their consideration of your letter the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to
the conclusion that the military implications of the proposed action
were such as make unilateral action at this time undesirable.
These military implications are now under consideration by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff and when a decision has been reached, a
definitive answer to your letter will be forwarded62

In the months that followed, while the Combined Chief of Staff Planners studied
the possible advantages and disadvantages, negotiations for the Santa Maria
base lagged. Finally, in May 1944, Admiral Leahy informed Cordell Hull that the
Combined Chiefs of Staff "perceived no military objection to Portugal's
participation in any eventual operation to liberate Portuguese Timor ...[the C.C.S.
proposed that] conferences be held in Lisbon...to determine Portuguese
capabilities and logistical and other problems involved irt Portuguese
participation .,."63
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The American Military Attache and the American Naval Attache in Lisbon
handled preliminary discussions regarding the technical aspects of Portuguese
participation. 8y August the combined British-American delegation had been
formed and talks would soon pick up where the Attaches left off. Meanwhile, in
Santa Maria, technicians were arriving on site to gather intelligence and then
return to the United States to develop the plans for the base. In a conversation
between Norweb and Salazar, Norweb camc to several conclusions which he
shared with Cordell Hull,
(1) An expedition to "Timor is all-important to {Salazar}...(2) {Salazar}
continues to connect Santa Maria with Timor...(3) It is {Salazar's}
desire to postpone major decisions on matters of Santa Maria until
staff conversations commence... (4) It is clearly understood {by
Salazar that} we prefer such discussions {regarding Santa Maria} to
be kept between Portugal and the United States aione.h4

Salazar was willing to allow preliminary work regarding the planning of the base,
and even allowed construction supplies to arrive on sight. He was, however,
unwilling to allow actual construction work to commence until he had in hand a
written assurance that the Portuguese would participate in the liberation of Timor.
Although the J.C.S., had full understanding of the same and still thought the
Azores vital to their global military plans, as of 11 October 1944 the Portuguese
government had not yet received from the United States government
confirmation in writing of their acceptance of Portuguese participation in the Far
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East theatre of war This was, in part, due to the fact that the J.C.S. was trying to
sort out British colonial interests and Portuguese colonial interests in the region.
The Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) was a theatre of war that was dense with
postwar colonial concerns for the British. British military designs clashed with
American directives, which called for a Central Pacific advance upon Japan. On
this the J.C.S. would not budge. In this case, close association with the British
due to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and mutual colonial interests worked
against the Portuguese in their negotiations with the Americans.65
In spite of the de!ay; on that same day, Saiazar drafted and transmitted a
cable to Santa Maria authorizing the "construction work of the giobai project."66
All along Saiazar had argued that the two governments had to find a "juridical
and political basis" for The Santa Maria airbase accord

67

Yet, in the end, Saiazar

relented on the basis of the "personal assurance" of Ambassador Norweb, who
promised that the letter would be forthcoming

b8

Norweb wrote a draft of the
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letter that he would suggest to his superiors, and Saiazar handed Norweb a draft
of the Santa Maria base accord."9
This action demonstrates an important shift in the relationship between
Portugal and the United States. Long conversations between first Kennan (and
then Norweb) and Saiazar had had the intended results. Both parties now had a
clearer understanding of each other's wartime goals. In this case, both the
United States and Portugal had something the other desired and could,
therefore, act in a mutually beneficial fashion.
Under the direction of Pan American Airways, the new airfield in Santa
Maria was constructed for the Portuguese government. Before a Luso-American
agreement was signed regarding the construction and use of this airfield, a
statement was released by each of the powers—Portugal, Great Britain and the
United States—regarding Timor. Each statement was dated 28 November 1944
and had virtually the same message regaiding Timor. The American statement
read:
The Government of the United States, conscious of the legitimate
desire of the Portuguese Government to put an end to the Japanese
occupation of Timor and recognizing that this Portuguese territory lies
within the large area of operations undertaken in the Pacific by the
Government of the United States and other allied governments,
accepts and agrees to the participation of Portugal in such operations
as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from
Portuguese Timor in order that that territory may be restored to full
Portuguese sovereignty. It recognizes that such participation can be
effected in direct and indirect form: direct participation by the use of
Portuguese forces...indirect participation, by the concession to the
Government of the United States of facilities for the construction, use

69lbid.

and control of an air base on the Island of Santa Maria, for the
purpose of facilitating the movement of American forces to the theatre
of war in the Pacific....70

That same day Portugal and the United States signed an agreement
regarding the form of Portuguese participation in the Pacific Not surprisingly,
Portugal and the United States had opted for indirect participation. Composed of
only four articles, this Luso-Arnerican agreement was concise and to the point.
Article one of the agreement indicated that the "Portuguese Government arid the
Government of the United States shall cause to be constructed on Santa Maria
Island an airdrome to serve as an air base." The constr uction of the airbase and
the cost of that construction would be borne by the Portuguese government and,
consequently, the base would be "considered the property of the Portuguese
State." In article two Portugal granted the United States, 'the utilization without
restrictions of the air base at Santa Maria which shall be, in respect of
operarions, administration, and control under the command of the American Air
Forces." Articie three then went on to state that, the "utilization of the field by
them {the Americans} shall terminate within six months after the termination of
hostilities or signature of an armistice with powers with which the United States is
at present at war in the Far East." The iast article of the Luso-American

70"DO Embaixador dos Estados llnidos da America ao Miriistro dos Negocios
Estrangeiros, (28 November 1944, Lisbon)," Minisierio do? Negocios Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de
Politics Externa (1936-1947), /A Nagao Portuguese e a Segunda Guena Mundial, vol. XIII
(Lisboa: Impresa Nacional-Casa de Moeda, 1986), document 532.
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agreement noted that the final details of the exchanges in command would be
concluded in a "complementary accord.'"1
This agreement marked a significant step forward in Luso-American
relations most notably because the Americans took the initiative in the
negotiations. Unlike the wolfram issue and the Lagens airbase negotiations—
both of which were driven by the British Foreign Office—negotiations for the
Santa Maria airbase were conducted between Ambassador Norweb and Prime
Minister Salazar. The result was a notable improvement in each party's
estimation of the other, as well as a greater sense of mutual trust. Post-war
Luso-American relations would build upon this new foundation

Conclusion
Between 1939 and 1944, Portugal managed to meet two out of three of
her wartime goals. She entered into a Pact with Spain and managed to convince
71"Aqreement
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Spain of the need to keep Iberia neutral throughout most of the war. This was
important not only for Portugal and Spain, but also for Great Britain and the
United States. She had also managed to maintain her own sovereignty even
after granting the use of the Lagens airbase to Great Britain-thanks in some
measure, to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Nevertheless, during this same
period the weaknesses of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance were evident.
No nation voluntarily enters into an alliance to their detriment. The AngloPortuguese Alliance was meant to be mutually beneficial—politically, militarily
and commercially. In the preceeding chapter it had been noted that the benefit to
Portugal had been limited. Britain could no longer provide support if continental
Portugal were attacked. This was a weakness, noi a benefit. Britain could no
longer meet the supply needs of the Portuguese. Shared armaments and
training was something that both parties had for centuries. They were
fundamental to Portugal's defense. Because of Britain's own war efforts, she
was incapable of meeting these needs which placed Portugal at a distinct
disadvantage. Worse yet, in the case of Timor, Britain's actions precipitated the
attack of the Japanese which then led to the wartime loss of Timor-with all the
horrible consequences that followed for the people of Timor. This is a clear
weakness of the alliance that the Portuguese surely considered. Portuguese
resentment of the failings of the alliance was reflected in the heated conversation
on 17 December 1941 between Monteiro and Sargent when Monteiro stated "We
in Portugal have been for many years under the impression of little loyalty in the
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relations of England with us."72 That was a remarkably blunt and critical
assessment of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
During this same time period, in her relations with the United States,
Portugal's interpretation of neutrality sometimes ran counter to American
interests. As a consequence, early wartime relations between Portugal and the
United" States were, at best, strained. In part, this was because Salazar
distrusted the Americans and, therefore, instructed his diplomats to move at a
snail's pace. Portugal also justifiably feared retaliation by Germany should her
actions be viewed as a breach of neutrality. Likewise, Portugal had to consider
Spain's reaction vis-a-vis the two Protocols signed in 1939 and 1940.
The United States, for her part, did not help the situation. Loose talk in the
U.S. Senate arid in the American press regarding an impending American
assault on the Azores seemed only to be confirmed by Roosevelt fireside chat in
1941. Worse yet, Portugal was continuously kept in the dark regarding American
intentions. The United States deliberately failed to give Portugal timely
assurances regarding her sovereignty and the sovereignty of her possessions.
American officials, including Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to
think that pressure tactics would make the Portuguese more malleable.
Although Salazar was keenly aware of Portugal's military weakness, he
was also aware of the strategic value of the Azores. He understood that each of
the principle belligerents—Germany, Great Britain and the United States—had
72Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, 'Do Embaixador de Portugal em Loridres ao
Ministro dos Negdcios Estrangeiros (18 Dezembro 1941, Londres)," Ministerio dos Neg6cios
Estrangeiros, Dez Anos de Politics Externa (1936-1947). A Nagao Portuguesa e a Segunda
Guerra Mundial, vol. X, document number 2839.

217

developed a plan for the invasion of those islands.73 By handing over control of
key military facilities in the Azores to the Allied powers, Salazar reinforced an
age-old treaty while ensuring the safe return of that property after the war. This
he did, not because of pressure from the Allies, but to render from them an
assurance of Portuguese sovereignty.
The loss of Timor to the Japanese in early 1942, however, brought to the
forefront Portugal's final wartime concern—conservation of her empire. From
1942-1943, negotiations with Japan over the issue of Portuguese Timor had
borne no results. By 1944 this issue was the major foreign policy issue of
Salazar's regime. First, his policy of neutrality had not kept Timor safe. Second,
reports of Japanese abuses were creating an atmosphere of heightened
dissatisfaction throughout the empire.74 Finally, at the 11 October 1944 meeting
between Norweb and Salazar, the Prime Minister himself "stressed that
Portuguese participation in the liberation of Portuguese territory was
indispensable to the honor and prestige of Portugal."75
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Thus, Salazar could allow the United States command of the air base at
Santa Maria for action in the Far East as a part of Portugal's efforts to regain her
own territory. It was a simple quid pro quo. Portugal would agree to grant the
use of the Santa Maria airbase, while simultaneously the United States would
agree to allow Portugal to participate in the liberation of Timor.75 This seems
simple, but was made complex because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were looking at
the issue of Timor from a military perspective, not a political one. Caught in the
middle of this diplomatic dilemma was Ambassador Norweb. Through a series of
long talks with Salazar, Norweb was able to gain his trust and convince Salazar
to take a leap of faith. Once Salazar committed to the final construction of the
base, everything else fell into place.
By the autumn 1944, Norweb had come to a conclusion regarding LusoAmerican relations which differed radically from that of his superiors at the White
House and in the Pentagon. In a telegram to Secretary of State Hull regarding
the progress on the Santa Maria island airbase negotiations, he wrote,
"Persuasion, reason, frank thrashing out of issues—and not the big stick which to
this neutral {Portugal} imbued with all the juridical considerations of the traditional
neutral could well place us, in his mind, in the position of using our superior
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power to impose our demands—have triumphed "n Portugal would not be
bullied, but could be persuaded if the results benefitted her own interests.

""The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) 10 the Secretary of State. Lisbon 12 October
1944," Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944, vol !V, Europe,
811.34553B/10-1244.
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CHAPTER VI

A NEW WORLD ORDER

In August 1941, even before the United States entered World War II,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed his vision of the post-war era in
a public document, known as the Atlantic Charter. This statement was issued
jointly by FDR and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and proposed a
postwar world in which the ideals of self-determination, freedom, justice, and
world peace would become the standard, not the exception. In terms of the
Atlantic Charter, David Reynolds, a leading historian of this period, has noted,
"Churchill ensured plenty of loopholes, but in a broad sense he had signed up to
American goals."1 The Atlantic Charter was based on the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of the rule of law and would be established by the cooperation of all nations.
This would include even those nations that did not have the same political
traditions of the United States. This would be their opportunity to follow the
American model of a democratic-republic. All this would be accomplished

1David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of
the Second World War, The American Ways Series (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001) 182.
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without violent revolution, but instead through the conquest of Nazi tyranny.
Thus, although the Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint Anglo-American vision
of a postwar world, it was a clear reflection and balance of American interests
and political ideology.
President Roosevelt died before witnessing the end of the war or the
implementation of this world vision. The successful end of hostilities brought new
challenges in international affairs, especially the spread of world communism and
an emerging super-power rivalry. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.) stood as the champion of communism. The Soviet Union had been
an ally during World War II in the fight against the Axis powers, but now that the
war had been won, America's wartime ally proved to be an ever-increasing threat
to America's post-war vision.
By the time former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made his "iron
curtain" speech on 5 March 1946, President Harry Truman was convinced that
the Soviet Union was a threat to America's postwar vision of Europe. In the
following year, events in Greece and Turkey reached a point of crisis. To
address this situation and clarify America's national interests in the region,
Truman spoke before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. His
speech, often referred to as the Truman Doctrine, permanently altered American
foreign policy when he stated, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures." Furthermore, in the same speech, Truman
asserted that the United States was obliged to act because, "If we falter in our
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leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely
endanger the welfare of this Nation."2 Hence, Truman linked the economic and
political stability of Greece and Turkey with world peace and, more significantly,
with American security. President Roosevelt's understanding of modern
warfare—i.e. airborne warfare-had extended the geography of American security
during the Second World War, but with this speech President Truman expanded
the geopolitical interests of the United States in peacetime.
To combat this new peril, the United States was willing to participate more
directly than ever before in both European and world affairs. This reflected a
shift in American foreign relations. The European Recovery Program, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program were
coordinated in synch with a new American imperative. While each of these
measures was meant to check Soviet expansion, they simultaneously promoted
the spread of the ideal of liberty, while thwarting the possibility of subversive
communist revolution in Europe. With the aid and guidance of the United States,
the recipients of her assistance would overcome their own economic
shortcomings and rebuild western Europe, come to embrace democratic values
and participate in a defensive union that could protect the North Atlantic region
against an enemy—read Soviet—threat.
This chapter will explore each of these foreign policy events through the
prism of Luso-American relations. Accordingly, it will examine Portugal's
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participation from the perspective of her own foreign policy interests. By
participating at this level of international affairs, Salazar's government regained a
sense of prestige within Portugal and her empire. During this period Portugal's
foreign policy needs were met by a shift in alliance from Great Britain to the
United States. This is not to say that Portugal abrogated her commitment to the
Windsor Treaty; Portugal remains to this day an ally of Great Britain. Instead,
this chapter will show how Portugal's post-war national interests-commercial,
political and military—were satisfied by her participation in the European
Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program. Through a series of coordinated diplomatic
actions, Portugal was able to supplant her flagging Anglo-Portuguese alliance
with a series of agreements with the United States. These are the building
blocks of Luso-American relations in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Marshall Plan
In June 1947 George C. Marshall, United States Secretary of State, spoke
before Harvard University's graduating class. He seized this opportunity to
present an argument for a broad post-war European economic recovery plan,
later known as the Marshall Plan. He convincingly tied European recovery and
stability to world peace, and spoke directly to America's fear of violent
subversion:
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next
three or four years of food and other essential products—principally
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from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay
that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic,
social, and political deterioration of a very grave character, ...
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the
possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of
the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the
United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United
States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of
normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no
political stability and no assured peace . .3

Secretary Marshall ended his speech with an appeal to the public's sense
of America's historic role in the world by stating, "With foresight, and a
willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which
history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can
and will be overcome."4 Since that responsibility was to encourage economic
stability while spreading the ideal of liberty, Marshal! implied America's
commitment to this plan was fully justified. As historian Michael J. Hogan has
asserted," The Marshall Plan rested squarely on an American conviction that
European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the
United States. These interests were interdependent and mutually reinforcing...."5

3"Press Release Issued by the Department of State June 4, 1947, "Remarks by the
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On 28 January 1948. in his speech before the House Committee on
Foreign Relations, Dean Acheson further clarified the plight of the European
people and the breadth of American responsibility when he said:
They [Europeans] and we want them independent of outside
dictation and of inside dictatorship, self-supporting and healthy in their
individual and national lives...At the end of the war we thought that
everyone believed that enduring peace and economic recovery from
the war was most assured by political settlement and economic
programs which were firmly founded on agreement between the great
powers... It is now plain that the Soviet Union does not intend to join in
the task of political settlement or economic recovery on any basis
which the other powers, or any nation wishing to maintain its own
integrity, can accept.6

The Soviet Union, through her own actions, had become tne enemy of liberty
and, consequently, the enemy of the United States.
Over the course of four years (1948-1951) the Marshall Plan, a.k.a. the
European Recovery Program (ERP), distributed over 13 billion dollars to sixteen
countries. In order to accomplish this goal, Congress enacted the European
Cooperation Act on 3 April 1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Congress, 2d session).
This legislation created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The
ECA, acting as an agent of the United States Government, administered the
European recovery program.7
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The organization of the EGA was fairly straightforward. In the United
States, the ECA ran under the direction of the Administrator for Economic
Cooperation. The President appointed both the Administrator and his deputy
Administrator by the consent of the Senate. Like any other head of an executive
department, the Administrator was directly responsible to the President. The
Administrator also served as a member of the national Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Financial Problems.8
In Europe, the United States Special Representative Abroad represented
the Administrator. Once again, the President of the United States appointed both
the U.S. Special Representative Abroad and his deputy by the consent of the
Senate. The Special Representative Abroad carried the rank of Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. His duties included acting as the chief
American representative to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), and synchronizing the undertakings of the ECA missions throughout
Europe. Each ECA participant was assigned a special mission for Economic
Cooperation. The job of the special mission was to work with both governmental
and private agencies in execution of the ECA goals.9
By most standards, the Marshall Plan was a great success. Devastated by
years of war, many European countries were quick to accept America's generous
offer. Portugal supported the concept of European recovery. She fully embraced

8The

Marshall Foundation, "The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1952,"
under "The Administrator for Economic Cooperation,"
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/librarv/doc eca.html [accessed June 15,201OJ.
9The

Marshall Foundation, "The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-1952, '
under "U.S. Special Representative Abroad," and 'Special ECA Missions Abroad,"
http://www.marshallfoundation.org/librarv/doc eca.html [accessed June 15,2010],
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the idealism of the Marshall Plan. On 5 June 1949, Pedro Theotonio Pereira,
Portugal's Ambassador to the United States, made some revealing remarks at a
Washington D. C. dinner honoring George C. Marshall. He stated,
General Marshall, I have recently re -read your Harvard .speech.
Recalling the world picture of that time, and the efforts made by this
country [the United States] to put your ideas into practice, I believe
that the United States could hardly have found a nobler and more
exacting symbol of their idealism of these days. The Harvard speech
reflects much that we find in the American spirit: Christian fraternity,
understanding and respect for others, the generous impulse, and an
honest and realistic sense to go directly to the root of the problem.10

To be sure, Portugal was part of the European Recovery Plan right from the
beginning. She was also a member of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation. Thus, Portugal's desire was to be fully engaged in the process of
rebuilding Europe. The key is that Portugal's hope was to not only participate in
postwar European recovery, but also assist in that recovery—albeit in a limited
capacity.
As such, Portugal chose not to request Marshall Plan funds in the first
year—1948-1949. During that same dinner, Ambassador Pereira had gone on to
characterize Portugal's decision to not request funds in the first year:
As a tribute of our understanding to those ideas, it was happily
possible not to ask that Portugal benefit from aid in the first year of the
Plan. Even with some sacrifice, we were thus able to cooperate,
within our limitations, so that others more directly affected by the war
effort or its sufferings might pass ahead of us.11

10Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros, "Remarks by the Portuguese Ambassador,
Senhor Pedro Theotonio Pereira," 5 June 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M153,
Processo 85 "Piano Marshall." A.M.N.E.
11lbid.
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This explanation is idealistic, humble and self-sacrificing. Yet, this is not exactly
the same thinking that Ambassador Pereira had expressed a year earlier in his
letter to Prime Minister Salazar regarding the benefits of Portugal's participation
in the European Recovery Plan. In that letter he stated,
The fact that Portugal will not now receive financial assistance,
places us in a truly exceptional condition. Along American lines of
thought, I do not know of other circumstances which could have
placed us in better standing, when the bigger nations of western
Europe are in reality living off of the help from the United
States... Even from an economic perspective, it is my belief that it
would only have hurt us to stay outside of the Marshal! Plan. All of the
materials for Europe are practically within its sphere and we would run
the risk of having to skimp on certain essential supplies.12

Thus, by signing the bilateral agreement known as the Economic Cooperation
Agreement signed in Lisbon on 28 September 1948, Portugal did not receive
financial support from the United States, but from her perspective she gained
much more.
Politically, she cast herself in a better light vis-a-vis the United States than
many other now dependent European powers Privately, American confidence in
Portugal was clear. In May of the same year, in a memorandum to George

12Originally,

"O facto de Portugal nao ir receber agora ajuda financeira, colocou-nos em
condi?5es verdadeiramente excepcionais. Perarite a mentalidade Americana, nao sei de outra
circumstancia que pudesse pasar mais na sua considera?ao quando as maiores na?oes da
uropa Ocidental estao vivendo na realidade da ajuda dos Estados Unidos...Mesmo no aspecto
economico 6 meu parecer que so nos prejudicaria ficar a margem do Piano Marshall. Todos os
fornecimentos para a Europa passam praticamente a estar na sua esfera e correriamos o risco
de nos ver regateadas certas mercadorias essenciais." Translation mine. Minist6rio dos
Negocios Estrangeiros, "Carta do Senhor Pedro Theotonio Pereira ao Senhor Ministro dos
Negdcios Estrangeiros sobre o Acordo Piano Marshall," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da
Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Piano Marshall." A.M.N.E.
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Marshall, John Dewey Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs,
stated,
Portugal's financial condition is sound; its budget has been balanced
for the past 15 years and the escudo is one of the firmest currencies in
Europe.
Portugal is participating in the ERP but is receiving no financial
assistance, Portugal has offered to make loans to other countries to
assist in the purchase of Portuguese goods, mainly fish, fish products,
naval stores, citrus fruits and cork. In view of the relative soundness
and stability of the Portuguese economy, the aim of the ERP in
Portugal will be primarily that of maintaining rather than rehabilitating
the economy.13

Months later, at the press conference in Washington D.C. held the morning after
the signing of the bilateral agreement, Acting Secretary Lovett echoed that same
confidence:
Although the Portuguese Government is receiving no financial aid
under the European Recovery Program, they have given their firm
support to the Program from the very beginning. The signing of the
ERP Agreement and the cordial remarks of the Portuguese Foreign
Minister on that occasion have shown again the spirit of good will and
cooperation of the Portuguese Government in participating in the huge
task of European reconstruction.14

Commercially, Portugal gained a foothold within Europe which would have
evaded her had she not participated in the European Recovery Plan This was
obvious from the onset since, at the time of the signing of the bilateral
agreement, there was also an exchange of notes between the United States and
13Department

of State,"Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 10 May 1948," Foreign Relations of the United
States Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. Ill, Western Europe (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1974) 711.53/5-1048.
14Ministerio

dos Negocios £strangeiros, "Department of State-Acting Secretary Lovett's
Statement," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7
"Piano Marshall." A.M.N.E.
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Portugal relating to Most-Favored-Nation status. Thus. Portugal gained this
preferred trading status with not only all of the other ERP nations, but also the
United States, the Free Territory of Trieste, and western Germany.
Consequently, Portugal hoped to both support other Europeans in their
purchases of Portuguese goods and to avoid being excluded from the trading
block established by the ERP.15
This commercial advantage was not enough to keep Portugal's finances
afloat. The very next year Portugal would submit a request for ERP funds. In
actuality, there were several factors leading to Portugal's sudden increase in
deficit spending. First, Portugal's desire to increase and expand her
infrastructure required the purchase of an extensive amount of equipment,
particularly in the areas of railway construction and telecommunications. This,
however, was not meant to transform Portugal's agricultural economy into an
industrialized economy. "On the contrary, the conditions of the country [Portugal]
lead us rather to seek to develop and to strengthen the agricultural
characteristics of our economy."16 Consequently, investment in the expansion of
Portugal's hydro-electric system, for example, was meant to both harness

15The

mutual exchange of Most-Favored-Nation status was discussed concurrently with
the ERP agreement. Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, "Carta do Senhor Pedro Theotbnio
Pereira ao Senhor Ministro dos Negocios Estrangeiros, Piano Marshall—Acordo Bilateral com
Portugal," 6 May 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Piano
Marshall." A.M.N.E. For the English text of the final agreement see, Ministerio dos Negocios
Estrangeiros, "Department of State, FOR THE PRESS-Economic Cooperation Agreement
Between the United States of America and Portugal," 29 September 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada
em Washington, M140, Processo 85,7 "Piano Marshall." A.M.N.E.
16Ministerio dos Neg6cios Estrangeiros, "1949/1950 Programme," May 1949, Arquivo da
Embaixada em Washington, M153, Processo 85,8 "Piano Marshall," 4. A.M.N.E.
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Portugal's "national water power [but also to improve] irrigation, transport and the
control of floods,"--the latter being strictly agricultural not industrial goals.17
Along with a marked increase in imports, there were "difficulties arising in
the field of external purchasing power (through the vertical fall of Portuguese
home exports and the freezing of part of the Portuguese available resources)"18
In other words, these "difficulties" were the results of a marked post-war
contraction in the demand for Portuguese goods (exports). Compounding the
situation was the "freezing" of Portuguese assets (gold) by the United States.19
The American government had frozen Portugal's assets in the United States over
the issue of German looted gold. By 1948 this issue was hampering American
efforts to gain long-term base rights in the Azores. Pressure was brought to bear
on the Secretary of the Treasury to unblock Portuguese assets in the United
States in order to facilitate diplomatic action. On 2 September 1948, Secretary
Snyder issued an amendment to General License No. 53 which included

17lbid.,

18lbid

3.

.,1.

19lbid. Sir Stanley Wyatt, Financial Counsellor of the British Embassy in Lisbon compiled
a report on would-be illicit gold transactions made through the Bank of Portugal from 1942 to
1944. He gathered this information from a series of "reliable' sources. This report was then sent
to both his superiors in London and to his counterpart, James E. Wood, at the American
Embassy. This report served, in part, as the evidence for the action taken by the United States
towards Portugal regarding her assets. Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
(OASIA), "Memorandum No. 131, Gold Imports into Portugal—Two Aspects, 10 September
1944," Appended to "Financial Attache, American Embassy (James E. Wood) to Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury (Harry D. White), 25 October 1944, Lisbon;' RG 56, Box 20, folder
Portugal (Incoming) Letters, May '43 - Dec. '44. National Archives.
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Portugal in the generally licensed trade area and unblocked Portuguese assets in
the United States.20
Thus by 1948, without having had access to all of her assets, Portugal
found herself in a disadvantaged economic position. Although the gold issue
was eventually resolved, the deficit spending resulting from the necessary trade
imbalances would continue. This situation did not raise alarm among American
leaders because Portugal's reserves were thought to be substantial enough to
cover her debts.21
By 30 June 1952, Portugal had received 51.2 million dollars in grants and
loans through the Marshall Plan. These funds were used for everything from
improving her infrastructure and national hydroelectric system, to building
schools and hospitals. Portugal had even had a hospital-tender ship constructed
for her cod-fishing fleet with equipment and materials purchased with ERP
funds.22
These Marshall Plan funds did not represent a large portion of the overall
funds allocated for European recovery. Portugal as a neutral had not
experienced the devastation that other continental European powers faced as a
consequence of the war. The industrial economies of Germany and France, for

20For a discussion of the gold issue and its diplomatic impact, see State Department,
"Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) to the Under
Secretary of State (Lovette)," Washington, August 11,1948, Foreign Relations of the United
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. Ill, Western Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1974), 840.51/FC 53/8-1148; and see Ibid , Annex.
21"Relations

of Individual Western European Countries with the Western Hemisphere."
Federal Reserve Bulletin 34 (February 1948): 151
22The

Marshall Foundation, "Marshall Plan Information," under "Funding Amounts and
Examples," http://www.marshalifoundation.org/librarv/doc. eca.html [accessed June 15, 2010],
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example, were nearly destroyed. They required tremendous inputs of cash to
rebuild their larger though much more damaged infrastructure. One of the key
goals of the Marshall Plan was to bring the aggregate industrial levels of Western
Europe to 30 percent above 1938 levels by 1951. Not only did it succeed, the
new levels actually reached 41 percent above 1938 levels. Nevertheless,
Portugal, as noted above, was an agricultural economy. The Marshall Plan never
met its intended goals for European agricultural output. Consequently, in 1951,
Western Europe remained dependent on outside sources for nearly 30 percent of
its foodstuffs.23
In the end, Portugal had participated in the Marshall Plan, embracing both
the vision of the plan and the practical financial assistance that it had rendered.
Beyond direct assistance, participation had also afforded Portugal entry into the
-

ERP trading block. Lastly, Portugal's participation resulted in her enjoying MostFavored-Nation status with many western European countries as well as the
United States. These were tangible commercial advantages that could offset the
limited commercial advantages of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.Q.)
The same could be said of Portugal and N.A.T.O. The North Atlantic
Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949. There were twelve

23lmanuel

Wexler, "The Marshall Plan in Economic Perspective: Goals and
Accomplishments," in The Marshall Plan, Fifty Years Late/, edited by Martin Schain (New York:
Palgrave, 2001), 150.
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original members--the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, and Portugal. For the other European powers, signing a multinational
defense treaty was nothing new. For the United States, however, NATO,
marked the start of a significant paradigm shift. In his recent work, From Munich
to Pearl Harbor, David Reynolds addressed this issue by arguing that Roosevelt
came to believe that airborne warfare left America vulnerable to attack.
Roosevelt, according to Reynolds, also believed that American values, i.e.
"liberty and capitalist democracy," could and should transform the world.
Roosevelt concluded that only in a world which embraced American ideology
could the United States be safe.24
This policy was adopted and applied in the post war era. In the United
States, there was a persistent and consistent assessment of the strategic value
of global air and naval bases A 1947 National Security Council (NSC) report on
base rights in Greenland, Iceland and the Azores assessed the strategic value of
each of these bases. These areas were already judged by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as primary base areas, with base rights "required" to meet American
security needs. The NSC assessment was determined by the "consideration of
their use for four purposes...." These purposes were: "bases for offensive
operations; bases forming a part of the defensive system about the U.S.; areas to
be denied the enemy; and as bases for the staging of air transport and combat
aircraft." The most critical role for the Azores was in the last classification, air

24Reynolds,

4.
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transport and combat aircraft. Here the Azores was listed as "The most vital
single spot in the world in this respect, exclusive of the war zone and the U.S.
proper. These islands are the key to our primary air line of communication." The
continued value of the Azores in American military defensive plans would play a
significant role in furthering Luso-American relations.23
Before Roosevelt's presidency, the United States felt itself geographically
protected by two oceans. After the First World War, the United States Senate
refused to join the League of Nations in 1919. On the one hand, it was
unnecessary because the United States still felt that the Western hemisphere
was insulated by its surrounding waters. On the other hand, Article 10 of the
League Covenant seemed to threaten the United States Congress' role in
directing American foreign policy. It stated that, if a member state were
threatened, the Council would advise how that threat would be met. In theory
then, powers constitutionally held by the United States Congress were to be
handed over to an international body, i.e. the League of Nations. These powers
might include the appropriations of funds, arms limitations and treaty
negotiations. The most critical of these powers, of course, was the power to
declare war which would now be in the hands of the League Council. This was
unacceptable to some members of Congress.
After experiencing the horrors of a second worid war, the idea of collective
defense began to take hold in the United States. As stated above, Roosevelt

25"A

Report to the President by the National Security Council on Base Rights in
Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores (25 November 1947, Washington)" in "Memorandum for the
President (25 November 1947, Washington),'1 President Secretary's Files, Box # 203, National
Security Council Files—Meetings, NSC 2/1 National Archives - President Truman Library.
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had a different vision of how America would be threatened in the future and how
she would have to meet these threats. In 1945, the United States hosted the
United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in
order to draw up the United Nations Charter. By October of that same year,
America was a founding member of the United Nations (U.N.).26 According to
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, participation in the U.N. did not
"impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member."27 Thus, participation in the U N. did not place any
restrictions on the U.S. Congress in terms of either a declaration of war or the
right to conclude bilateral or multilateral defense treaties. The U.S. Senate then
went one step further when, on 11 June 1948, it passed Resolution 239, more
commonly known as the Vandenberg Resolution. Of its six objectives, the most
relevant to this discussion was the second objective, which stated: "[The U.S.
government should pursue the] Progressive development of regional and other
collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance
with the purposes, and provisions of the [U.N.] Charter."28

26The United Nations, "Welcome-English," under "History ot the United Nations,"
http://www.un.orq.htm [accessed July 13,2010], It should be noted that Portugal was not a U.N.
member until 1955 because of certain veto by the Soviet Union. The Salazar regime was
vehemently anti-communist. Portuguese Communist members were often jailed or exiled. The
consequence of this treatment was that the Soviet Union barred Portuguese admission to the
U.N.

27North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part I—The Antecedents of the Alliance,"
http://www.nato int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm [accessed July 12, 201OJ.
28North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, "U.S. Senate Resolution 239—80'" Congress, 2nd
Session—("The Vandenberg Resolution")," under "e-iibrary," under "basic texts," under "Part I—
The Antecedents of the Alliance," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (accessed July 12
2010).
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At this time, Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, the U.S. Senator from Michigan,
was at the peak of his political power. He was Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Senate President pro tem, and the leading Republican
spokesman in Congress.29 In conjunction with Robert A. Lovett, George
Marshall's Undersecretary of State, Vandenberg developed Resolution 239 out of
growing concern over mounting Soviet aggression and influence in Western
Europe From 1948 to 1949, the West held its collective breath while bearing
witness to the Berlin Crisis. Concurrently, direct Soviet pressure was brought to
bear in Czechoslovakia, while indirect pressure was felt in both Finland and
Greece. Meanwhile the national Communist parties of both France and Italy
seemed to be gaining ground. All the while, the Soviet Union held veto power
within the U.N.'s powerful Security Council.30 In April of 1948, Vandenberg
voiced his concern directly in a letter to one of his constituents:
I agree with you that the United Nations must be used in every
possible way to create collective security through peaceful means.
The great fundamental difficulty is that practically all our American
efforts in these directions are aggressively opposed by Soviet Russia
and her satellites. This is true in the United Nations where we are
constantly met by Russian veto. It is true in connection with our
economic recovery programs. In the case of the European programs,
for example, the Soviet states immediately met together in Yugoslavia
and publicly announced their purpose to "wreck" these economic
programs... 31

29Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., editor, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952)405. Interestingly, prior to World War II, Senator Vandenberg
had been a staunch isolationist. However, on 7 December 1941 all that changed. Upon
reflection of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Senator later wrote, "That day ended
isolationism for any realist." As quoted in, Ibid., 1.

30lbid.,

31lbid
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, 401-402.
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Thus, the Vandenberg Resolution was not meant to weaken the-U.N., but instead
to strengthen both it and the Marshal! Plan. The Vandenberg Resolution
politically helped pave the way for N.A.T.O. by making it clear that the U.S.
Senate was open to multilateral defensive alliances in accordance with Article 51
of the U.N. Charter.
The ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty were clearly expressed in its
preamble. It affirmed:
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live
in peace with all peoples and all governments. 'They are determined
to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the
North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.32

These ideals mirrored those of the Atlantic Charter, seeking collective peace,
self-determination, liberty and the rule of law. The establishment of N.A.T.O.
would allow those nations benefitting from the Marshall Plan but still frightened
by the constant threat of outside coercion to feel more secure. Thus, N.A.T.O.
would work in tandem with the Marshall Plan to bring about both political and
economic stability to the region.
Belgium, France Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
were all signatories of the Treaty of Brussels. The Treaty of Brussels was,
among other things, a defensive pact between these countries. Signed on 17
32North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty." under "e-library," under
"basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements,"
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (accessed July 12 2010).
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March 1948, it served as the predecessor of the North Atlantic Treaty.33 With
America's help and support this coordinated action could be extended and
strengthened. Europe could be transformed from a splintered, self-interested,
volatile region-which sporadically dragged the world into war—into a
brotherhood of nations which embraced liberty, rejected violent revolution and
worked towards a mutually beneficial future through the rule of law.
Portugal was not among the first circle of nations to be approached by the
United States regarding this new vision of European defense. In July of 1948,
representatives from the United States, Canada, Belgium, France, Luxemburg,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Washington, D.C. to discuss the
possibility of a multinational Atlantic defense treaty. At this initial meeting it was
agreed that "certain other North Atlantic countries, such as Portugal, Norway,
Iceland and Denmark [would later be approached]...to ascertain whether those
Governments would be prepared to become parties to the projected North
Atlantic Security Pact."34
Although the press followed these talks closely, it was only in October of
that year that Portugal was approached regarding possible membership.
Hesitancy on the part of the United States may have been due to Prime Minister
Salazar's negative view of European federation. On 28 April 1948, during a

33For the text of the treaty see, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The Brussels
Treaty—Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence,"
under "e-library," under "basic texts," under "Part I—The Antecedents of the Alliance,"
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (accessed July 12 2010).

34Ministerio

dos Negocios Estrangeiros, "Pro Memoria," [Note from Sir Nigel Roland, the
British Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations],
6 October 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico." A.M.N E.
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speech "The West in the Face of Russia" delivered before an assembly of the
senior Portuguese officers, Salazar voiced his concern regarding the possibility
of European federation by stating, "the organization of a world interested in
maintaining the basis of western civilization clearly cannot make itself whole on a
supra-national basis, but only through the understanding and cooperation of
national sovereignties.. .The idea of a federated Europe seems to me to be
outside the possibility of realization for many reasons. . ,"35
On 31 December 1948, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta responded with
no less than three pages of Portuguese observations regarding the projected
Atlantic Pact. The Portuguese government had three main reservations.
Portugal's first concern was the use of the term "European Federation" which
Portugal felt denied the cultural integrity of individual nations in Western Europe.
Furthermore, the Foreign Minister argued that under the pressure of political and
economic conformity, the spirit of trust among these parties would soon be lost.
Portugal's second concern had to do with the construction and use of strategic
bases throughout Europe for the exclusive defense of the Atlantic. Portugal
thought the latter exceeded the intent of the United Nations. She also suggested
that some national governments might not accede to N.A.T.O. if this was its
primary goal. Finally, the question of Spain was brought to the forefront.
Portugal pointed to the indisputable fact that in terms of the defense of the

350riginally,

"A organizagao do mundo interessado em manter as bases da civilizagao
occidental nao pode fazer-se integralmente, como e visivel, no piano supranacional, mas apenas
no entendimento e concerto de soberanias nacior.ais... A ideia de uma Europa federal parece-me
fora das possibilidades de realizagao por muitas razoes. .Translation mine.) For a published
edition of the speech see, Antonio Oliveira Salazar, "O Ocidente em face da Russia," in
Discursos e Notas Pollticas: 1943 - 1950, vol. IV, (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, L.da, 1951), 332.
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Iberian Peninsula, Spain was critical. Consequently. Portugal insisted that there
had to be some type of "revision of Spain's situation within the western
concert"—i.e. Spain could not be continuously or. worst yet, permanently
excluded by the Western powers.36
Back in September of the same year, these same fears had already been
voiced in conversations between Minister Caeiro da Matta and the American
Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh. Later that month, John D.
Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs, reassured MacVeigh that
American and Portuguese thinking were "running on not dissimilar lines." He
agreed that the term "Western Union" was a poor choice in describing what
America hoped to achieve through this Pact because it could easily be confused
with the "unofficial projects looking toward unification of Europe...." In terms of
Spanish reintegration, Director Hickerson hoped that, on the one hand, the
Portuguese might help guide the Spanish government in the right direction—at
least from an international perspective. On the other hand, he also informed
Ambassador MacVeigh that America had been sounding out her allies around
the globe regarding the issue of Spain and that she was moving towards an
easing of her current official position towards Spain. At this point, the United
States of America was operating under the United Nations Assembly 1946

360riginally, "...revisao da situa?ao da Espanha no concerto occidental" Translation
mine. Minist6rio dos Negocios frstrangeiros, "Pro Memoria," [Note trom J. Caeiro da Matta,
Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations to Sir Nigel Roland, the British Ambassador to
Portugal], 31 December 1948, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico."
A.M.N.E.
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Resolution which prohibited diplomatic missions to Spain. Hickerson stated that
the United States was ready to support a modification of this Resolution.37
Clearly, there was once again a problem with Luso-American
communication. The United States wanted Portugal to participate in the Pact.
Portugal was willing to participate in the Pact but voiced a few reservations. The
United States chose not to address these reservations directly. Instead, Portugal
was fed information on a need-to-know basis via Ambassador MacVeigh. Given
the, attention these talks were getting from the international press, Ambassador
MacVeigh mused that this would not bode well for the negotiations. As he
pointed out in a note to the Secretary of State, "[Salazar's] experience of
government does not lead him easily to conceive that press 'leaks' in connection
with top secret matters can be unintentional."38
It is no wonder that in November of 1948, in response to a press release by
the Agence France-Presse regarding the possible entry of other European
nations into the Atlantic pact, the Portuguese government used the Portuguese
press outlets to "stir up the pot." The Portuguese report stated that:
[certain circles in Portugal viewed the possibility of] the adhesion of
Portugal to this Pact...with skepticism...These circles state that it is
precisely because of Portugal's ancient alliance with Great Britain, and
of the facilities which she has granted to the United States that formal

37State Department, "The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the
Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh), Washington, September 22, 1948," Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. Ill, Western Europe (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974), Lisbon Embassy Files, Lot 56F159.
38State

Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to the Secretary of State,"
Lisbon, November 8, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol.
Ill, Western Europe (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 840.20/11-848, No.
412.
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adhesion by Portugal to the pact wouid, in practice and for the time
being, be little more than superfluous/9

Ambassador MacVeigh was convinced that Prime Minister Salazar himself wrote
the press release, and that his use of the press did not bode well for future
negotiations regarding Portuguese membership in the Atlantic Pact.40
On 10 January 1949, Portugal received formal responses to Foreign
Minister Caeiro da Matta's Pro-Memdria of 31 December 1948 by both the British
Ambassador to Portugal and the American Ambassador to Portugal. In both
cases Portugal was reassured that the proposed pact was a defensive Treaty,
nothing more—i.e. that the issue of European political and/or economic
integration were outside of the parameters of the proposed Treaty. The
American Aide Memoire noted that, "[the Treaty] would in no way derogate from
the full sovereignty of the parties; and that it will not be applicable to the colonial
possessions of any party except through providing for consultation should they
be threatened." Both countries also assured her that the Treaty itself would not
make specific provisions for the establishment of strategically significant bases—
neither military bases, nor air bases. The American Aide Memoire went one step
further, "Obviously, no party could be required under the Treaty to grant facilities
on its territory to all or any of the other parties without its full consent." As to the
question of Spain, both countries agreed that they fully understood Portugal's
strategic doubts regarding the conclusion of a defensive pact in which Spain was
not a member. The American Aide Memoire added that,
39lbid.
40lbid.
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[America] would like to see Spain included whenever this may become
politically possible, but that under present circumstances Spain s
inclusion is not politically possible for most European
participants ...[Nevertheless,] non-inclusion of Spain at this time
should not be a deterrent to Portuguese participation in the proposed
Treaty, but rather that Portugal's defense problems, including the
Spanish element in the strategic picture, could be dealt with more
satisfactorily if Portugal were a party.41

Thus, Portuguese worries over European federation and the possible
blanket use of bases within members' ter ritories were laid to rest. At its root,
both of these concerns reflected a fear of loss of national sovereignty. It also
brought to the forefront Portuguese concern over the future role of her colonies
within the context of an Atlantic defense treaty. Spain remained a sticking point.
Spain was important to Portugal. Nonetheless, both America and Great Britain
were very clear in distinguishing that whereas Spain was important to Portugal,
Spain was not as important to them as Portugal.
On 8 March 1949, at 3:40 pm, an oral message was delivered to the
Portuguese government informing them that a draft text was nearing
completion—within a day or two. The Portuguese were given a timeframe of
roughly one week to consider whether or not they wished to be an original
signatory. After a week's time, the text would then be made public. They were

41Minist6rio

dos Neg6cios Estrangeiros, "Aide Memoire," [Lincoln MacVeigh, the
American Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign
Relations], 10 January 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico."
A.M.N.E. For the British note see, Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, "Aide Memoire," [Sir
Nigel Roland, the British Ambassador to Portugal to J. Caeiio da Matta, Portuguese Minister of
Foreign Relations], 10 January 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto
Atlantico." A.M.N.E.
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also informed that the "conference for final consideration and signature will be
held in Washington about April 4."42
That same day, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta composed a Memorial.
He insisted on further clarification regarding several issues before Portugal being
publicly invited to join N.A.T.O. Portugal could not see herself signing an alliance
that would compromise her for more than twenty years. He explained that within
a twenty-year period he could well envision an attack on the West by the Soviet
Union. Beyond that period, however, he could just as easily imagine a European
rivalry escalating to the brink of war. Portugal did not want to participate in a
European war similar to the past two world wars as
the experience never rendered any advantages in correspondence to
the sacrifices made [by Portugal]...Further [from Portugal's
perspective] this new web of alliances was similar to those in
existence prior to September 1939 and, in the event of a conflict or the
weakening of the United Nations, the mechanism of N.A.T.O. could be
activated as a consequence of an act of aggression not originating in
Soviet Russia. In which case, the Portuguese Government and, in all
likelihood other governments, could not compromise themselves by
intervening.43
Thus, the question of the duration of the treaty was for Portugal fundamental to
her decision to participate in the alliance.

42State

Department, "Oral Message, 8 March [1949]," RG59, Box 1, folder "Papers
Relating to North Atlantic Pact, 1949 to International Working Group. National Archives.
430riginally,

"...a experiencia nao Ihe advieram nunca vantagems correspondents aos
sacrifices que uma ou outra vez Ihe custaram...Corn efeito, por virtude de uma rede de Tratados
semelhantes a que exitia antes de Setembro de 1939, e que na hipotese de fracasso ou
diminui?ao de vitalidade da UNO pode de novo florescer na Europa, o mecanismo do Pacto do
Atlantico Norte pode vir a ser posto em funcionamento em consequ&ncia de uma agressao nao
originaria da Russia Sovietica " Translation mine. Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros,
"Memorial," [Note from J. Caeiro da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations, to both the
Ambassador from the United States to Portugal and to the Ambassador from England to
Portugal], 8 March 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150. "Pacto Atlantico," proc.
33,12/no. 2 A.M.N.E.
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The question of Spain also remained a serious issue to the Portuguese.
Once again, Caeiro da Matta reiterated that the Iberian Peninsula was a
geographic and strategic unit. An attack from the east would cross into the
peninsula via the Pyrenees. It was essentia! that Spain be a part of the
defensive pact. He then went one step further by pointing out that, "a profound
alteration of the actual political conditions in Spain could in the blink of an eye
represent the installation in that nation of an extremist Government with political
and strategic consequences that are easy to foresee."44 The conditions for that
change could be external, i.e. direct assault by the Red Army. To the
Portuguese government, however, in a much more probable scenario this
change would be internal via a communist revolution in Spain. Thus, Portugal's
Foreign Minister was arguing that as hard as it was for some western countries to
support General Franco's regime in Spain, the alternative could be a strategic
nightmare. In an earlier conversation with Ambassador MacVeigh, Caeiro da
Matta had stated as much when he asserted, "I don't like Franco and I don't like
his regime, but stability in Spain is a necessity for us all."45
Lastly, the March 8 Memorial also brought up the issues of both colonial
possessions and territorial guarantees. Caeiro da Matta noted that the United
States had stated that the tenets of the Treaty would be applied to a participant's
440riginally,

"...uma altera?ao profunda das actuais condigoes politicas em Espanha
poderia representar a breve trecho a instalagao naquele pais de urn Governo extremista com
consequ^ncias politicas e estrat6gicas faceis de prever." Translation mine. Ibid.
45This

remarkable statement by Caeiro da Matta was quoted in a note from MacVeigh to
the American Secretary of State. State Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to
the Secretary of State, Lisbon, September 8, 1948," Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers, 1948, vol. Ill, Western Europe (Washington, D C.: Government Printing
Office, 1974), 840.00/9-848, No. 332.
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colonial possessions, if those possessions were being threatened and then just
for consultation. Since Portugal had possessions outside of the Atlantic theater,
would the United States--and other pact nations—come to her assistance if those
colonies outside of the Atlantic were threatened?46 Furthermore, Portugal
thought that in one form or another there should be "a guarantee of the territorial
integrity of each of the adherents [to the Pact]."47
Despite these concerns, eight days later Portugal received a formal
invitation to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. The invitation from Secretary of State
Dean Acheson was also sent to the Embassies of Rome and Copenhagen. It
included the final text of the North Atlantic Treaty. Concurrently, Foreign Minister
Caeiro da Matta received a separate letter from Acheson addressing Portugal's
concerns as expressed in his "Memorial" dated 8 March.48
In this note, Acheson claimed that Articles 12 and 13 should allay any
fears that Portugal may have in terms of the duration of the Treaty. Article 12
stated: "After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time
thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the
purpose of reviewing the Treaty...." Furthermore, Article 13 stated: "After the
46lt should be noted that Caiero da Matta made a point of excluding Britain from the need
for any further clarification on this point because of Portugal's alliance with her, i.e. the Windsor
Treaty of 1386. Ministerio dos Negocios Izstrangeiros, "Memorial," [Memorandum from J. Caeiro
da Matta, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Relations, to both the Ambassador from the United
States to Portugal and to the Ambassador from England to Portugal], 8 March 1949, Arquivo da
Embaixada em Washington, M150, "Pacto Atlantico," proc. 33,12/no. 2. A.M.N.E.

47lbid.
48This

"Note" from Acheson included the formal invitation to sign the North Atlantic
Treaty, the final text of the Treaty, and a response to Caeiro da Matta's memorandum dated 8
March. State Department, "Secretary of State to the Embassy of Portugal," Washington, March
16, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150. Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/
Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.
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Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one
year after its notice of denunciation...." Consequently, although this was a
twenty year treaty, after ten years concerns could be addressed by any
member—leaving open the door to possible revision.49
Acheson in some ways skirted the issue of Spanish non-inclusion by
simply arguing that Portuguese adherence to the Pact would not infringe upon
their commitments to existing Spanish-Portuguese agreements. However, he
could not have been clearer when it came to Portuguese concerns over the
security of their colonies. To this end he assured Caeiro da Matta, "It is clearly
understood that the obligation to consult covers threats to any party in any part of
the world, including its overseas possessions." As for Portuguese concerns
regarding her own territorial integrity, Acheson went on to maintain that, "the
Treaty offers all parties much more effective assurances for security than does
the Charter of the United Nations...[in that] Article 4 expressly mentions a threat
to the 'territorial integrity' of any of the parties as a cause for consultation among
all."50
Not surprisingly, the following day a note was sent from the British
Embassy in Lisbon to the Portuguese Foreign Minister which mirrored American
sentiments precisely.51 Much more revealing was the British note dated 19
March:

49lbid.
50lbid.
51Foreign Office, "British Embassy to Portuguese Foreign Ministry," Lisbon, 17 March
1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes
Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.
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The United Kingdom Government have always regarded a duration
of twenty years as highly desirable and would have welcomed a
longer period if there had been any chance of obtaining it. In their
view a duration of twenty years emphasizes that this is a long term
association for peace and security and not merely an ephemeral
alliance against the Soviet Union. It commits the United States and
Canada more fully to military cooperation with Western Europe and to
this extent will not only break isolationist habits on the other side of the
Atlantic, but also give far greater confidence to Europe than any short
term arrangements could do. In view of the United Kingdom
Government interdependence has become an inescapable condition
of survival of the countries of Western Europe.t2

If authorities in Portugal were still unconvinced that the twenty year term was a
condition of the European contingent and not a condition of the United States,
the rather frank telegram that followed from Acheson would dispel that notion.
Dated 21 March 1949, Acheson was responding to comments made to him by
both the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh, and the
Portuguese Ambassador to the United States, Pedro Teotonio Pereira, regarding
Portugal's concerns as to the duration of the Treaty Both men had repeated to
Acheson Portugal's traditional reluctance to become embroiled in "continental
conflicts," to which Acheson replied:
I well understand your preoccupation. My own govt has, since the
early days of its independence, always endeavored similarly to avoid
involvement in Eur conflicts, such an important change in our historic
policy that we too have given most careful thought to the question of
the duration of the treaty. Brit, Fr, Belg, Neth, and Lux govts strongly
preferred a duration of fifty years but my govt was reluctant, as is
yours, to accept such a long-term commitment. After the most careful
consideration, however, my govt reached the conclusion that twenty
years with provision for review after ten years represented the best

52Foreign

Office, "British Embassy to Portuguese Foreign Ministry," Lisbon, 19 March
1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes
Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E
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term...We believe that a shorter duration would not be adequate to
provide in Eur the necessary long-term stability and confidence of
security.53

This statement not only reaffirmed and clarified British interest in a long-term
Treaty—i.e. they would have preferred a fifty year commitment-but also served
to communicate the importance of this commitment. The British wanted to break
the North American nation's habit of isolation. The Americans were reluctant, but
accepted a compromise of twenty years—a truly historic shift in policy. As
misery loves company, Portugal was asked to join in order to ensure long-term
stability and security in the region regardless of her traditional reluctance to bind
herself to long-term continental affairs.
Acheson's telegram could not have come at a better time.54 After several
Cabinet meetings and several discussions with the Spanish Ambassador to
Portugal, Portugal accepted the invitation to join the North Atlantic Pact on 30
March 1949

55

On 2 April 1949, Foreign Minister Caeiro da Matta as well as four

other Portuguese representatives attended the private meeting of the signatory
"State Department, "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Portugal," Washington,
March 21, 1949," Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1949, vol. IV,
Western Europe (Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 840.20/3-2149:
Telegram.
54MacVeigh informed Acheson that the Portuguese Cabinet had already met twice and
twice the invitation had been rejected. The Cabinet was set to meet again to discuss the issue
once more, and MacVeigh knew that Salazar would have this telegram in hand before the
meeting. State Department, "The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeigh) to the Secretary of State,
Lisbon, March 22, 1949," Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1949, vol.
IV, Western Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 840.20/3-2249:
Telegram.
55ln

this note, Caiero informed Sir Nigel Ronald that Portugal had that very day notified
Ambassador MacVeigh of her acceptance of the invitation to join N.A.T.O, Unfortunately, the note
to MacVeigh was no where to be found. Ministerio de Neg6cios Estrangeiros. "Caiero da Matta
to Sir Nigel Ronald" Lisbon 30 March 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto
do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A M.N E.
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powers of the North Atlantic Treaty held in Washington, D.C. This session finally
allowed the representatives of all the signatory powers to meet to discuss any
lingering questions. The one question that Portugal had was whether or not
Portugal's treaties with Spain—the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of
17 March 1939, and the Additional Protocol of 29 June 1940—were compatible
with Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty
stated: "Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in
force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with
provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international
engagement in conflict with this Treaty."1"3
This question had already been posed to both the United States and Great
Britain. Still, Portugal thought it best to ascertain how the other signatory powers
interpreted the wording of Article 8 and its application to her situation. After a
lengthy discussion, Portugal was finally satisfied. All present agreed that, based
on their understanding of Portugal's treaties with Spain, these two treaties were
not incompatible with the North Atlantic Treaty.57
The next day, Acheson received a letter from Caeiro da Matta stating that
Portugal was now prepared to sign without reservation.58 On 4 April 1949, the

56State Department, "Secretary of State to the Embassy of Portugal," North Atlantic
Treaty text, Washington, March 16, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto
do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.

57State

Department. "Conference of the Foreign Ministers..." Transcript. Washington,
April 2, 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, Ml50, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/
Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3, 3-10. A M.N.E,
58Ministerio

de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta) to
Secretary of State (Acheson)" Washington 3 April 1949, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington,
M1-50, Facto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A M N.F.
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United States and Portugal-along with 10 other powers—signed the North
Atlantic Treaty forming the North Atlantic Pact. This had been a difficult journey
for Portugal because she was not party to the drafting of the original text.
Nevertheless, in the end she could be content with what she had gained and
what she had learned.
In its simplest form, what she had secured for herself by signing the Treaty
was recognition of her sovereignty and her colonial possessions. Moreover,
whereas within the constraints of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance Portugal could
expect assistance from Great Britain if she or her colonies were threatened,
within N.A.T.O. Portugal had a concert of nations to aid her in her defense.
Ultimately, what she had learned was that her Atlantic position and her Atlantic
possessions made hera significant partner in this organization. That realization
was soon made apparent.
After the signatures and the ceremonies were completed, the Foreign
Ministers present agreed that a Working Group would be organized in
Washington, D.C. "to study and recommend the nature of the organization to be
established under Article 9." That Group began its work on 23 August and
continued until the N.A.T.O. Council convened on 17 September. The Council
met to establish a Defense Committee and to take the necessary steps to
implement the terms of the Treaty. The Working Group created the
organizational plan for N.A.T.O. and finished its report on 9 September.
Accordingly, the North Atlantic was to be divided into four geographic blocks.
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These geographic blocks were to be coordinated by four Regional Planning
Groups.59 The flow chart below illustrates the organization of N.A.T.O.
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Figure 7: N.A.T.O organizational chart.

Portugal was made part of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning
Group. From an American security perspective, this decision made perfect
sense. A Central Intelligence Agency report on Portugal in October 1949
confirmed that:

59"Working Group Report" in "Memorandum for Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive
Secretary, National Security Council, Subject: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12, September
1949, Washington," in "A Report to the National Security Council by the Under secretary of State
on North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 September 1949, Washington," President Secretary's
Files, Box # 206, National Security Council Files-Meetings, Meeting 45, 15 September 1949.
National Archives - President Truman Library.
60"North

Atlantic Treaty Organization," President Secretary's Files, Box # 163,
Conferences; Paris Conference, October - November 1949. National Archives - President
Truman Library.
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From the point of view of US security, the importance of Portugal lies
mainly in the strategic location of the Atlantic islands, the homeland,
and the African colonies...Of foremost importance are the Azores,
which lie on a major sea and air route across the North Atlantic.
Possession of air and naval bases in the Azores would be highly
desirable to the US in the event of war with the USSR to afford
protection for US lines of communication and forestall possible attacks
on the US from such bases...In continental Portugal there is one firstclass airfield...Furthermore, the port of Lisbon is one of the finest
harbors in the world, and is close to the Atlantic entrance to the
Mediterranean.61

Thus, Portugal's position in the Atlantic, and her air and naval facilities made her
an asset to N.A.T O Beyond regional security, these same qualities made her
an asset to American security. For the Portuguese, her selection for this
particular Group could only have served to further reinforce her Atlantic identity.
Many issues were raised during the NATO negotiations. One issue that
was brought to the forefront throughout the negotiations was the obvious
distinction that the other signatory powers made in relation to Portugal and
Spain. Portugal's insistence on Spanish inclusion in the Pact was based on
military strategy. As she pointed out many times in these talks, Portugal feared
invasion from the east. Portugal's recent treaties with Spain were meant to
strengthen her security. Spanish inclusion in N.A.T.O. would have added to that
sense of security.
Portugal's assessment of Spain was in some ways later supported by
General Eisenhower's own appraisal of Spain. In a 1951 meeting with President
Truman and his Cabinet regarding N.A.T.O., Eisenhower noted that "Spain had
61"Ceritral

Intelligence Agency, Portugal, Situation Report 31 (13 October 1949,
Washington)," President Secretary's Files, Box# 261, Intelligence File. Situation Report (30-31),
National Archives - President Truman Library. ..
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20 divisions and she hated Stalin." In typical Eisenhower style he added "I feel
about the question of keeping Spain out the same as I fee! about keeping a
sinner out of church. You can't convert the sinner unless you let him get inside
the front door." Eisenhower was a general, not a politician. His assessment of
Spain was a military assessment of Spain.62
Portugal's position on Spain notwithstanding, at this time the other powers
were not willing to entertain the idea of Spanish inclusion due to the politics of
Spain's current reputation. At his press conference on the Atlantic Pact on 18
March 1949, Dean Acheson answered questions regarding Spain and Portugal.
When asked about Spain, he pointed out that members of the Pact have to be
unanimous in agreeing to accept any nation. In this respect, members of the
Pact would have to consider two matters. "Firstly is such a nation in a position to
further the democratic principles of the treaty. Secondly is such a nation in a
position to further the security of the North Atlantic area." When asked in what
category Portugal fell, Acheson replied that, "he could not speak for the other
negotiators but his own vote was cast for Portugal on both counts."63
Throughout these talks the Portuguese Ambassador to the United States,
Pedro Teotonio Pereira, had worked tirelessly to gather as much intelligence as
possible for the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Relations. By March, he was
""Meeting of General Eisenhower with the President and the Cabinet, Wednesday
January 31, 1951," in "Memorandum for the President (February 6, 1951)," President Secretary's
Files, Box #113, Cabinet—Secretary of State—Misc. (re NATO 1951), National Archives President Truman Library.
63Ministerio

de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Dean Acheson ...Press Conference on the
Atlantic Pact," [Portuguese Embassy in the United States to Portuguese Foreign Ministry]
Washington, 19 March 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Pacto do
Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A.M.N.E.
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sending several telegrams daily with information regarding both formal and
informal talks with members of the State Department, press releases made by
the same and by Congressmen, as well as summaries—sometimes, actual
copies-of editorials from leading American newspapers. As an experienced and
trusted member of Salazar's diplomatic corps, Pereira understood the need to
add context to the on-going negotiations between the two governments.
In the last two weeks leading up to the formal signing of the Treaty,
Ambassador Pereira became aware of what he wouid later term "the Spanish
deception."64 He related his stunning findings to Caeiro da Matta in a brief letter.
Pereira told Caeiro da Matta that, while the Minister had been meeting with
Spanish officials in Lisbon regarding the possible effect inclusion in the Pact
might have on existing Portuguese-Spanish treaties, in Washington
...the Spanish were circulating rumors with the intended effect of
convincing others that Portugal was not in a position to individually join
the Pact.. Spain, who in all these years have purposely publicly
ignored the exact extent of the peninsular accords...appeared
suddenly to present 'the block as a formal alliance capable of linking
the two countries in a singular polity . .As Your Excellency knows the
telegrams that were profusely circulated between 20 and 25 [of March]
came to state that Portugal had been officially warned by Spain that
she was not at liberty to join the Atlantic Pact . .So disastrous and
barefaced was this game that we were made aware of the fact that the
[American] State Department thought it necessary to intervene. The
Spanish Charge d'Affaires was summoned to the State Department
and was told that these events would only serve to complicate matters
more for Spain 65
64Ministerio

de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Ambassador in the United States
(Pereira) to Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta)," Washington, 20 April 1949. Arquivo
da Embaixada em Washington, M150, Proc. 70,2/No. 242. A M.N.E.
"Originally, "tratava a Espanha de fazer circular ca por f6ra rumores que tinham por fim
fazer crer que Portugal nio estava em situa?§o de aderir isoladamente ao Pacto. A Espanha que
durante tantos anos fez men9§o de ignorar em publico a exacta extensao dos acordos
peninsulares. .aparaeceu de repente a apresentar o 'bioco com uma alian?a formal capaz de
ligar os dois paizes numa mesma politica [sic], E sabe V. Exa. que teiegramas [sic] profusamente
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Thus, while Portugal had good reason to promote Spanish inclusion in the Pact,
it was clear that Spain did not have Portugal's interests at heart. Once again,
Portugal's neighbor had proven herself difficult at best. This experience could
only serve once again to remind the Portuguese that despite geography and
recent close relations they were, indeed, distinct from Spain.66 Portugal was, as
Caeiro da Matta confirmed in his press conference on 2 April, "an Atlantic
country."S/

Mutual Assistance & Mutual Defense Aqreements--the Azorean Connection
Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty required a clear military
commitment by the United States of America on a rather extensive basis. Article
3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states, "In order more effectively to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of

espalhados por toda a parte, entre 20 e 25 do corrente chegaram a dizer que Portugal tinha sido
oficiaimente advertido pela Espanha que n§ao era livre de se juntar ao Pacto do Atlantico...Tao
desastrado e calvo foi este jogo que viemos logo a saber que o Departamerito de Estado se
julgou na necessidade de entrevir. Foi o Encarregado de Negdcios de Espanha chamado ao
Departamento de Estado e foi ali ditto que tais reaches [sic] so serviriam para dificultar a
posigao de Espanha." Translation mine. Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese
Ambassador in the United States (Pereira) to Portuguese Foreign Minister (Caeiro da Matta),"
Washington, 5 Aprii 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, Ml 50, Proc. 70,2/No. 204.
A.M.N.E.
66Spain

would not be admitted into N.A.T.O. until 10 December 1981, six years after
General Francisco Franco's death. See, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain," under 'The North Atlantic Treaty," under "elibrary," under "basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements,"
http://www.nato.int (accessed July 12, 2010).
67Ministerio

de Neg6cios Estrangeiros, "Caeiro da Matta. Press Conference on...the
signing of the North Atlantic Alliance," Washington, 2 April 1949. Arquivo da Embaixada em
Washington, M150, Pacto do Atlantico—Documentos/ Recortes Imprensa, Pasta #3. A M.N.E.
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continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."68 Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty obliges all parties to agree "that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all...."69 To this end, six months after the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty, President Truman signed into legislation the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949.70 The intent of the law was made clear in its first paragraph which
reads:
The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and
other countries to promote peace and security in furtherance of the
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations require additional
measures of support based upon the principle of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid. These measures include the
furnishing of military assistance essential to enable the United States
and other nations ..to participate effectively in arrangements for
individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and
principles.... [Furthermore, under "Title I" of this law, it] authorized to
be appropriated to the President for the period through June 30, 1950,
out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for
carrying out the provisions and accomplishing the policies and
purposes of this title, not to exceed $500,000,000, of which not to
exceed $ 100,000,000 shall be immediately available upon
appropriation, and not to exceed $400,000,000 shall become available
when the President of the United States approves recommendations
for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area which may be
made by the Council and Defense Committee to be established under
the North Atlantic Treaty.71

68North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty." under "e-library," under
"basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements," http://www.nato.int
(accessed July 12; 2010).
69lbid.
70Public

Law 329, 81st Congress, 1st Session (H.R. 5895); Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. XXI, No. 538 (October 24, 1949).
71ibid.
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Hence, under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP),
the President could-without Congressional oversight—offer funds to those
nations who were seeking military aid—presumably under the recommendations
of the NATO Defense Committee.72
The U.S. State Department then initiated a series of negotiations with the
other signatory powers to offer military assistance to them and to conclude
defense treaties which would eventually offer American military access to bases
around the globe Portugal, of course, was one of these nations/3 The Mutual
Defense Assistance agreement between Portugal and the United States was
signed in Lisbon on 5 January 1951.
The Treaty is brief, with only seven articles. It begins by affirming that
both Portugal and the United States are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and,
that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty required that they work towards
collective security. It then goes on to make specific reference to the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and to assert that this Treaty will "govern the
transfer of such assistance."74 It is important to remember that this was meant to
be a bilateral agreement, i.e. a mutual exchange of assistance. Thus, not only

72This

Act would later be amended and then extended. Finally, it was replaced by the
Mutual Security Act of 1951—by then appropriations had risen to $7,500,000,000. This Act was
extended each year by appropriations until the early 1960s. For a detailed early analysis of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Program see, Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, "The Mutual
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438

260

was Portugal meant to gain from the agreement, the United States of America
was also meant to gain something in the exchange.
The importance of tying this mutual assistance directly with the mandates
of the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be overstated. Article I stated that the
intended goal of such assistance is,
to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and to
facilitate the development of, or be in accordance with, defense plans
under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty.... [Furthermore, it required
that] Each Government undertakes to make effective use of
assistance received...in accordance with defense plans formulated by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recommended by the North
Atlantic Treaty Defense Committee and Council, and agreed to by the
two Governments.75

According to the Treaty, all assistance had to be used in accordance with the
aforementioned plans, and the common security interests of both parties had to
be maintained.7b
The terms of this exchange of assistance were spelled out in the first two
articles of the Treaty. In Article I, the United States offered "equipment,
materials, services, or other military assistance'' to Portugal.77 In return, in Article
II, Portugal agreed to "facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of
the United States of America...raw and semiprocessed materials...which may be

""Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and
Portugal," January 5, 1951, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 2, pt. 1,
439.
76lbid.
77lbid.,

438.
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available in Portugal or dependent territories under its administration."78 The
next four articles dealt with the more mundane details of the exchanges such as
public relations, patent issues, taxation, and the status of personnel.79 The last
article dealt with the manner in which the Treaty could be amended as well as
the duration of the Treaty. In the case of the latter, the Agreement was to remain
in force "until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the
intention of the other party to terminate it."80
The first six months after the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Treaty were taken up with the process of creating the necessary bureaucracy to
facilitate the exchanges. Both parties had to agree on the ports to be used to
ship goods abroad. Each country had to hire shipping agents. These agents
then had to present their papers to the governments to which they were
discharged because each agent was "to operate as a part of [his respective]
Embassy."81

78lbid.,

439. Among other things, of particular interest to the United States were
Portuguese uranium ore deposits. Whether it was a concern over securing it for the United
States or keeping it from America's enemies, Portuguese uranium mines were a constant topic of
diplomatic conversation from 1949 on.
79lbid.,

440-441.

80lbid.,

441.

B1lbid. Four ports in the United States were selected for MDAP transport goods, New
York, Seattle, San Francisco, and New,Orleans. The agent for New York was Antonio da Cruz
Chambel of the Portuguese Commercial Office in New York. The Acting Consul for Portugal in
San Francisco, Guilherme Armas do Amaral was responsible for both the ports of San Francisco
and Seattle. While Fisher G. Dorsey, Vice-Consul for Portugal in Houston, was selected as the
shipping agent for New Orleans. For the selection of the ports, see State Department,
"Secretary of State (Acheson) to Portuguese Ambassador to the United States (Luis Esteves
Fernandes)," Washington, 8 September 1951, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218,
Acordo de Assistencia e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52 A.M.N.E. For the designation of the
agents, see Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Portuguese Ambassador to the United States
(Luis Esteves Fernandes) to Vice-Consul for Portugal at Houston, Texas (Fisher G. Dorsey),"
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By August of 1951 shipments from the United States to Portugal began in
earnest. By year's end 1952, Portugal had received 16,237 tons of supplies from
the United States Army. These shipments included radios, ordinance, motor
transport vehicles, small arms and machine guns, as well as artillery and artillery
ammunition. Portugal received 4,000 antipersonnel mines, 12,000 antitank
mines, and an astounding 42,000 rockets (ostensibly, to go with the 442 rocket
launchers). Nearly 500 cargo trailers, and over 700 trucks were sent to Portugal
during this short time period, including 5 ambulances.82
Additionally, from September of 1951 to December of 1953, Portugal also
accepted 94,959 tons of supplies from the United States Air Force (USAF).
These supplies included 240 aircraft, including 166 Republic F-84 Thunderjet jet
fighter planes and fifty Republic P-47D (F47) Thunderbolt fighter planes. This
USAF shipment also included twenty North American Aviation T-6 Texan single
engine trainer aircraft, one Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw multi-purpose helicopter,
and three Grumman air-sea rescue flying boats-altogether a remarkable boost to
Portugal's air corps. Beside the planes, the USAF also provided Portugal with
more radar sets, more motor vehicles, a twenty-ton crane and 2,900 aircraft
rockets.83

Washington, 22 December 1951, Arquivo da Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acordo de
Assistencia e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E.
82Ministerio

de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Quarterly Estimates of MDAP to Port—
Consolidated FY '50 and FY'51 (Selected ltems}/Department~ARMY," Arquivo da Embaixada em
Washington, M218, Ac6rdo de Assistencia e Defesa Mutua, Processo 15/51-52. A.M.N.E.
83Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros, "Quarterly Estimates of MDAP to PortConsolidated FY '51 and FY'52 (Selected ltems}/Department—AIR force," Arquivo da
Embaixada em Washington, M218, Acordo de Assistencia e Defesa Vlutua, Processo 15/51-52.
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The quantity and quality of military assistance that Portugal received in the
first few years of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program clearly reflected the
State Department objectives enumerated in its 1950 policy statement regarding
Luso-American relations:
(1) to maintain and improve existing cordial relations; (2) to ensure
continuation and development of the facilities now granted to us in the
Azores; (3) to encourage Portuguese participation in efforts to achieve
economic, political and military integration in western Europe and
coordination in North Atlantic area; and (4) to aid in the economic and
strategic development of Portugal's large African possessions.84

With a mind to these stated objectives, it was noted that Portugal's "low level of
industrial development' limited Portuguese capacity to produce the necessary
military equipment to bring her armed services up to anticipated N.A.T.O. levels.
This industrial underdevelopment necessitated a strong American investment in
Portugal's military development.85
The range of equipment—nearly six times the weight for the air forcereflects Portugal's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
role that she would play in the defense of the Atlantic. In the organizational flow
chart above it was noted that Portugal fell within the North Atlantic Ocean
Regional Planning Group. The C.I.A. report dated October 1949, cited earlier,
also confirmed that Portugal's importance lies in her Atlantic position. These
M.D.A.P. funds were meant to facilitate and coordinate "military integration" of

84State Department, "PORTUGAL: RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
PORTUGAL," Washington, October 20, 1950," Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic
Papers, 1950, vol. Ill, Western Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977),
611.53/10-2050: Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State.

85lbid.
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the Portuguese armed forces into the joint defense of the North Atlantic area,
which in the case of Portugal meant a focus on the air force.
In this same policy statement, the importance of the Azores was again
repeated. It was, however, the "Top Secret" supplement to the policy statement
on Portugal that plainly spelled out American interests in that region of the
Atlantic. This supplement confirmed, "The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] have
established a requirement for long term base rights in the Azores. Immediate
plans call for the development and expansion of existing operational and storage
facilities for the Air Force and ultimately for naval anchorages and facilities for
naval aircraft."30
Unfortunately for the U.S.; Portugal remained reluctant to allow peacetime
foreign bases on its territory. The cause of this hesitation stemmed from the
question of sovereignty: if foreign troops were allowed on Portuguese soil, would
they willingly quit that region when asked? The supplement went on to note that
the Portuguese "indicated that any further discussion of this question should take
place within the NAT [North Atlantic Treaty], a preference which we believe
stems from their desire to tie any extension of Azores facilities to the satisfactory
development of NAT plans for Portugal's defense."87 American frustration over
Portugal's position and the determination and confidence of the analysts to
change Portuguese policy in this regard was palpable as the statement
concluded,

86lbid.,

[Annex],

87lbid.
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Their [Portugal's] unwillingness to extend such facilities in peacetime
remains to be overcome and it will be necessary to convince them that
arrangement for the utilization of these facilities, which are the most
important contribution Portugal can make to the strengthening of the
collective defense of the North Atlantic Region, as weil as of western
Europe, must be completed as soon as possible before it becomes too
late....88

The analysts' solution was to continue negotiations directly with Portugal to
develop and expand the extant facilities as much as possible within the terms of
the 1948 Agreement.89 Which is exactly what they did.
On 6 September 1951, Portugal signed the Defense Agreement Between
Portugal and the United States of America authorizing the use of the Lagens
airbase, and to a lesser extent the Santa Maria airbase, in the Azores. As stated
earlier, the Preamble of the North Atlantic: Treaty states that the signatories "are
resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense .. "90 The Preamble of the
1951 Luso-American defense treaty makes direct reference to the North Atlantic

88lbid.
89lbid. As discussed in Chapter V, the 1944 Agreement allowed the United States to
construct the aerodrome at Santa Maria, while also having transit rights at Lagens until the end of
hostilities in the Far East. The terms of this treaty ended on 2 June 1946. On 7 September 1946
a temporary agreement was reached between Portugal and the U.S. This agreement allowed the
U.S. to use the Lagens facilities for another 18 montns. Meanwhile, U.S. led negotiations were
on-going for both the use of and extension of the facilities at Lagens. A new Luso-American
Agreement was finally reached on 2 February 1948. For the text of the 7 September 1946
agreement see, State Department, "Portuguese-American Military Conversations in the Azores, 7
September 1946," RG 59 Records of the Spanish and Portuguese Desk Officers, Box 1, folder
1943-1951 AZORES NEGS. (Documents) National Archives. For the negotiations leading up to
the -1948 Agreement, see State Department, "PORTUGAL," Foreign Relations of the United
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947, vol. Ill, The British Commonwealth; Europe (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), 1019-1052. For the text of the 1948 Treaty-including the
technical annex with maps etc—see Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros," Acordo Tecnico de 2
Fevereiro J948" P.E.A., 459, and Ministerio de Negocios Estrangeiros," Acordo T6cnico, Anexo
ao Acordo, entre os Governos de Portugal e dos Estados Unidos da America, de 2 Fevereiro
1948" P E A., 459. A.M.N.E.
90North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty." under "e-library," under
"basic texts," under "Part II—Juridical texts and formal agreements," http://www.nato int
(accessed July 12 2010).
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Treaty stating, "Having in mind the doctrine and obligations arising from Articles 3
and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty...[the parties have] resolved, in accordance
with the preamble of that Treaty, to unite their efforts for the common defense
and for the preservation of peace and security.'91 Consequently, this treaty put
into practice the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty for collective defense,
while also fulfilling one of the stated objectives of American foreign policy toward
Portugal.
The Preamble to the Luso-American defense treaty also referred to
N.A.T.O. plans regarding the Azores vis a vis Portugal and the United States by
stating,
...according to the dispositions adopted within the Organization of the
North Atlantic Treaty, the area of the Azores directly interests Portugal
and the United States and that between them they must establish
agreements for the determination and utilization of the facilities which
it is possible for the first of the mentioned Governments to grant in
those islands.92

The 1951 defense agreement spelled out the terms in which the United States
would be allowed access to the facilities in the Azores while still preserving
Portuguese sovereignty in that region. The Treaty itself was only twelve articles
long. Article 1 went to the heart of the matter by stating, "The Portuguese
Government grants to the Government of the United States in case of war in
which they are involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty...the use of

91"Defense

Agreement Between Portugal and the United States of America," September
6, 1951, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 5, pt 3, 2264
92lbid.
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facilities in the Azores...."93 Since the United States had been using Azores'
facilities since 1944, wartime use of the facilities was not the problem.
Peacetime use of the facilities was.
In order to fit into N A.T.O. strategic planning, Portugal was compelled to
allow a foreign nation (the United States) to use her bases while still maintaining
her own sovereignty over those islands. Article 2 dealt directly with this issue by
delineating what role the United States would play in this theatre. It also set a
timeframe, for the proposed project. As such, Article 2 began,
The Governments of Portugal and the United States, in technical and
financial collaboration...will construct new installations and enlarge
and improve those existing... These preparatory works shall include,
among other things, the storage of oil, munitions, spare parts and any
supplies considered necessary for the purposes in view.94

Thus, with the aid of the United States, the facilities in the Azores would be
expanded. The timeframe for this expansion project was fixed from the date of
the signing of the current treaty until 1 September 1956.35
Article 3 was intended to put to rest the question of sovereignty that so
disturbed Portuguese sensibilities by stating, "All construction and materials
incorporated in the soil will from the start be considered property of the
Portuguese State without prejudice to the recognized right of the United States to
use such constructions and materials in time of war or in time of peace to the

33lbid.
94lbid , 2264-2265. Article 7 set the life of N.A.T.O. as the term under which this
stockpiling of materials and supplies at the Azores bases could continue.
95lbid.,

2265. Article 7 granted the United States six to twelve months for the complete
evacuation of the island facilities. See, Ibid., 2266.

268

extent and in the manner provided in this Agreement...." Accordingly, the base
itself was Portugal's. The United States simply had the use of the base until 1
September of 1956. However, this article further stipulated that, "the United
States may raze or remove for its account technical equipment belonging to it
and not necessary to the future functioning of the bases,"96 Hence, Portugal
owned the base, but not necessarily all of the equipment that the Americans
planned on bringing to it.
Articles four and five addressed the question of who would maintain the
bases after 1956. Subsequent to American withdrawal, Portugal would maintain
the facilities. To this end, the United States also agreed to, "provide facilities
necessary for the apprenticeship and training of Portuguese personnel having in
mind the perfect functioning of the bases...."97 This is not to say that after 1956
there would be no American presence on the bases. In time of peace, any
American personnel that remained after the 1956 withdrawal and pursuant to "the
plans established by...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization., [would act] under
Portuguese direction."98
Since there were two aerodromes in the Azores, one at Lagens and one
on Santa Maria, it was necessary for the diplomats to distinguish between the
uses of both. From September of 1951 until the completion of the American
evacuation, Article 6 specified that, "the transit of American military aircraft

96lbid.

97lbid.
98lbid.,

2266.

269

through the Lagens Airdrome...[would be] permitted and there will be authorized
on that base, during the same periods, the training of United States aviation and
naval personnel...."99 Thus, the Lagens airbase would not oniy be the site of an
expansion and improvements program, but also the location of a training center
for both American and Portuguese personnel. Meanwhile, access to Santa
Maria's airdrome was vaguely worded: "There will also be permitted the eventual
visit to the airdrome of Santa Maria of some military aircraft which will be
provided for by technical arrangements to be concluded between the Ministers of
Defense of the two Governments." Evidently, the real focus of the treaty was the
expansion and use of the Lagens airbase, whereas the Santa Maria airdrome
would serve in a dramatically reduced, supportive role.
Article 8 was, in effect, the U.S escape clause. It reflected the traditional
fear of the United States to enter into long-term bilateral military commitments. It
declared, "The Government of the United States may at any moment renounce
the concessions granted under the present Agreement in which case the
obligations assumed in this respect by the Portuguese Government will likewise
cease." At first glance, it seems to contradict the stated objectives of both the
J.C.S. and the State Department. Those objectives, however, were subject to
change based on the ever-changing geo-political world situation. This Article
allowed the United States the flexibility, if necessary, to shift focus.
The last quarter of the Agreement reflected the strategic importance of the
bases; its language went beyond the limits of a bilateral agreement. Articles 9

"Ibid.
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and 10 allowed N.A.T.O. use of the Azores in time of war and in time of peace—
although the latter, only after the American evacuation. This makes perfect
sense since the goal of the treaty was to incorporate Portugal into N.A.T.O.
defense plans. It was clear that long after the initial expansion of the bases, and
even after the expected American evacuation of the bases, the Azores would
remain central to N.A.T.O. defense plans in the North Atlantic. Article 9
reaffirmed Great Britain's position as Portugal's oldest ally, by extending to her
the right to "facilities analogous to those granted [the U.S.]."'00 Finally, Article 12
noted that on the effective date of this treaty (1 September 1951), the
"Agreement of February 2, 1948 will cease to have validity."101

Conclusion
The period between 1947 and 1951 was witness to a truly intense period
of diplomatic activity, most of it initiated by the United States of America. The
U.S. was driven to alter the future of Europe. Two worid wars had taught her that
she could no longer stand idle and hope that Europe could recover from the
devastation of modern warfare. Those five years saw the implementation of a
new world vision, an American vision in which economic stability and liberty
stood preeminent, while communist subversion was minimized and the Soviet
expansion was kept in check. In order to achieve those goals, the United States

100lbid.,

2266-67.

101lbid„
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spearheaded the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the
Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
The Marshall Plan brought economic stability and, later, growth to
Western Europe. This economic stability would go a long way in maintaining
political stability in the region for as President Truman pointed out, "The seeds of
totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in
the evil soil of poverty and strife."102 Secretary of State Marshall went one step
further when he avowed, "our policy is directed not against any country or
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should
be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence
of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."103 American
policymakers of the time acted upon the belief that economic stability and
political stability were inextricably linked, the consequence of both being the
extension of liberty.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a defensive treaty which

-

united 12 founding members behind one common goal—security in the region.
Consequently, if the Marshal! Plan moved Western Europe towards economic
stability (and by extension political stability), N.A.T.O steered it towards military
stability. With the establishment of N.A.T O. came joint planning and a joint

102Harry

S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The
Truman Doctrine," 180.
103Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947, "Remarks by the
Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, at Harvard University on June 5, 1947,"
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1947 sol. Ill, British Commonwealth:
Europe (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Lot 64 D563, Box 1 (20027),
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vision of defense, not only for Western Europe but also for the entire North
Atlantic region. Thus, with the-stroke ot.a pen, each of the N.A.T.O. members
was forced to view their role in the region from a common perspective rather than
a national perspective. At least among the twelve, the rule of law would govern
their military development and actions.
The Mutual Defense Assistance Program was the next logical course of
action. If the original twelve were going to act in concert, they would need to be
prepared to do so in terms of both military supplies and training. Each would be
expected to bring something to the defense of her neighbor. The cost of the war
and the differing levels of industrial development made it necessary for the
United States to render military assistance to these countries in order to bring the
entire group up to a certain level of preparedness. The final feature of this
integrated plan was the-completion of a series of Mutual Defense treaties that
reinforced the ties initiated in N.A.T.O. These bilateral treaties gave the United
States military access to bases throughout the Atlantic region. In the short term,
it allowed for the expansion of and improvement of these foreign bases in order
to accommodate American equipment and weapons. In the long term, these
bases were designed and equipped to serve the needs of N.A.T.O.
Portugal was party to each of these steps. Without a doubt, in terms of
Lusc-American relations this period was extraordinary. Portugal's decision to
participate in the Marshall Plan was a direct result of her national interests. For
Portugal, the Marshall Plan had in its design some of the commercial safeguards
and privileges inherent in the commercial aspect of the Angio-Portuguese

273

alliance. She now enjoyed Most-Favored-Nation Status with a variety of
countries including the United States, as well as guaranteed access to the
European market which the ERP created.
Portugal's sense of regional importance was further augmented by her
invitation to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a founding member.
Although not a member of the draft committee, Portugal was courted by the
United States. Her larger neighbor to her east, Spain, was not. Due to Franco's
and Spain's politics, and to the West's associating Franco's regime with
repression and failed fascism, Spain was left out of N.A.T.O. Portugal was
viewed by the U.S. and by the European community as distinct from Spain. Her
strategic significance came from her position in the Atlantic, including her Atlantic
islands and her African colonies.
More to the point, it was the Azores that gave Portugal her bargaining
power at this time in history. Negotiations for the continued use of the airbase in
Lagens were a constant foreign relations issue during the planning and
implementation of both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Even the issue of looted German gold—so important to the United
States—had to be sidestepped in order to ensure that the Lagens airbase would
become and remain home to several thousand American military personnel.
This base was seen as critical to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, later, to
N.A.T.O. defense planners. As such it was critical to not only have Portugal join
N.A.T.O., but also to give her the military assistance necessary to strengthen her
relatively weak defense forces. Consequently, the year 1951 witnessed first the
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Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Portugal and the United States,
followed shortly by the Mutual Defense Agreement. The former offered Portugal
an infusion of much needed modern weapons, military equipment and training.
The latter, ensured that the Lagens (Lajes) airbase would receive the necessary
improvements so that American and, later, other N.A.T.O. forces including the
newly American trained Portuguese aviators could use it
Portugal's Atlantic, African and Asian coionial possessions continued to
remain essential to her during these 'N.A.T.O" negotiations. Right from the start,
she insisted on clarification from both the United States and Great Britain
regarding the defense of her colonies. She was given ail assurance that even
those possessions outside of the North Atlantic region would be protected in
case of attack. It was only after these assurances were made that Portugal
would proceed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Portugal's national
interests demanded the security, preservation and defense of her colonies.
By 1951, Portugal had supplanted the commercial, political and military
assurances she had traditionally received through the Anglo-Portuguese alliance
with a series of American initiatives. In doing so, both nations had made great
strides towards extending their diplomatic relations. Not since the founding of the
American Republic, had both nations engaged in direct negotiations that went
beyond the issues of commerce and immigration. The Atlantic was their
common ground. Its stability, and defense their common interests This remains
true to this day
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION:
COMMON GROUND—THE ATLANTIC

The purposes of this dissertation were two-fold. The main purpose of this
dissertation was to offer an analysis of the paradigm shift in PortugueseAmerican relations from one of estranged tolerance to one of mutually beneficial
alliance within the timeframe of 1941 to 1951. This study also argued that in
order to understand the shift in Luso-American relations it was necessary to first
examine the Anglo-Portuguese alliance because Portugal's foreign policy was
rooted in the development of that alliance. Established with the Treaty of
Windsor in 1373, the essential elements of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance are
commercial, political, and military. In its six hundred year history, it has been
renewed numerous times and invoked repeatedly by both parties. By 1951, each
of these elements had been supplanted by a post-WWII American initiative—
specifically the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the
Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Consequently, the shift in Luso-American
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relations is not simply the case of Portugal--a small power-looking for protection
from or acquiescing to the will of the United States--a big power. It is the result of
Portuguese policy-makers realizing the limits of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in
fulfilling Portugal's national interests and making a series of decisions that then
resulted in Portugal meeting her postwar goals
The Anglo-Portuguese alliance served Great Britain and Portugal well.
Portugal's alliance with Great Britain seemed inevitable given their common
geographic position along the Atlantic Ocean -both located along the western
fringe of Europe. From the onset this position facilitated contact and, in
particular, commercial exchange. It is clear that geographic location played a
key role in the development of the Portuguese mindset. The long-standing
dynastic rivalries between England and France, and Portugal and Castile,
contributed to the development of close military ties. Consequently, although
Portugal often sought to remain apart from European conflicts, more often than
not her alliance to Great Britain made her a pivotal figure in Europe's most
significant wars—the Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, and the War of
Spanish Succession. Portugal's participation in these events was essential to
her national development.
Before 1810, Portugal's long-standing association with Great Britain
satisfied her foreign policy needs. The treaties, the marriages, the military action,
and even the commercial ties all served to facilitate Portugal's foreign policy
goals. At several critical moments in her history, Portugal's relationship with

England had secured for her both political legitimacy, international status and the
protection of colonial empire—for example, the Treaty of 1661.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conflicting interests in
Africa and grossly unequal international standing strained this long-standing
alliance to the breaking point. This situation was particularly true from 1810 to
1910, from the Peninsular Wars to the establishment of Portugal's First Republic.
Great Britain's prominence in Portuguese politics, both domestic and foreign,
was such that this century has at times been referred to in Portuguese history as
the "English Century." In an encyclopedic article published in 1963, Marcello
Caetano went so far as to call Portugal a protectorate of England during this
period. Though ideologically disparate, the governments of both the First and the
Second Republic worked diligently to free themselves of this dependence.
During the Twentieth Century World Wars, Portugal reasserted herself as a
valued partner in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, not simply a weak dependent.
Indeed, it was only by the middle of the twentieth century that a new pattern
emerged based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and once again mutual
enemies.
Initially, relations between Portugal and the United States had everything
to do with geography and commerce. The Atlantic Ocean served as a conduit for
early contact between the two nations. America's trade network developed on
the Atlantic Ocean and Portugal's Atlantic islands were an important part of that
network. During the period of the Early Republic relations between the United
States were stable. Whenever possible, Portugal assisted in the protection of
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American merchant shipping. Yet, the eighteenth century did not witness an
expansion of the diplomatic ties in large measure because of each nation's
political ideology. America was a republic which, particularly in the western
hemisphere, wanted to spread the ideal of liberty. Portugal, on the other hand,
was a colonial power with a vast territorial possession in South America-Brazil.
Indeed, Portugal recognized that spark of republican liberty in the region as a
threat to her holdings. These differing political perspectives as well as differing
commercial interests shaped the extent of their diplomatic relations and kept
them at arm's length.
The tumultuous events of the early nineteenth century set the stage for the
steady decline in Portuguese-American relations. The Napoleonic invasions of
the Iberian Peninsula, the transfer of the seat of power from Lisbon to Rio de
Janeiro, the elevation of Brazil from colony to kingdom, the forced return of the
Portuguese monarchy to Lisbon as a constitutional monarchy, Brazilian
independence, and the on-going conflict between Portugal (later Brazil) and
Spain (later Buenos Ayres) over Montevideo and the Banda Oriental of the Plata
River—all these events occurred within the first quarter of the nineteenth century
and served to detract from the friendly development of Portuguese-American
relations. Concurrently, in the United States, the consequences of certain
actions taken during the War of 1812 overshadowed the goodwill that two
decades of positive relations had created. One example of such an unfortunate
event was the sinking of the General Armstrong in 1814 by British warships while
moored in Horta. The inability„of Portugal to protect foreign vessels in her own
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ports coupled with her consequent unwillingness to make reparations left the
American public, and her political representatives, with a dim view of the
Portuguese.
This opinion did not alter with the radical events of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. While the United States had spent the better part of
the nineteenth century focused on continental expansion, Portugal was focused
on maintaining her own sovereignty and that of her colonial empire. Coming, as
it did, on the heels of a regicide, American policymakers speculated whether or
not Portugal's First Republic could be accepted as a legitimate government.
Therefore, even though Portugal had joined that exclusive club of republics, it
was not enough to gain the confidence of America.
Portugal's decision to participate in the Great War was as much a result of
her desire for international recognition as her need to preserve her African
colonies. After Great Britain invoked the alliance, Portugal entered the war. She
fought in Flanders and in Africa. At the Portuguese tomb of the unknown soldier,
visitors today can view the huge wooden cross that her soldiers carried onto the
battlefields of Flanders. Riddled with bullets, it bears silent witness to Portugal's
wartime sacrifices.
When faced with the prospects of a Second World War, Portuguese
officials, particularly Salazar, took steps early on to evaluate the political situation
and plan Portugal's wartime position. Her wartime goals reflected her national
interests. First, Portugal hoped to uphold continental sovereignty. Second, she
wished to maintain Iberian neutrality. Lastly, Portugal wanted to protect her
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colonies. They executed this plan while in continuous collaboration with Great
Britain and the United States. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance facilitated this
coordination in part because it is a defensive alliance which does not oblige
either party to act automatically. It must be invoked. Consequently, Portugal
was able to maintain her neutrality even after the air raids of London began.
Prior to the German invasion of Poland, Great Britain and Portugal had
decided that the best plan of action for the good of the alliance was Portuguese
neutrality. Moreover, in line with British thinking, Portugal was to draw Spain into
the circle of neutrals. This led to the Iberian Pact, followed by the Protocol which
secured Iberian neutrality for the duration of the war in Europe. In the face of
mounting pressure from German submarine hunting in the Atlantic, Great Britain
asked for the creation of a new airbase in Lagens; Terceira. Portugal obliged.
Once built, Great Britain requested the use of it. After a relatively short period of
negotiation, Great Britain was granted command of the airbase as well as access
to a variety of other facilities in the Azores. Portugal was at ease with each of
these decisions because these military considerations fell within the parameters
of the "special relationship" that she shared with Great Britain. This base closed
the air gap in the Atlantic. Its contemporary and future significance was
understood by both the British and the American Chiefs of Staff. Finally, in this
early phase of the war Portugal provided wolfram to Great Britain, the United
States and Germany. She adroitly organized the sale of wolfram to the
advantage of the Allies. The Germans had to pay in cash or kind whereas the
British paid on credit. By the time of the wolfram embargo of 1944, Germany had
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only received delivery of a third of the total wolfram supply. This was a definite
blow to the German military-industrial complex.
Thus, as a neutral, Portugal had collaborated with the Allies in a series of
actions that rendered positive results for the Allied cause. In effect, the AngloPortuguese alliance had served to further the interests cf the Allies by giving
Portugal the legal out she so desperately clung to when harassed by the
Germans. This same alliance, however, had failed the Portuguese. More to the
point, the loss of Portuguese Timor to Japanese forces in February of 1942 was
a direct failure on the part of the British. Consequently, by 1944 Portugal was
faced with a simple reality. From 1939 to 1944, Portugal had done her part to
meet the needs of British.
Yet, from the start the British were unable to do the same. Again,
Portuguese wartime goals were straightforward: continental sovereignty; Iberian
neutrality; and preservation of empire. The 1939 British Military Mission had
unequivocally concluded that they could not provide ground forces for the
protection of continental Portugal in the event of war. Thus, in terms of British
support, the first of Portugal's wartime goals was off the table before the war had
even begun. Worse yet, the bungled Australian-Dutch operation in the Pacific
theater in December of 1941 led to the Japanese attack on Portuguese Timor.
The Portuguese were furious with Britain for several reasons. First, as a
Commonwealth nation, Australia was presumed to act in close coordination with
Great Britain. Second, earlier talks between Portugal and Great Britain indicated
that something was about to happen in Timor, yet Portugal was kept in the dark
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by her oldest ally. Finally, beside the obvious and needless loss of life and
property in Portuguese Timor, a vital Portuguese wartime goal was
compromised. This event was the catalyst for the shift in Luso-American
relations.
For the Americans, this shift in perspective really began a year earlier
with the signing of 1943 Accord for use of the Lagens airbase. Much to the
surprise of the Americans that document made no mention of their use of the
base. As with the negotiations regarding Iberian neutrality and the wolfram
issue, the Americans had been content to allow the British to run the
negotiations, in doing so they were trying to respect the six hundred year history
of diplomatic relations between the Portuguese and the British. It was now clear,
particularly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that this simply would not work.
Concurrently, George Kennan, on staff at the American embassy in Lisbon, had
come to the same conclusion. While Kennan worked to better diplomatic
relations between the United States and Portugal and also secure American use
rights at Lagens, Salazar seized this opportunity to bring the issue of Portuguese
Timor to the forefront.
Ambassador Norweb was able to conclude those negotiations
regarding use rights at Lagens on New Years Eve in 1943. After their
conclusion, he immediately initiated negotiations for the construction of yet
another aerodrome in the Azores on the island of Santa Maria. The vital
difference in these talks is that they were direct Luso-American negotiations.
Salazar insisted that the cornerstone of these talks be Portuguese participation in

the liberation of Portuguese Timor. The slow start to these talks seemed to stem
from the fact that there was no political foundation from which to build this
relationship. Instead, long talks between Kennan and Salazar, and later Norweb
and Salazar, built a sense of mutual trust and understanding between these men
where there had been none before. Ultimately, each party received exactly what
they hoped for. Portugal, Great Britain and the United States simultaneously
released statements to the effect that Portugal would in some way participate in
the liberation of Portuguese Timor, and to that end an airbase would be
constructed on the island of Santa Maria under the command of the United
States.
At the end of the Second World War, the Portuguese and the British were
still allies. There was no breech in diplomatic relations over the Timor incident
There was, however, a clear change in the world arena. The United States and
the Soviet Union had emerged from World War II with differing world
perspectives. The United States had two primary postwar goals. First, they
wanted to help rebuild the European economy. Second, they wanted to keep the
Soviet Union in check. In order to meet these goals the United States fostered
three initiatives: the Marshall Plan; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Ironically, these plans, once applied in
joint cooperation with Portugal, met the same elements as that of the old AngloPortuguese alliance—economic, political, and military.
The thought behind Marshall Plan funding in Europe was to rebuild the
countries of Europe—friend and foe alike—to strengthen not only the economic
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fabric of Europe, but aiso the political fabric. The reconstruction of the European
economy was important for the American economy because of the strong
commercial and banking ties between the two. Beyond these concerns,
however, the economies of these countries were meant to be reconstructed so
that the citizens of these countries would not fall prey to the tyranny of
communism through acts of subversive revolution.
Portuguese participation in the Marshall Plan was limited in that they did
not to apply for funds in the first year, but still participated as members of the
O.E.E.C. The economic network that the Marshall Plan erected in Europe
created a kind of commodities exchange system. In order for Portugal to trade in
Europe she needed to participate in the Marshall Plan. In the second year of the
plan she also received funds. What this did for Portugal was that it gave her
commercial entrance into the European market from which she would have been
excluded.
The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a marked
evolutionary leap in American diplomatic thought. For the first time in American
history, American politicians were willing to agree to a defensive alliance with not
one but a variety of European powers. The United States now extended her
security interests far beyond the western hemisphere to include Western Europe
and the North Atlantic region. For Portugal, being a founding member of
N.A.T.O. also satisfied one of her postwar goals. With the stroke of a pen, her
political needs on an international level were completely safeguarded.
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Finally, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program was meant to facilitate
the coordinated efforts of N.A.T.O. The weapons and training that the United
States provided was to be used only for the purposes of meeting N.A.T.O, goals,
The M.D.A.P. between Portugal and the United States gave Portugal the military
support she had only dreamed of receiving from Great Britain. These planes and
munitions were all top of the line. They had to be because again this was an
extension of N.A.T.O goals. Each of the member states had to be at a certain
minimal level of preparedness. Portuguese servicemen also received training
from their American counterparts.
By 1951, Portugal had supplanted the commercial, political and military
assurances she had traditionally received through the Anglo-Portuguese alliance
with a series of American initiatives. Portugal and the United States had made
great strides towards extending their diplomatic relations Not since the founding
of the American Republic, had both nations engaged in direct negotiations that
went beyond the issues of commerce and immigration.
The foreign policy of the New State was a success for Portugal throughout
most of the 1950s. Portugal's membership in N.A.T.O. meant that military aid in
terms of both arms and training would continue with dramatic results for
Portugal's armed forces. This was important for Portugal in terms of her own
military readiness, and all the more so later when her African colonies were in
open rebellion. Domestically, this aid was also important for the Salazar regime
because it allowed the New State to placate the Armed Forces. Without their
continued support, the regime's future would have been uncertain or seriously
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threatened. The critical nature of the career military's support of the dictatorship
was demonstrated in the contentious 1958 Presidential elections campaign when
Air Force General Humberto Delgado ran in opposition to the regime's candidate
but was defeated in a rigged election. Essential to the defeat and eventual exile
of Delgado was the career military support for the regime.
In December 1955, with American support, Portugal was finally admitted
to the United Nations. Portugal's admission to the United Nations had complex
consequences. On the one hand, the regime's opposition was unhappy about
the international recognition United Nations membership signified for a Salazardominated Portugal. On the other hand, Portugal's membership in the United
Nations exposed Portuguese rule over its African and Asian colonies to greater
anti-colonial pressures which now could be brought to bear directly by the Soviet
bloc and by the newly independent Asian and African members in the United
Nation's session.
This period of goodwill began to change after 1954-55, when newly
independent India applied great pressure to try to force Portugal to de-colonize
"Portuguese India." Ironically, the same issue that had strained the AngloPortuguese alliance became the key bone of contention between Portugal and
the United States. Colonialism or in this case, decolonization was the main issue
of divergence for these two nations, reaching its peak in the 1960s. Beginning in
1958 Portugal began sending its newly trained officers off to anti-guerilla training
camps. These camps were not in Great Britain, nor were they in the United
States. Instead, they were in countries like Belgium and France. These nations,
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like Portugal, had a vested interest in maintaining their overseas empires and
fighting anti-colonial insurgents, particularly in Africa. Nevertheless, in 1959 both
Belgium and France had decided to de-colonize their tropicai African colonies,
while France continued to fight a colonial war in their North African colony of
Algeria.
While President John F. Kennedy embraced the ideal of self-determination
as defined by the United Nations, Prime Minister Salazar rejected it and, instead,
mounted armed resistance to it in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.
African insurgencies began in Angola (1961), Guinea-Bissau (1963), and
Mozambique (1964). Kennedy first tried offering aid, then political pressure to
force Portugal to begin decolonization; neither caused Salazar to budge on the
issue of empire For his part Salazar, angered by what he viewed as American
interloping in Portuguese business, refused to enter into serious negotiations to
extend American base rights in Lagens after 1962. At the very last moment,
Salazar granted American forces the right to remain until negotiations were
concluded.
After the anti-colonial insurgencies began both the United States and the
Soviet Union provided support to various African nationalist parties. As time
passed this situation became all the more convoluted as the war in Vietnam led
American officials to turn a blind eye to the use of N.A.T.O. trained Portuguese
troops and arms being used to fight the anti-coloniai insurgents in Portuguese
Africa. As of the April 25, 1974 coup and Revolution, this war had lasted thirteen
years. Luso-American relations had reached their nadir in the early years of the
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Kennedy administration but beginning in late 1962 in United Nations' voting, the
United States took care not to oppose Portugal openly on many colonial issues
due to the need for continued American access to the Azores bases.
Base talks were not resumed until 1969, and were concluded only in 1971.
By that time Richard M. Nixon was President and now sought to end the Vietnam
War. In 1968 an ailing Prime Minister Salazar was replaced by Marcello
Caetano. Portugal confronted yet another crisis of empire yet Caetano wanted to
resume talks with the United States. Unlike Salazar, he wanted economic aid
from the United States and felt that the base talks were a good point of departure
for those negotiations.
Regardless of the increased diplomatic tension between Portugal and the
United States over the issue of Portuguese decolonization, commerce and
immigration continued between the two countries. Portuguese exports to the
United States were small—a trend that remained true even after the end of the
Estado Novo. Portuguese imports from the United States, particularly
agricultural products, remained steady.
In 1990 Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island summarized LusoAmerican relations in these terms:
Today, Portugal and the United States, though greatly different in size,
stand fully allied, joined by a transatlantic bond of common values and
shared principle, a bond made all the stronger by the wonderfully
constructive role that is played out by the Portuguese-American
community. I am proud to regard myself as an honorary member of
that community and as a dedicated friend of Portugal.'

1Mario Soares and Claiborne Pell, "Introduction: Portugal's Democracy," in Portugal:
Ancient Country, Young Democracy, edited by Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel
(Washington, D.C.: The Wilson center Press, 1990), 8.
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The people of Massachusetts and Rhode Island share a special bond with
Portugal and, in particular, with the Azorean archipelago. Early trade and
whaling connections were strengthened during the first wave of Portuguese
immigration, 1890-1920, when these communities played host to tens of
thousands of Azorean immigrants. Due to strict immigration laws in the United
States after 1921, this immigration stream decreased to a mere trickle. It was not
until the late 1950s that this pattern would change.
Portuguese immigration to the United States began increasing after
passage of the Azorean Refugee Act of 1958. Sponsored by Senators John O.
Pastore of Rhode Island and John F Kennedy of Massachusetts, this legislation
was initiated after a devastating volcanic eruption on the island of Faial caused
extensive damage. It allowed some 1500 new non-quota visas to be issued to
heads of families in Faial to immigrate to the United States. This was then
followed by the Azorean Refugee Act of 1960 which allowed another 2,000 non
quota visas to be issued. These Acts resulted in the arrival of nearly twenty
thousands new Portuguese immigrants to the United States, most of whom took
up residence in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. On the heals of the 1960 Act
there followed a revision of the immigration law of the United States, which
resulted in a markedly increased number of Portuguese immigrants to the United
States, particularly from the Azores. This number—over 226,000 as of 1990has now nearly matched that of the first wave, 1890-1920.2

2Jerry R. Williams, In Pursuit of Their Dreams: A History of Azorean Immigration to the
United States (Dartmouth, MA: University of Massachusetts, 2005), 110-111.
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The Azorean Refugee Acts of 1958 and 1960 were beneficial to the
Portuguese government in the short term for obvious humanitarian reasons.
Nevertheless, in the iong term these Acts also provided these islands with quite
tangible relief from years of overpopulation and underdevelopment. Meanwhile,
as a whole the Portuguese economy benefitted from the constant, increasing
flow of remittances.
In the end, Salazar was able to follow through on most but not all of his
postwar goals. Portugal's participation in the Marshall Plan allowed it access to
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Portuguese trade in the
European market has been much more significant to its economy than trade with
the United States. European investment in Portugal has also been markedly
more significant than American investment in Portugal.
In terms of military support, Portugal has reaped millions in grants and
loans from the United States. Portugal's participation in the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program, the Military Assistance Program, and a variety of other
programs over the years has not only supplied modern arms to Portugal but, just
as significantly, has trained her armed forces. Since the 1983 base agreement,
Portugal has also received substantial economic aid. Part of that aid went
towards the creation of the Luso-American Development Foundation which has
fostered cultural exchanges between Portugal and the United States.
The one key failure of the Salazar regime in terms of meeting its postwar
foreign policy goals was its inability to maintain the empire. Entrance into the
United Nations did nothing to help Portugal secure her African or Asian colonies.
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Renaming the colonies "overseas provinces" did nothing to placate U. N. critics
of Portuguese overseas holdings. Beginning in 1954-1955, a newly independent
India began supporting a campaign of passive resistance in Portuguese India.
By and large this method failed until, in 1961, the Indian army invaded and
conquered Goa, Damao, and Diu. Naturally, Portugal turned for help to her
oldest ally, Great Britain, but she refused. India was part of the British
Commonwealth and, therefore, Britain feit she could not render aid to Portugal.
Although Salazar never recognized the legality of Indian action, these colonies
were lost.
When the anti-colonial insurgencies began in Portuguese Africa, Portugal
could not count on her N.A.T.O. membership to help her, as this was an internal
issue not an external threat. Nor could Portugal expect help from the very
agency that was promoting global decolonization, the United Nations. As
mentioned above American covert action in Africa only served to further muddy
the waters for Portugal. Thus, in Africa, Portugal fought a long, complicated and
costly colonial war without an ally. Ironically, it is the consequences of these
colonial wars that resulted in the coup that ended the New State regime.
The coup that took place in April of 1974, beginning the Carnation
Revolution, resulted in a new system of government, new policies and a new
constitution for Portugal. Between September 1974 (Guinea-Bissau), and
November 1975 (Cape Verdes, S. Tome/Principe, Mozambique and Angola),
Portugal had de-colonized its African territories. The new democratic regime
continued Portugal's ties within N.A.T.O. and improved relations with the United
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States. With Portuguese assent, American armed forces under N.A.T.O., largely
Air Force and Navy, have maintained their presence in the Azores to this day.
These good relations both prior to and after the Carnation Revolution have
played a significant role in American foreign policy as well. This is particularly
true in two instances in which Portugal has allowed American use of the Lagens
base at two decisive moments. First, in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War as
Americans gave critical aid to the Israeli armed forces. Second, in 2001 when
the United States began its bombing raids over Afghanistan.
At the start of the Second World War, the decision to move away from a
reliance on the guarantees inherent in the 600 year old Anglo-Portuguese
alliance were well founded. While, British political, military and commercial
strength was declining, Portugal stili needed the assurances that she traditionally
gained this alliance. Concurrently, the United States was emerging as a global
power. By participating in key American initiatives, Portugal strengthened its
diplomatic ties with the United States while also gaining those political, military,
and commercial assurances that it recognized as fundamental to its survival.
What the Marshall Plan rendered Portugal was the right to Most-Favored-Nation
status with a number of European powers as well as the United States. This
commercial relationship was necessary to Portugal's postwar economy. Being a
founding member of N.A.T.O. offered Portugal greater international standing,
recognition of her empire, and a strong defensive alliance. Finally, the M.D.A.P.
increased Portugal's military capacity in every sense and at levels that the British
would never have been able to sustain.
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